

VOLUME X  
Third issue  
31 March

RCMW  
Number 40

*U.S.*  
**THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL**  
*A* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas *Library*




## Review of Current Military Writings

---

March 1931

---

1930-1931  
Third Quarter



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

RECEIVED

MAY 11 1931

DIVISION OF DOCUMENTS

## REVIEW OF CURRENT MILITARY WRITINGS

Volume X

March 1931

Whole Number 40

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY THE  
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL  
LIBRARY

### CONTENTS

	Page
PART I—BOOK REVIEWS.....	5
Section 1—Classified Contents.....	7
Section 2—Book Reviews.....	11
PART II—PERIODICAL LITERATURE.....	61
Section 3—Directory to Catalog of Periodical Articles.....	63
Section 4—Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles.....	65
Section 5—Subject Index to Catalog of Periodical Articles.....	83
Section 6—Abstracts of Foreign-language Articles.....	107

The use of this School periodical will be greatly facilitated by consulting the CLASSIFIED CONTENTS of book reviews (page 7) and by reading the EXPLANATION prefacing PART II (page 61).

THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL PRESS  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

1151—6-6-31—500

*D. M. L. Dec. 27, 1931.*





Part I  
**BOOK REVIEWS**

---


CONTENTS	Page
Explanation.....	5
Section 1—Classified Contents.....	7
Section 2—Book Reviews.....	11

---

**EXPLANATION**

PART I contains reviews of the principal books recently accessioned which are of technical or professional interest. Accompanied by the table of contents of the book under consideration, each review purposes to indicate, "... in general terms what the prospective reader may expect to find in the subject matter and the degree of authoritativeness of the contents; it cites any valuable information or conclusions presented, together with such comments of the reviewer as may be helpful. The objective is that the review determine, for one engaged in study, research, or cultural reading, whether the volume in question will contribute to the end sought" (*Instruction Circular No. 1*). The publication of these reviews is designed to aid the School personnel in selecting from the Library accessions those works which will best suit their purposes. A reference to Section 1—Classified Contents, will enable the reader to choose for investigation such books as promise to be of interest.

The works reviewed in the RCMW by no means exhaust the books and documents received by the Library, many of which—though of considerable merit and interest—cannot be scheduled for review by instructors because of pressure of other work. The complete list of accessions is published at intervals in the LIBRARY BULLETIN.



# Section 1

## CLASSIFIED CONTENTS

to

### Book Reviews

General Arrangement.—Book reviews are arranged in sequence of classification symbols; this results in grouping books upon a particular subject.

Military Classification	
M 1 NATIONAL FORCES	Page
M 103 NATIONAL DEFENSE	
Debeney: <i>Sur la securite militaire de la France</i> .....	11
M 105 NATIONAL CONDUCT OF WAR	
Cordonnier: <i>Si Bonaparte . . . ? Strategie et Politique en liaison</i> .....	11
M 2 ARMIES OF THE WORLD	
M 207 MILITARY LAW MARTIAL LAW	
Fairman: <i>The law of martial rule</i> .....	15
M 4 ARMS AND SERVICES	
M 409 AIR ARM	
Air annual of the British Empire, 1930. Vol. II.....	16
M 5 FIELD FORCES	
M 500 JOINT FORCES	
Aston: <i>Letters on amphibious wars</i> .....	17
M 501 ART AND CONDUCT OF WAR	
Serrigny: <i>Reflexions sur l'Art la Guerre</i> .....	18
M 506 LARGE UNITS	
Field Service Regulations	
Eady: <i>Historical illustrations to field service regulations, "Operations," 1929</i> ....	18
M 9 MILITARY HISTORY BIOGRAPHY	
M 904 GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY	
Austin: <i>A saga of the sword</i> .....	19
M 937 ROME	
Seullard: <i>Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War</i> .....	19
M 9403 WORLD WAR	
B—Special topics Fiction Personal narratives	
MacMunn: <i>The King's pawns</i> .....	20
Jerrold: <i>The lie about the War. A note on some contemporary war books</i> .....	20
Sherriff: <i>Journey's end. A novel</i> .....	21
Wendler: <i>Soldiers' women. (Translation from the German)</i> .....	21
Nason: <i>A corporal once</i> .....	22
Boyd: <i>Salute of guns</i> .....	22
Carstairs: <i>A generation missing</i> .....	22
Harrison & Cartwright: <i>Within four walls</i> .....	23
Kelly: <i>39 months with the "Tigers," 1915-1918</i> .....	23
Campagne: <i>Le Chemin des Crois 1914-1918</i> .....	24
Nadel: <i>Down the red lane. (Translation from the French)</i> .....	24
C—Civil History	
Gooch & Temperley: <i>British documents on the origins of the War, 1898-1914.</i> Vol. VI: Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12.....	24
Gibbs: <i>Since then. The disturbing story of the world at peace</i> .....	25
Muir: <i>Political consequences of the Great War</i> .....	26

D—Allied Conduct of the War	
Grant: <b>America's part in the Supreme War Council during the World War</b> .....	27
E—General Military History Commanders	
Germain: <b>The Kitchener armies.</b> The story of national achievement.....	27
M: <b>La Verite sur la Guerre 1914-1918</b> .....	27
Mayer: <b>Nos Chefs de 1914.</b> Souvenirs personnels et essais de psychologie militaire.....	28
Rockwell: <b>American fighters in the Foreign Legion, 1914-1918</b> .....	29
G—Arms and Services	
Infantry	
Butts: <b>The keypoint of the Marne and its defense by the 30th Infantry</b> .....	30
Tanks	
Woolnough: <b>A brief history of the Royal Tank Corps</b> .....	30
H—Military conduct of the War in the field	
Bourget: <b>Si Napoleon en 1914</b> .....	30
Aston: <b>Secret service</b> .....	31
Hosse: <b>Die englisch-belgischen Aufmarschpläne gegen Deutschland vor dem Weltkriege</b> .....	32
Herbillon: <b>Du General en Chef au Gouvernement.</b> Souvenirs d'un officier de liaison pendant la guerre mondiale.....	32
J—Campaigns and battles	
Mordacq: <b>Pouvait-on signer l'armistice a Berlin?</b> .....	32
Palat: <b>La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental.</b> Tome XII: L'Annee d'angoisse, 1917.....	33
Bircher: <b>Die Schlacht bei Etche-Virton am 22. August 1914</b> .....	34
Bloem: <b>The advance from Mons, 1914</b> .....	34
Spears: <b>Liaison, 1914.</b> A narrative of the great retreat.....	35
Documents allemands sur la bataille de la Marne.....	40
Larcher: <b>La grande guerre dans les Balkans, direction de la guerre</b> .....	41
Gorges: <b>The Great War in West Africa</b> .....	42
M 942 GREAT BRITAIN MILITARY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY	
Rawson: <b>Earl Beatty, admiral of the fleet, Viscount Borodale and Baron Beatty of the North Sea and of Brooksby</b> .....	42
Churchill: <b>A roving commission; my early life</b> .....	43
MacMunn: <b>Behind the scenes in many wars.</b> Being the military reminiscences of Lieut-General Sir George MacMunn.....	44
M 943 GERMANY	
Seeckt: <b>Thoughts of a soldier.</b> (Translation from the German).....	46
M 944 FRANCE	
D'Auvergne: <b>The prodigious marshal.</b> Being the life and extraordinary adventures of Maurice de Saxe, Marshal of France.....	46
M 946 SPAIN Peninsular War	
Oman: <b>A history of the Peninsular War.</b> Vol. VII: August 1813-April 14, 1814.....	47
M 956 TURKEY War with Greece (1919-1922)	
Andrew: <b>Towards disaster.</b> The Greek Army in Asia Minor in 1921.....	47
M 964 MOROCCO	
Joubert: <b>Lettres du Maroc.</b> L'Offensive dans le Riff, 1925. Le Tache de Taza.....	47
M 973 UNITED STATES Biography	
Lejeune: <b>The reminiscences of a Marine</b> .....	48
General Classification	
1 PHILOSOPHY	
150 PSYCHOLOGY	
Pitkin: <b>The psychology of achievement</b> .....	49
3 SOCIOLOGY	
Douglas: <b>Good-bye to western culture.</b> Some footnotes on East and West.....	50
312 POPULATION	
Wilkinson: <b>The world's population problems and a white Australia</b> .....	51

## Book Reviews—Classified Contents

327 FOREIGN RELATIONS	
Fischer: <b>The Soviets in world affairs</b> .....	51
Interpretations of American foreign policy.....	52
Survey of American foreign relations, 1930.....	52
Graham: <b>Britain and America</b> .....	53
330 ECONOMICS	
Carman: <b>Social and economic history of the United States</b> . Vol. I: From handicraft to factory, 1500-1820.....	53
Flügel & Faulkner: <b>Readings in the economic and social history of the United States</b> .....	53
Lewisohn, Draper, Commons & Lescoghier: <b>Can business prevent unemployment?</b> .....	54
Feis: <b>Europe, the world's banker, 1870-1914</b> .....	54
342 US CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY	
Beard: <b>The American leviathan; the republic in the machine age</b> .....	55
350 ADMINISTRATION	
Vassilyev: <b>The Ochrana</b> . The Russian secret police.....	55
Cain: <b>Our government</b> .....	56
4 PHILOLOGY LANGUAGE	
Baeza: <b>Brighter Spanish</b> .....	56
9 HISTORY BIOGRAPHY GEOGRAPHY	
917.3 UNITED STATES TRAVEL AND DESCRIPTION	
Villar: <b>America sajona</b> .....	57
943 GERMANY HISTORY	
Koch-Weser: <b>Germany in the post-war world</b> . (Translation from the German).....	57
947 RUSSIA HISTORY	
Chamberlin: <b>Soviet Russia</b> . A living record and a history.....	58
Dillon: <b>Russia; To-day and yesterday</b> . An impartial view of Soviet Russia.....	58
973 UNITED STATES BIOGRAPHY HISTORY	
Leach: <b>That man Dawes</b> .....	59
Malin: <b>The United States after the World War</b> .....	59



Section 2  
BOOK REVIEWS

MILITARY

Debeney, General.—**Sur la securite militaire de la France.** [The military security of France.] Paris, 1930. M 103-C.44-D

CONTENTS: Preface. Armee Nationale ou Armee de metier?: L'armee de metier; L'armee speciale; Les deux armees; Armee d'outre-mer; Armee Nationale; Augmentation du materiel; Reduction du temps de service; Les "conditions prealables"; La forme de l'armee moderne; La couverture; Le grand ressort; La guerre courte; Amelioration du materiel; Valeur des unites; L'ides directrice; Epilogue. L'armee de 1870 et les reserves instruites; L'armee de 1870; Campagne de Crimée; Campagne d'Italie; Les lois du marechal Niel; Les reserves instruites. La question budgetaire; Politique de materiel et politique d'effectifs. Le probleme de la securite et de la reduction des armements devant la societe des nations; Bases juridiques d'une limitation et reduction des armements; Evolution du probleme au sein de la societe des nations; Etat actuel de la question.

*Reviewed by J. H. VAN VLIET*

The author discusses the results that various treaties since the World War will have on French security. He weighs the capabilities of a small regular army, reinforced by an organized reserve and comparing what France has and what Germany is authorized to have, including what he thinks Germany is really doing.

The book brings out various principles of national and military security, using present French and German conditions as an example and shows the length of time required to make reserves efficient. It discusses the French "National Defense Act" and stresses the need of industrial plans that will provide war munitions on a large scale. General Debeney emphasizes a policy for offensive action rather than the defensive.

There is reviewed the French military system prior to and including 1870, showing the failure of that system to provide men and supplies required. In a brief discussion of the League of Nations disarmament scheme, the author claims that Germany is profiting thereby and France and the other nations are losing out.

Cordonnier, General.—**Si Bonaparte . . . ? Strategie et Politique en liaison.** [If Bonaparte . . . ? Strategy and politics in liaison.] Paris, 1930. M 105-C.44-A

CONTENTS: Preface; Avant-propos. L'Europe avide de guerre a la fin du XVIIIe siecle; Politique des frontieres et l'autre politique; Strategies de Louis XIV et de Napoleon; Louis XIV conducteur de guerre; Louis XIV, Turenne, Villars; Frederic II et la strategie a buts limites; Bonaparte Premier Consul; L'armee de reserve; Le passage des Alpes; Le Premier Consul en Italie; Il reste a vaincre; Conclusion; Croquis.

*Reviewed by W. F. SAFFORD*

The object of the book is to conduct the reader through three different gardens: first, the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV; second, the absolute monarchy of Frederick II; and third, the Republic before the political authority of Bonaparte was well assured.

The sources, from which the author derives his information, are apparently, the best obtainable. But, as he himself remarks, many of these sources are the memoirs of different people, written years after the events, viewed in the light of later occurrences and corrected accordingly. Inasmuch as Napoleon himself wrote studies of the military campaigns of Louis XIV and Frederick II we have his comments thereon. But in these it must be noted that the policy of Napoleon was quite different from that of Louis XIV, just as it was different from that of Frederick II.

"Find the enemy's army and destroy it" is a maxim of Napoleon in which is contained modern strategy. However, such an axiom is modified

by the situation and politics shape the situation. Louis XIV used his army only when forced to do so. He only fought to drive off the enemy's army. Frederick II operated in much the same way, but avoided wars by agreements with other countries. Napoleon, however, imposed the rule of searching for the enemy's army—not only to repulse it from the frontiers, but to destroy it. This rule has become a dogma and has been adopted blindly. We must, however, envisage the circumstances under which it was conceived; and we must study with an open mind to see how situations modify the rule. The officer who studies the wars of the past does not do it like a young painter who learns his art in copying the works of the masters; he gathers principles to transpose in a setting extremely different. An officer is not apt at war if he has not a fecund imagination made wise by study.

In the conduct of a war one must distinguish which part is political and which is strategical. He who studies Napoleonic strategy finds this distinction difficult, since the same man commands in both. It was he alone who decided whether politics or strategy governed as to the theaters of operations and as to the objectives. Statesmen do not spend their time in exploring the field of politics in relation to the conduct of armies. And the military, in their study of strategy, neglect the politics. The chess board of strategy changes its aspect when politics modify the plays. In time of war it is too late for statesmen to learn strategy and for the military to learn the politics involved. All strategy must, therefore, be studied in the light of politics. "Politics is the mistress, the army is her servant."

In olden times the war chiefs—kings, dukes, counts and other nobles—were also political chiefs. There was absolute unity of politics and strategy, even with "division of work," under Louis XIV and under Frederick II (and also after Napoleon became Emperor, although not before) because they were the heads of their states politically and were obeyed by their army commanders.

What would Bonaparte's strategy have been had he been general of the armies of the King instead head of the state? Undoubtedly Napoleon would have had an exceptional military career, under a king, as the interior troubles in all European countries created a situation favorable for wars. In fact all Europe was avid for war. The policy of all nations of that time was aggressive. Never has there been an epoch when all countries of Europe were, at the same time, so mad for conquests.

Instead of seeking to establish the natural frontiers, the politics and strategy of Napoleon were strangely like those of the Romans. The unlimited theater of war was one of the main reasons for the fall of both Rome and the Empire of Napoleon; too many of their own men were sacrificed. The limits imposed by nature determine that each European nation must remain within these boundaries. Those nations that have attempted to expand beyond their natural frontiers have suffered by it. The Rhine appears as the natural frontier of France, more because of the security which it gives than of the fact of limiting the country.

According as one practices or not the *Policy of Frontiers*, strategy takes absolutely different forms. Louis XIV and Frederick II did. In the World War Germany did not—the result of the war might have been very different had Wilhelm II limited himself to creating new, and more extensive, frontiers. To Napoleon the frontiers meant nothing: a policy with an unlimited objective brings a strategy without measure. With no limits to the objective he could well say: "Seek the enemy's army and destroy it." With a comprehensive system of railroad lines both mobilisation and concentration are protected by their rapidity. While the last war gives no conclusive proof of the value of frontier fortifications, we are at least sure of the necessity of rapidity of mobilization and concentration. That is, the experience of 1914 pleads the cause of Napoleon. Under the Republic there was no money for fortifying frontiers, the government was uncertain, the demand was for conquests. Of what use then were fortifications?



The author then reviews the life and long reign of Louis XIV, with a detailed study of his politics and a comparison with those of Napoleon. As to Turenne, the commander of Louis' army, we have Napoleon's *Precis des guerres du maréchal de Turenne*, dictated at Saint Helena. Turenne is one of the few great generals of the world. His death in 1675 was a severe blow to France. His controversy with Louis is comparable with that of Napoleon and the Directorate. A chief of an army has the right to conduct the operations as he sees fit, provided he does not depart from the end fixed by politics; if not allowed to do so he should offer his demission. A political chief of the general staff, having no responsibilities, does not have to give his resignation if his counsel is not followed, but he should keep still and assist in whatever is decided. Politicians are often led, by their ignorance of war, to make generals dance. On the other hand, a general has the duty of conforming to the will of politics: to attain the desired objective but not to exceed it.

In 1740, Frederick II ascended the throne of Prussia. This kingdom had been newly created and had neither frontiers nor traditions but it did have a (mechanically) well drilled and disciplined army of 83,000. Seeking more territory Frederick II occupied Silesia. In the battle that ensued shortly thereafter Frederick II, through complete ignorance of the art of war, and in particular the use of cavalry, fled from the field when he believed all was lost; but the next day received word that his infantry had finished by being victorious. If, "little by little," Frederick became "the greatest general of the century," he had much to learn, even as to bravery.

Prussia, however, kept Silesia (Treaty of 1748) and the army was raised to 156,000. Austria raised a coalition to retake Silesia but, in order to allow her allies time to prepare, hostilities were to be opened the following year (1757). This all became known to Frederick and, knowing that he would be crushed if he waited, he took the initiative and invaded Saxony in August, 1756. Then, in the manner of Louis XIV, Frederick organised the country to defend and keep it. This began the Seven Years War. Threatened on all sides in 1757 Frederick penetrated into Bohemia with almost all of his forces. Theoretically this was correct, to mass against the principal and first ready adversary. Actually there was no mass at all. The advance into Bohemia and the battle of Prague are described in detail. Both operations might be termed "The Comedy of Errors." Frederick bungled and showed himself the most inept pupil that Mars had ever had. But, fortunately for him, the Austrians possessed a number of leaders almost as bad and their number added to their confusion. This extraordinary battle is worth reading, if only for the mistakes made.

Frederick II showed that he had firmness of character. Profiting by his mistakes in this battle, which he was not too blind to see, even though he won, Frederick reorganised his army, changed the drill to gain speed, modified his maneuvers to obtain suppleness and rapidity—above all in his cavalry. These changes were seen at Rossbach, at Leuthen, Mellwitz and Zorndorf while his cavalry leaders, Driesen and Seydlitz, have written their names into history.

These battles of Frederick II we see are neither in Prussian territory or in the neighborhood. Like Louis XIV, but unlike Napoleon, the king of Prussia did not rush the enemy capitals. Frederick the Great, like Louis the Great, did not seek the enemy army until that army became a menace to the national territory; and then only to repulse it. Their strategy, like their policies, remained linked to the frontiers of either the old territory or those of territories acquired, sometimes with hardly a battle, but which demanded great efforts to conserve. Both enlarged their country.

Had France, in 1799, been willing to renounce all claim to Holland, to abandon Italy and to content herself with her natural frontiers, which she had then attained, there is no doubt but that she could have kept these

boundaries. Yet, since then much blood has been spilled and France is about as she was in 1709: it has not yet her natural frontiers.

Prior to 1796 the sole interesting study of strategy of the Revolution is that of Valmy, which was repeated in 1914 by Joffre against von Kluck. At Valmy there was accord between politics and strategy; otherwise Dumouriez would have failed. In 1796 we find Napoleon begging the Directorate to allow him to agree to an armistice with the King of Naples. Strategy demanded it but politics in this case nearly compromised the whole expedition.

In 1796 the Revolutionary armies were disposed in a cordon, for defense. The error of this was evident and Napoleon created a mass of maneuver and demanded liberty of action. At the end of 1914 we again see the "cordon" in all its horror. Napoleon might, perhaps, have vanquished his adversary during the war of movement, especially had he been the head of the German army, but it is doubtful if he could have done any better in the period 1915 to November 1918. The fortresses of Vauban may be compared to the trenches and in the stabilized warfare we see the principle of Louis XIV.

The campaign of 1800 was to prove Bonaparte the best general, to gain the support of the army and that of the country and to consolidate Napoleon's power. All of which led directly to the administrative and civil reorganization of France—*Le Cede Napoleon*. The Constitution of the year VIII did not give the First Consul sufficient power. This gave Moreau the desired excuse for non-cooperation; actually, his blind jealousy would have found some excuse under any circumstances. His pride and unintelligence of the situation cost France many lives and caused a great deal of harm because he put himself above his country.

Legally Bonaparte could not command an army. Under the circumstances he found it necessary to violate the constitution. It was necessary to gain time in order to attend to the affairs of France; to finish the pacification of Brittany and the Vendee; to clothe, arm and equip the army; to call conscripts and to train them; to manufacture materiel; and all that there was to do for internal order and administration. There was only one way: to intimidate the adversary. To do this Napoleon crossed the Alps and fought the "battle of reversed fronts" at Marengo. The whole is a fairy tale.

Never, with the "god of war," does one fall into the formula; always the maneuver corresponds to the particular situation of the moment, everything is calculated, tomorrow will never be the repetition of yesterday. Napoleon, by couriers, directed all elements of the army in Italy; and also politics in Paris. His plans were faulty as he was deceived as to the number of the enemy at Montebelle and also as to the progress of his own army in crossing the Po. He took the "initiative of movement," because the Austrians failed to do so. The enemy, strong in cavalry, did not profit by it on the field of battle, although the plain of Marengo is very favorable for the use of that arm. After Montebelle all contact with the enemy was lost—the enemy became completely invisible until, having crossed the Bermuda in three points (Napoleon failed to have these bridges watched, let alone guarded) they debauched en masse and attacked. The initiative had passed to the enemy, the surprise was complete.

In haste Bonaparte recalled the troops of Lepeype and Desaix but it was too late, the Austrians were victorious. Now comes the strange part of this fairy tale—the Austrian commander was so anxious to send the news to Vienna that he retired from the field, in order to write his dispatches, leaving his Chief of Staff in command. The Austrians massed in column for the pursuit but hardly had they formed when Desaix, who had arrived, made a sudden attack, supported by all available artillery and cavalry. The Austrian Chief of Staff was killed in the first onslaught. With no leader, amazed by the attack, the Austrians fled in panic. The victors of 4:00 p.m. became the vanquished at 5:00 p.m.

We have Napoleon's words of how he, many years later, remembered conducting the battle; actually the battle of Marengo escaped from him, it was not directed at all. After many victories and much experience the memory of earlier maneuvers is viewed in the light of greater knowledge and obscured by later events. At Marengo the chief of the French armies did not have his forces in hand; units did not have their artillery; cavalry, so capable of producing great effect on the plain of Marengo—Kellermann so demonstrated with only two brigades—was almost entirely lacking; at all times Napoleon had a force much inferior numerically; what forces he had he had dissipated; he failed to keep contact after Montebelle; he failed to guard, watch, or destroy bridges that the Austrians could use; and his army was too small to undertake the pursuit.

Why does not history show in what a fiasco the campaign terminated? The peace treaty meant nothing since Austria had been given the power (the army) to overthrow it. Napoleon made an even bigger mistake politically than he did strategically. The battle was simply to satisfy the personal vanity of Bonaparte; he had asserted that he could fight such a battle, and must needs prove it; he had made a wager and wanted to carry it through. The only thing gained at Marengo was glory. Glory and an extension of the theatre of operations to territory removed from the base, in country that was not national.

Louis XIV regulated his ambitions by his frontiers; Frederick II regulated his by the means at hand; Napoleon knew no limits. Napoleon's political aspirations were responsible for this armistice. He well knew that his presence in Paris was essential to his political advancement. He could not allow himself to be tied to a campaign afield. Later, in November, 1800, Napoleon had a chance to put to work his talents as a strategist; but he remained in Paris, leaving each of the four armies to the individual initiative of the respective chiefs. Certainly there was need for coordination, but Bonaparte was too busy with politics, for his own personal gain, to bother with national defense. In December, 1800, Moreau won the decisive battle necessary for peace. Won it on the principal front, the route from Paris to Vienna.

The author shows how either Louis XIV or Frederick II would have handled the campaign of 1800, based on the policy of frontiers and strategy limited thereby. Either would have accomplished as much as Napoleon, and with much greater economy of force. Both would have obtained some real and lasting benefit to their country. Unfortunately for France the politics of this period were such that floods of blood were spilled, and have been spilled since, with no material benefit. Generations have suffered from this era.

The three gardens explored are almost in the same century but they suffice to show the statesman and the strategist the capital influence of politics on the conduct of war and almost as much on the conduct of operations.

This book is an excellent work on the subject treated. The review is, necessarily, limited while the book itself gives details and a more comprehensive study of the question. It is a valuable contribution to military literature and the student will be well repaid for its study.

Fairman, Charles D.—**The law of martial rule.** 1930.....M 207-C.73-J

CONTENTS: Foreword; Historical background of martial law; The problem; The nature of martial rule; Instituting martial rule in the British Empire; Instituting martial rule in the United States; Under circumstances falling short of war; Martial rule and a state of war; Measures of martial rule: Trial and punishment—In the British Empire; Measures of martial rule: Trial and punishment—in the United States; Measures of martial rule: Interference with liberty and property; The tribunals of martial rule; Terminating martial rule—liability and indemnity; Conclusion; Bibliographical note; Tables of cases cited; Index.

Reviewed by E. O. SAUNDERS

In my opinion *The Law of Martial Rule* by Professor Charles Fairman of Williams College is the best and clearest consideration of the subject of

martial law or martial rule yet published. Dr. Fairman is a reserve officer in the United States Army with the rank of Captain, Field Artillery, but he has evidently had very limited, if any, experience with martial law situations, federal or state. He treats the subject therefore as a theorist. He has considered everything and omitted nothing. But at the same time he proves nothing; he has not definitely concluded anything.

Captain Fairman makes no adequate distinction between martial law as a federal military expedient and as an emergency measure expressly or impliedly provided for by the organic law of the several states. He does not point out the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in *Ex parte Milligan* has no controlling effect upon the several states invoking martial law pursuant to state law. Nevertheless the *Law of Martial Rule* is the best text available and will serve a useful purpose in our library.

It is to be regretted that Captain Fairman did not publish a supplementary part of his book, a text on military government.

**Air Annual of the British Empire, 1930.** Vol. II. Great Britain, 1930..... M 409-C42-A

CONTENTS: Preface; Foreword. Empire aviation; Service aviation; Airships; Civil aviation; Sporting flying; Air survey; The British aircraft industry; Aero-engines; Aero-engine accessories; Airscrews; Aircraft; Steels and alloys; Varnishes; Wheels and brakes; Wireless, navigation and instruments; Air survey and photographic equipment; Flying equipment; Aerodrome and air port lighting and equipment; British commercial aircraft; Aircraft production in the dominions; List of illustrations; General reference; Index.

Reviewed by O. WESTOVER

This book in scope and purpose is similar to the *Aircraft Year Book*, published in the United States.

The information and data recorded in this volume may be grouped under the following different general headings:

- (1) A series of articles dealing with the development of aviation, and particularly air transport in the British Empire;
- (2) A review of the air forces of the British Empire, including auxiliary and reserve forces, and a comprehensive review of the development of British airships;
- (3) A review of civil aviation, including such allied matters as aviation insurance, sport flying, gliding, flying contests, etc. Considerable space is devoted to air survey, including an account of operations of the various companies engaged therein;
- (4) A comprehensive survey of the British aircraft industry;
- (5) An aircraft supplement containing miscellaneous data pertaining to aviation.

Several of the prefatory articles are of special interest to military students, namely: *The Influence of Aviation on International Relations*; *The Strategic Mobility of Air Forces*; and *Air Transport in the British Empire*. There is no doubt that Great Britain fully realizes the value of aviation in establishing closer unity between its provinces and colonial possessions and that it is determined to foster aviation development to that end in the shortest possible time. The map which shows the air routes now connecting the British colonial possessions and the air routes projected, is evidence of a deep appreciation of both the military and commercial value of aircraft to the British Empire.

That portion of the book dealing with the air forces of the British Empire contains much that is of interest, but does not contain sufficient detailed data to be of value to military students in this country. The data regarding individual aircraft contain no statement of military performance, without which little comparison can be gained as to the relative superiority or inferiority of American and British aircraft of similar designs. The influence of the development in high speed aircraft, which culminated in the British successes in the Schneider Trophy Cup Races, is reflected in the tendency in development of British pursuit aircraft.

Two articles are of especial merit. The first article on airship design is a comprehensive review showing the early influence of Zeppelin designs on British airships and the engineering difficulties encountered in applying such designs. It outlines the reasons which led to the temporary suspen-

sion of British airship activities about eight years ago, and the intensive development of a purely British design of airships as reflected in the types R-100 and R-101. The disaster of the R-101 had not yet occurred when this book was written. The reader can, therefore, well appreciate the blow which the crash of the R-101 meant to British aspirations in the development of another link in colonial air transportation over routes exclusively limited to British territory.

The second article on the evolution of mooring and handling devices for airships is a comprehensive review of the history of the development of mooring masts, and is by far the most detailed and interesting survey of that kind which it is believed has ever been published.

The articles on civil aviation, although comprehensive and well written, contain nothing of particular value to the military student. The development of free ballooning and sport flying, including gliding, is an interesting phase of this subject.

That portion of the book which deals with the British aircraft industry is likewise comprehensive in scope, and contains particularly interesting articles on *Safety and Control*, wherein is discussed the development of slotted wings and their influence on control in a spin; *Air Cooled Engines*, their present and future development; and the *Ashdown Rotoscope*, the first published article known on this exceedingly interesting new development. An illustration showing the pistol camera, developed by the British, and the development of the Rotoscope, as outlined in the above mentioned article, suggests the thought that a combination of the two will eventually be developed as a further means of increasing the efficiency of the military photographic observer.

The aircraft supplement contains much statistical and general data concerning British commercial aircraft and aircraft production in the Dominions, and includes statements of courses of study in aeronautics at British universities.

The book as a whole is valuable for reference, particularly for Army and Navy officers concerned with military aviation and the development of commercial aviation in international relationships. Being a summary up to include the year 1929, it is practically up-to-date. There is much of value to aeronautical engineers and aircraft manufacturers contained in the articles and photographs furnished covering the designs of British aircraft, aircraft equipment, and accessories. The articles are all authoritative, written by men in the British military or naval services or high in the ranks of British scientists and engineers.

Aston, Sir George.—**Letters on amphibious wars.** London, 1920. . . . . M 500-J4

CONTENTS: Preface to first edition; Preface to second edition; Afterword to second edition; First letter—the war in Chile in 1891; Second letter—the war in Chile in 1891; Third letter—the Spanish-American War of 1898; Fourth letter—the Spanish-American War of 1898; Fifth letter—the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5; Sixth letter—the Russo-Japanese War of 1894-5; Seventh letter—the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5; Eighth letter—the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5; List of maps; Index.

Reviewed by A. W. LANE

The purpose of this book is to illustrate the direction of combined naval and military forces against a common objective, by consideration of actual operations undertaken between 1890 and 1911 when the first edition of the book was published. The particular operations studied are those which took place during the Chilean War of 1891, the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

The operations mentioned are cited to show the interdependence of the army and navy in wars in which both were employed. Upon what appears to be good evidence, the author concludes that the proper objectives for joint overseas expeditions are hostile fleets, armies, or portions thereof, and that the naval strength of the enemy should be the first ob-

jective of the forces of a maritime power, both by land and by sea. The great importance of maintaining secrecy as to the destination of an overseas expedition, and of rapidity of action which can be secured only by careful forethought and preparation, is clearly shown.

Although the book is intended to be only an introduction to study of amphibious wars, and although it is written in a style designed to appeal to the general reader as well as to professional soldiers and sailors, it does clearly and adequately present the most important considerations affecting the employment of combined military and naval forces. The author, formerly a professor at both the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, and the Army Staff College, Camberley, states that courses of lectures delivered at the Staff College at Camberley have provided the material from which the letters have been composed. Unquestionably, the book is of value to anyone interested in the subject of joint overseas expeditions.

Serrigny, General.—**Reflexions sur l'Art de la Guerre.** [Reflections on the art of war.] Paris, 1930.....M 501-A.44

CONTENTS: Les principes et les procedes; Le chef; L'Organisation du commandement; Preparation morale de la guerre; Preparation materielle de la guerre; Principes de la defense des Etats—I. Defense des frontieres terrestres—II. Defense contre les armees de l'air; La conduite des operations—I. Theorie de la peur—II. Defense strategique—III. Offensive strategique—IV. La bataille tactique; Conclusions. [Principles and procedure; The commander-in-chief; Organization of command; World preparation for war; Material preparation for war; Principles of the defense of states; Defense of frontiers—Defense against the air; Conduct of operations; Theory of fear—Defensive strategy—Offensive strategy—Battle tactics; Conclusions.]

Reviewed by F. M. BARROWS

This is not a new book but is the third edition of a work published shortly after the armistice.

The author, in this edition, at first intended to re-write it completely taking into account the evolution of ideas resulting in the last ten years from changes brought about through World War experiences. On second thought the author has felt that all the interest of the work remained in the fact that it was written almost "the day after the armistice" and that it consequently represents the average ideas of a combatant coming out of the Great War. The author has therefore maintained, in this edition, the integral text of 1918.

The interesting final chapter is given below:

In arriving at the end of this study, we are naturally led to throw a glance to the rear. One is then struck by the small number of principles which govern, in the main, in war. Adaptation of the end to the means, economy of force, echelonnement, rational employment of time and space, concentration and decentralization of means . . . Behold, that is all.

These principles, one finds always, and above all, not only in the conduct of operations, but also in the organization of command and even in the material and moral preparation for use. The reader must realize this point of view after reading the first chapters of this work, in fact he is convinced of it. These principles are not exclusively of the military domain; they apply to all works whatever they be; they constitute, indeed, the patrimony of our reason and dominate all of our creations.

On this solid base is victory. But let us not forget that these principles remain of matter, shapeless and without value, unless the creative imagination intervenes and brings them to life. The commander-in-chief is the one to work upon this clay: He must breathe into this inert matter, and his genius will give it life.

Eady, Major H. G.—**Historical illustrations to field service regulations, "Operations," 1929.** London, 1930.....M 506-A.442

CONTENTS: Preface; List of maps and sketches; List of suggested reference books; Foreword, by Field Marshal Sir George Milne; Armed forces: Their command and the principles of war; Fighting troops, their characteristics and armament; Strategic preliminaries to joining battle; Battle; Information; Protection; The attack; The defence; Night operations; Movements by sea, land and air; Examples of types of orders, and results of bad or vague orders; Campaign index.

Reviewed by J. L. FRINK

This book is a symposium of historical examples bearing on the British *Field Service Regulations, Vol. II, 1929—Operations*. Except for the subjects of protracted defense and warfare in undeveloped and semi-civilized



countries, the theme is replete with valuable historical references and deductions therefrom covering the period from earliest times to include the World War.

Subjects covered include the principles of war, command, characteristics and armament of combat arms, strategical preliminaries to joining battle, battle, information, protection, the attack, the defense, night operations, movements by sea, land, and air, and examples of orders, good and bad. A number of the most important historical examples cited are illustrated by maps and sketches. The list of reference books included is exceptionally well chosen and is composed of books easy to read and to obtain.

Austin, F. Britten.—**A saga of the sword.** 1929.....M 904-C

CONTENTS: War comes to the world; Writ in Cuneiform; With Alexander; Delenda est Carthago!; The Legion passes; "..... and Muhammed is his prophet!"; On the first Crusade; The man with the gun; The lion of the north; "Vive l'Empereur!"; The last charge; The end of an epoch.

Reviewed by E. P. KING

This book is pure fiction—a collection of "historical" short stories. The stories, in no sense continuous, follow one another in chronological order.

The first story is a drama of pre-historic times and depicts the origin of armed conflict among *homo sapiens*. The last story is set in the World War and describes the introduction into warfare of the latest military innovation—the tank. The other stories fit logically between these two.

The archaeology, mythology, and history, so far as known to this reviewer, are essentially sound. The book is well written and interesting. Obviously, the scope of the book is so great, compared with its length, that practically every detail is omitted that might be improving for a soldier. If the book has a purpose, it is to accentuate the futility and horror of war.

This book may have cultural value for the military reader by stimulating historical reading of some of the campaigns described. It can have no other professional value for him.

Scullard, Howard H.—**Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War.** London, 1930.....M 937-B92 (SC)

CONTENTS: Preface; Select bibliography; Illustrations. Ancient authorities for the period; Rome, Scipio, and Spain; New Carthage; Baecula; Ilipa and last steps in Spain; The interlude; First years in Africa; The last campaign; Scipio, the soldier, the man, and his work; Appendixes; Index.

Reviewed by J. B. JOHNSON

This book, of 331 pages, which won the Thirlwall Prize in 1929, represents a painstaking and critical research of sources and a very readable presentation of the material obtained. Its bibliography and footnotes serve to make it an authoritative text on the subject chosen.

The author states that when he undertook this work, no book had been written in English for the past century on Scipio Africanus. Since then, Liddell-Hart's *A Greater than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus* has appeared, but the latter does not begin to show the same critical use of sources. Scullard's book stresses the adoption of new weapons and new and less rigid tactics by the Romans under Scipio, culminating in the employment of the single and double envelopment.

This book makes a good companion piece to Baker's *Hannibal* and will be of interest to all officers as general reading, and to the G-3 Section of this School in particular for its tactical exposition of the battles of Baecula, Ilipa and Zama and for its historical examples of joint operations at New Carthage and Gades. An early example of the successful use of military intelligence is recounted on pages 200-201 which should be of interest to the G-2 Section.

MacMunn, Lt. Gen. Sir George.—**The King's pawns.** Being empire stories of the World War. London, 1930.....M 9403-B3-A.42

CONTENTS: The Sinai Front; Palestine; Mesopotamia; Kurdistan; Persian Gulf; The Indian frontier; India in France; South Africa.

Reviewed by E. K. STERLING

The author is an English Army officer. This book is a collection of short stories dealing with English Army officers, enlisted men and colonials in various parts of the world.

Some of the stories are interesting but to the average reader they contain so many colloquial phrases that the exact meaning is difficult to obtain. For any one who has lived in those countries these stories would probably be enjoyable.

It has no military value except one story (Toujours en Vedette) where an infantry company with pack artillery under the command of a Major of engineers was ambushed in a defile through failure to take proper security measures.

Jerrold, Douglas.—**The lie about the war.** A note on some contemporary war books. London, 1930.....M 9403-B3-F

Reviewed by L. D. DAVIS

Mr. Jerrold is, in England, something of a controversialist. He knows by personal experience and study something about the War of 1914-1918. It was therefore quite natural that he should take note of the fact that there had been a tremendous demand for war books of the so-called new sort, books generally described by advertisers as "frank and absolutely fearless." Mr. Jerrold observed that it was being said that these books dealt with the actualities of war, and that people were just now beginning to turn against the idea of war. It is against these two assertions that the author breaks a lance. The "lie" he writes about has nothing to do with who started the war or who won it, and that is a little, at least, to be recorded in praise of the pamphlet.

The sub-title really explains the nature of the book. The author bases his discussion on certain assumptions to be found in one or more of sixteen of the new war books, among which may be mentioned Hemingway's *Farewell to Arms*, Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Graves' *Good-Bye to all That* and Zweig's *The Case of Sergeant Grischa*.

The pamphlet is not written in criticism of any of these books individually. Indeed, the author observes that none of the sixteen are indifferent and some are excellent pieces of literary work. He writes in support of his general denial that any of these books, or others of the same sort, give "the truth about the war."

The assertion that people are now turning against the idea of war is disposed of quickly, as being of no consequence, if literally true, which latter the author does not admit. The author agrees that one hears many people these days saying that they never knew what war was like until they had read *All Quiet on the Western Front*, or some other war book of the new sort, but queries, what of it? He doubts that any emotion, any feeling, which lay dormant throughout four years of war, cold to the death of millions of men and the sufferings of millions more, only to be aroused by a novel, can have any effective result in assuring the progress of peace.

The main argument of the pamphlet is directed against the assertion that these books portray the actualities of war, or tell "the truth about the war." The author denies, as does anyone who is acquainted with the real truth, that brave men are shot for cowardice, that jailers are invariably brutal but the suspect always the paragon of virtue, that every ration party runs into an intensive bombardment, that the rank and file recognized the callous indifference of their government and knew that they had misplaced their faith in its good intentions, and so on.



As Mr. Jerrold puts it, the trouble with these war books is that they deal with every kind of a struggle except the struggle of army against army, of one people against another and, denying that the conflict at arms was a significant war, they nevertheless attempt to make a significant novel. He points out very clearly what every military man knows, but what only a few general readers appreciate—that to the individual all military operations are bound to seem rather meaningless, since it is divisions, more often corps, armies and groups of armies, that make the blows or resist the hostile thrusts. Naturally the marchings of a squad of infantry often will seem entirely futile to its members.

Mr. Jerrold also charges that these books very studiously conceal the fact that there were some desirably good results from the War. And finally, he charges that all these books, by sentimentalizing the problems of peace and war and ignoring the actual racial and economic growth during the previous decades, have done the cause of peace a great disservice.

The careful reading of this pamphlet by one about to embark upon an incursion into the literature which we know by the designation of "war books," telling the truth about the war, certainly would provide the reader with the means for an enlightening interpretation of such "war books."

Sherriff, Robert Cedric.—**Journey's end.** A novel. 1930..M 9403-B3-F.42

Reviewed by A. GIBSON

This is a World War novel that has stood out distinctly from the mass of such novels by reason of the success of its dramatization. The play for stage presentation and the talking picture play have been highly successful not only from the standpoint of popularity but from the viewpoints of the dramatic critics. One who has seen either of these plays has seen and heard the story, for the dramatization keeps very closely to the novel.

The story presents the tragedy and psychology of war through the experiences of several infantry officers and soldiers who bore the stress and strain of the years of trench warfare in the mud, wet, and cold through the severe fighting and patient holding on in Flanders. The breakdown of the nerves of officers who have stood the strain for months and possibly years and the liberal use of whiskey to bolster up failing physical, mental, and moral stamina, stand out. The sordidness of war and the lack of glamour are in the story but while, in the general crop of war novels, the physical, mental and moral degradation present a very depressing picture, in *Journey's End* courage, kindness, generosity and humor dominate the mud and muck and sense of human frailty and futility.

Wendler, Otto Bernhard.—**Soldiers' women.** (Translation from the German) London, 1930.....M 9403-B3-F.43

Reviewed by H. C. INGLES

The book is a study of the results of the enforced separation of the sexes that takes place in war. The author traces the lives of four German soldiers on the Eastern Front and the lives of their wives and sweethearts in Germany. Through the lives of his characters he endeavors to point out that the separation of men and women and the denial to both sexes their normal social contacts is one of the serious results of war and quite as derogatory to society as any other of its deplorable features.

The book is fiction—and if one believes that there is any virtue or admirable qualities in the German people—he must conclude that it is entirely fiction. It is shocking and probably not true of the life of any German soldier. However it deals with one of the effects of war heretofore avoided and is a valuable contribution to recent war fiction books.

Nason, Leonard H.—**A Corporal once.** 1930.....M 9403-B3-F.73

CONTENTS: Columbus; El Paso; The crossing; Bayonne; Bois des Haies; Bois de Parroy; Counter-attack; La Bourboule.

*Reviewed by W. F. SAFFORD*

An entertaining story of a private who is first introduced to the reader at Columbus, N.M. Wounded in Villa's raid he is sent to El Paso for treatment and thence overseas where some of his various experiences are chronicled. Finally he is wounded and sent to a hospital, where the story leaves him, convalescing.

The writer makes no attempt to teach a lesson, reaches no heights and avoids technicalities. For those that know soldiers and can read the vernacular, through the words of the book, and more especially for those that served with troops during the last war, it is an interesting and whimsical tale, comparable with others by the same author.

Boyd, Donald.—**Salute of guns.** London, 1930.....M 9403-B4.42

CONTENTS: Illustrations. Times and places: Riding to Persepolis, England—Autumn 1914; Numbers 7, 8 and 9, Pont Riqueul—Spring 1915; Nuts in May, Rue du Bois—Summer 1915—Wytachaete—Winter 1915; Conrad, Gris Nez—Spring 1916—Notre Dame de Lorette—Bully-Grenay—Summer 1916; Fare ye well, the Somme—Summer 1916; Winter rain, Hill 60—Winter 1916; Third Ypres, Menin road—Summer 1917—the ravine; All the happy times—Arras—Autumn 1917; Hymn to Saturn, Flesquieres—Winter 1917-18; Poor bloody horses—the retreat—Spring 1918; A bottle and kind landlady—St. Valery—Albert—Summer 1918; Old soldiers never die—Aubers—Summer 1918; Living are the dead—Le Havre—Autumn 1918; Apology.

*Reviewed by P. HAYES*

This is the story of the war experiences of a young Englishman, who served for the first few months as an enlisted man, and the remainder of the War as a battery officer in a field artillery unit.

The author attempts to set down only that which he saw, and in the detail and proportion which would have presented themselves to anyone who was in his place.

The story is told in a colorful manner, and in such detail that we find discussed certain things which because of their intimate nature, are usually omitted. The author describes the duties of a battery officer, his hardships, the routine of his day's work.

There is nothing of tactical value in the work. The technique of the arm is brought out in the description of battery positions, the method of laying down fire, by a discussion of life at an observation post, duty as a liaison officer with an infantry unit, and in other experiences which the author went through.

Interspersed throughout the book are interesting word pictures of the daily life of an artillery subaltern; his duties, his associations, his amusements, his trials. The book does emphasize the fact that a battery officer can know little of what is taking place except on his immediate front; his part in and knowledge of the war are mainly concerning his battery and the front over which it operates. One also finds in this work that the orders issued were of fragmentary nature, and often in map form.

There is much of colorful interest, much of human analysis, in this delineation of the life of an artillery subaltern. The book will be of special interest to an officer of the field artillery.

Carstairs, Carroll.—**A generation missing.** With a foreword by Osbert Sitwell. London, 1930.....M 9403-B4.42

*Reviewed by J. S. PRATT*

*A Generation Missing* is an interesting story of the World War experiences of an American commissioned in the British Army on the Western Front. The story impresses one as being the actual experiences of the author—experiences reflecting his emotional reactions during the several years of war rather than the details of any particular engagement.

The descriptions of the battle scenes given, however, paint an excellent and vivid word picture for the reader. The book has very little in it of real military value except for its portrayal of the psychology of the soldier in the front line. The book should be classified as purely fiction, but as an interesting story from the human point of view.

From the standpoint of psychology, the book should be of interest to the G-2 Section of this School.

Harrison, Major M.C.C. and Cartwright, Captain H.A.—**Within four walls.** London, 1930.....M 9403-B4.42

CONTENTS: Preface; List of illustrations; Mons to Burg; Burg; Torgau; Halle and Magdeburg; Magdeburg prison; Ströhen; Küstrin, Schweidnitz and Aachen; Conclusion.

*Reviewed by M. F. HARMON*

This volume presents the narrative account of the experiences of Major M.C.C. Harrison and Captain H.A. Cartwright of the British forces during over three years of captivity in Germany. It is composed of the personal accounts of the participants themselves and there is every reason to believe that it is accurate and authoritative in every respect.

Clear, comprehensive and intensely interesting are the descriptions of prison conditions at the important German prison camps and prisons of Torgau, Burg, Halle, Magdeburg, Furstenburg, Zorndorf, Schweidnitz and Aachen; as well as the experiences and vicissitudes attending the many unsuccessful attempts and the finally successful effort to escape.

The volume is illustrative of the resourcefulness, ingenuity and determination that may be engendered in an intelligent person by a supreme will of accomplishment. It is replete with helpful hints to the captured officer and particularly so to that class who will never consent to a complacent captivity during war time. Perhaps the outstanding thought in the narrative is the idea that every attempted escape increases the quality and strength of guards and thus decreases the fighting strength of the enemy at the front.

Insofar as historical prison data is concerned, the book is not sufficiently comprehensive to be of any great value, but it would prove of interest for research in this particular sphere.

Kelly, D.V.—**39 months with the "Tigers," 1915-1918.** London, 1930.....M 9403-B4.42

CONTENTS: Preface—Why another war book?; Illustrations. "Peace warfare"; The Somme; Arras—1916; The Somme once more; Mud—The Hohenzollern redoubt in 1916-17; The Hindenburg line; The bloody salient (Ypres 1917); Waiting for the March offensive; March, 1918; April, 1918; May, 1918; The last interval; The beginning of the end; The last phase.

*Reviewed by L. H. WATSON*

This book is an account of the activities of the British 110th Infantry Brigade, composed of the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th "Leicesters," from July 1915 to 1918. It was written in the spring of 1919, as the author says, "when my memory was perfectly fresh and clear." It describes the trench warfare in which the brigade engaged in the vicinity of Arras and of Ypres; the Ypres offensive in 1917, the hard winter of 1917-1918 at Epehy, the British retreat in March 1918, the three weeks battle in April 1918, the retreat in May 1918, and the series of attacks beginning in September 1918 which culminated in the armistice in November 1918.

The book contains several maps, but these are hard to read, because they do not contain a north-and-south arrow, and the author continually refers to direction; he also mentions many places which cannot be found on the maps. The book contains several good airplane photographs of sectors of the Hindenburg line. The book has value in research work, but is dull reading.

Campagne, Colonel.—**Le Chemin des Crois 1914-1918.** [The way of the cross, 1914-1918.] Paris, 1930.....M 9403-B4.44

CONTENTS: Preface; Avertissement. De la Semoy a la Marne; La Marne; Vers les tranchées; Champagne; Lorraine; Detente; Le Labyrinthe; Hiver; Verdun; Un secteur tranquille; Vers la Somme; Adieu au 107/3; L'Ennemi; Au 7-8; Crise morale; La petite guerre; A la maniere de; L'Italie; De la Marne au Piave; En conseil de Guerre; L'Altipiano; Le 15 juin 1918; Au fil des jours; Dernière bataille; *Pax nobiscum*; Appendice. [Preface by Georges Girard; Foreword; From the Semoy to the Marne; The Marne; Towards the trenches; Champagne; Lorraine; In a rest area; The Labyrinth; Winter; Verdun; A quiet sector; Towards the Somme; Adieu to the 3d Bn. 107th Inf.; The enemy; To the 78th Infantry; The crises in morale; Raids; A question of punishments; Italy; From the Marne to the Piave; Courts-martial; The Altipiano; The 15 June 1918; To the last days; Last battle; *Pax nobiscum*; Appendix.]

Reviewed by J. A. WOODRUFF

An interesting account of the experiences of an infantry officer of the regular army who served at the front the entire war. First as a company, then a battalion commander in the first French advance into Belgium and the subsequent retreat to the Marne. He then served as a battalion commander in the trench warfare in Champagne, Lorraine, Artois, Verdun and on the Somme.

In the Fall of 1917 he became Colonel of the 78th Infantry and served with that regiment the remainder of the War in Italy.

The story is told in a most interesting manner and should be read by every officer who can read French. It is of particular value to officers interested in leadership, and is of value to the Command Section for the course in leadership.

Nadel, Henri.—**Down the red lane.** (Translation from the French) 1930.....M 9403-B4.44

Reviewed by E. H. ALMQUIST

This is the true story of a young French soldier. The author graduated from the Sorbonne in 1914. When war breaks out that year, imbued with the wave of exhilaration which swept over all, he enlists in order to partake of his share of the "glorious adventure." He casts his lot with the common soldier and seeks no promotion. Being made a corporal displeases him, due as he says, to his "spirit of independence which did not adapt itself to any hierarchy."

The story is an excellent psychological study of the mental reactions of the soldier. To him war holds no meaning of country and glory but rather the hardships, misery and fear which are ever present.

The writer has shown unusual aptitude for observation in his portrayal of the daily life of camp, trench and battlefield, and the book is full of small incidents which add to its interest for the reader. The ability of the soldier to correctly analyze and judge his officers and non-commissioned officers is well brought out.

The book is written in an interesting style, is easy to read, and well accomplishes the desire of its author which is "to show you simply, frankly, candidly, the sorrows and the joys, the fears and the hopes, which can be borne by one man, like other men, who was carried along by the storm."

Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, Harold.—**British documents on the origins of the War, 1898-1914.** Vol. VI: Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12. London, 1930.....M 9403-C3-C.42

CONTENTS: Foreword by the editors; Note on the arrangement of documents; Plan of Volume VI; List of editorial notes; List of abbreviations; Names of writers of minutes; List of King Edward's minutes; List of documents; Foreign Office and other documents. Anglo-German relations, 1907; Great Britain, France and Germany, 1908; Great Britain and Germany, January-July 1909; Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's proposals. August-December 1909; The Bagdad railway, 1905-10; Anglo-German negotiations, 1910; Naval negotiations, January 1911-February 1912; The Haldane Mission, 1912; Appendixes; Map showing railways and railway projects in Asiatic Turkey, 1907; Index of persons, showing the writers of despatches,

etc., and the official positions during this period of the principal persons mentioned in the text; Subject index.

Reviewed by H. M. GRONINGER

This volume covers the Anglo-German relations between 1907 and 1912. The main topics of discussion between these countries during this period pertained to naval armaments including the Agadir situation, the Bagdad railway and the Persian situation.

The documents contained in this volume were obtained principally from the Foreign Office supplemented by the Embassy archives and the private correspondence of Sir Edward Grey, Sir Arthur Nicolson, and Sir Charles Harding.

These documents provide interesting reading and should be of value to any officer who contemplates specializing in military intelligence work.

Gibbs, Sir Philip H.—**Since then.** The disturbing story of the world at peace. London, 1930..... M 9403-C5-A

CONTENTS: The great reprieve; The German revolution; The advance to the Rhine; The peace treaties; The white armies; The mutilation of Hungary; The Greek tragedy; The Fascist regime; The revival of Germany; The future of Austria; The regeneration of Poland; The leadership of France; The state of England; America after the war; The record of the League; The restless races; The martyrdom of Russia; The unveiling of women; The post-war mind.

Reviewed by A. GIBSON

This book is a logical sequel to the author's two other books, *Now It Can Be Told* and *More That Must Be Told*. Published in 1930 it covers the important world movements in the twelve years since the armistice, from the standpoint of a keen journalist who was in close contact with many of the men and events and with the philosophy of a writer who has witnessed the struggles and sufferings of men of all nations, without resultant cynicism but with keen sympathy and clarity based upon a wide understanding of human nature.

Each important country is taken up in turn. Each important world movement is given a separate section of the book. The picture in each case is brief but clear and sufficiently comprehensive for the reader who wishes to obtain a good general idea of world movements since 1918. The style is very readable. The book has no index, no table of references, no maps and no illustrations. The nineteen brief chapter headings of the table of contents constitute a concise statement of the scope of the book.

In the Allied occupation of Germany, the British sense of fair play and sportsmanship caused them, in the author's opinion, to be even more lenient than were the Americans with the Germans. In the making of the peace "all the other plenipotentiaries (except President Wilson) thought first of their national interests and aspirations, and last of the ideal justice which eludes the grasp of human nature."—"He lost his grip on this complicated problem." "They made a peace lower than the best instincts of European intelligence, though higher than the worst. . . . A gathering of angels round the table could hardly have drawn frontiers which would have left no minorities on one side or the other."

In all white nations there is a tremendous disillusionment and revulsion against war. The question arises as to whether western civilization would survive another general war and yet the potential causes of war seem more numerous and serious than ever before. The author adheres to the League of Nations and to its offspring, the World Court, as the only agencies in sight capable of making those adjustments among nations and peoples which will avoid recourse to war. He recognizes weaknesses and failures of the League. He points out however its important achievements and probable future growth in its beneficent power and influence. The *status quo* is unjust and cannot be maintained. The adjustment must come through the League of Nations or through war.

The world is waiting anxiously to see the outcome of the Russian experiment. Whatever the result the rest of the world must adjust itself to it.

The strain on our civilization may be greater than that of the War itself. The result may be beneficent or may be disastrous. What is now going on there is but the logical outcome of centuries of oppression. It has caused untold human suffering but the Russian people deserve the world's sympathy in their struggles.

The white man's relationship to the dark skinned races must adjust itself to changed world conditions in education, transportation, commerce and communication, all of which have changed completely the attitude of the dark skinned races toward the white race and have added to the world's many apparently unsolvable problems. To grant self-government to many dark races now clamoring for it, while being apparently liberal policy, is in reality reactionary for it will tend to throw these races back into the condition of anarchy, disease and death from which the white race has preserved them by generations of enlightened effort. Not to grant them self-government antagonizes many of the white race and most of the colored. The approved solution is difficult to arrive at.

The boy scout movement is one of the hopes of the world. To avoid war in the future and to adjust the tremendous injustices that prevail among nations, national hatreds, mistrust and selfish chauvinism must give way to a better understanding and greater mutual sympathy among nations. The international gatherings of the Boy Scouts are a tremendous influence toward this end.

This book is valuable in an officer's general reading to enable him to obtain quickly and in an interesting way, a survey of world movements since 1918. It has no particular military value.

Muir, Ramsay.—**Political consequences of the Great War.** London, 1930. M 9403-C5-A

CONTENTS: Preface; The forces at work; The settlement after the war; The progress of democracy; Europe and the non-European world; The progress of internationalism; The changed position of Britain and the British Empire; Bibliography; Index.

*Reviewed by J. C. WHITCOMB*

The author is a former professor of Modern History at the University of Manchester, England.

This is a remarkable little book. In its few pages it covers the high points of this vast subject and finds space to discuss nearly every nation involved in or affected by the War. The last chapter, in particular, is a graphic account of how Britain has slipped and is still slipping from its position of international leadership. It is recommended unreservedly to those who are interested in this subject and especially as a preliminary outline for those about to study it.

The first chapter, *The Forces at Work*, is devoted to the political background before the War.

Chapter Two, *The Settlement After the War*, describes the Peace Conference, its methods, aims, and its effects on each of the affected nations.

Chapter Three, *The Progress of Democracy*, is a very interesting study of the hopes and disillusionments of the post-war period, and the political and social effects in each of the European countries.

Chapter Four, *Europe and the Non-European World*, sketches the changing relations and takes up in turn, the Mohammedan world, the new Turkey, the Arab states, North Africa, Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, India, China.

Chapter Five, *The Progress of Internationalism*, deals principally with the work and accomplishment of the League of Nations.

Chapter Six, *The Changed Position of Britain and the British Empire*, is a frank, and, to the reviewer, tremendously interesting account of Britain's decline among the great powers of the world. "There seems to be a decline . . . in the energy of her people. . . . A creeping apathy, a growing defeatism. They may be evanescent, but while they last they are dangerous."



Grant, Lt. Col. U.S., 3rd.—**America's part in the Supreme War Council during the World War.** (In records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, D.C., Vol. 29-30). 1928..M 9403-D5-D1

Reviewed by H. W. HUNTLEY

In this paper, which was read before a meeting of the Columbia Historical Society of Washington, D.C., the author reviews the military situation which prompted the establishment of the Supreme War Council in November of 1917, and then describes the composition, functions, methods of procedure and organization of this council of representatives from the most important allied powers engaged in prosecuting the war against the Germans.

Although necessarily a much abbreviated account of the work of this important agency, the document presents a clear analysis of its powers and limitations and by a discussion of a few of its initial problems, the functions of the council in arriving at a proper plan for the prosecution of the World War can be visualized. Particularly, the attitude of the American members of the council with regard to the utilization of American troops with the troops of other powers and the question of unity of command in the field are outlined.

For students of the World War, this paper is of interest.

Germain, Victor W.—**The Kitchener armies.** The story of national achievement. London, 1930.....M 9403-E4-D.42A

CONTENTS: Preface; Works specially referred to in the text. The Old Army; The call to arms; The first New Army; The great mustering; The forging of the Giant's sword; Loos and the Dardanelles; The prelude to the Somme; The Somme—Opening phase; The Somme—Last phases; The passing of the Kitchener armies; Appendix—The British Empire in the War.

Reviewed by H. C. INGLES

The book is a well written very readable history of the recruiting, training and equipping of the new British armies in 1914. It starts with a resume of the British military establishment when Great Britain entered the War and points out its woeful inadequacy. It presents Kitchener as an inspired man and shows that he appreciated the task before Great Britain as no one else at the time did. He planned and started to build an army of seventy divisions with all necessary corps and army troops and auxiliary services. Subsequent events showed his estimate to be correct. The methods by which the new armies were raised are carefully traced.

In an endeavor to show how the *Kitchener Army* met its trials the book concludes with an account of the fighting in France and the Dardanelles to include the battles of the Somme.

Since our military system is essentially the same as the British the book is full of valuable information for the American officer. The author's estimate of Sir Douglas Haig is particularly interesting since so much of it applies to many of our own general officers in France. The book is recommended to all officers.

M., Lt. Col. H.—**La Verite sur la Guerre 1914-1918.** [The truth about the war, 1914-1918.] Vol. I: Joffre—Nivelle. Vol. II: Petain—Foch—Sarrail—Franchet D'Esperey. 2 volumes. Paris, 1930.....M 9403-E4-D.44-B920

CONTENTS: Tome I: Avant-propos; Joffre; Nivelle. Tome II: Petain; Foch; Front Oriental.—Introduction.

Reviewed by R. C. SMITH

This author has grouped his discussion of the War around the leaders of the French Army at the particular period discussed. It is only incidentally, however, that he discusses the leader. The book is very fully documented by quotations from the Allied and German press at the various periods and

by quotations from letters or conversations with various French officers. Unfortunately, many of the French officers are concealed under initials or rather obscure references. This author's judgment of Marshal Joffre is quite severe and concurs about with that of Lieutenant Colonel Mayer, French Army, and that of Captain Liddell Hart, British Army. The author criticizes severely the French plan of campaign in 1914 and also the conception of the use of the 75 mm cannon. He alleges a total misconception of the use of this weapon as light artillery and states that there was no provision for medium and heavy artillery and that the French early difficulties were largely due to this reason.

The author's criticism of the Nivelle regime is rather severe and corresponds to the generally accepted view. However, he credits most of Nivelle's difficulties to the situation and methods of war that were handed on to him by the Joffre administration. He criticizes in no mild language the warfare of "nibbling" that was employed by Joffre.

The section devoted to Petain gives a commendation of Petain's methods of reestablishing the morale of the French troops. The section under Foch is a panegyric that knows no limit in its praise. He gives Foch and Clemenceau almost the entire credit for the final winning of the War.

The other sections of the book cover the World War on other fronts where French troops were engaged. This book is of considerable interest to those studying the larger background of military history of the World War. The quotations from the press of allied, enemy and neutral countries, as well as the quotations from political leaders make it quite interesting reading. It is too general, however, to be of value for the detailed study of military operations.

Mayer, Lt. Col. Emile.—**Nos Chefs de 1914.** Souvenirs personnels et essais de psychologie militaire. [Our leaders of 1914. Personal recollections and essays in military psychology.] Paris, 1930  
M 9403-E4-D.44-B920

CONTENTS: Les chefs de notre armée; Joffre; Foch; Percin; Lanrezac; D'Amade; Sarraill; La disparition probable des armées.

#### Reviewed by R. C. SMITH

The author is a contemporary of the generals of whom he writes. He entered the Ecole Polytechnique in the same class with Marshal Foch and was on the retired list from about 1900 to 1914. During the latter period he was a writer on military subjects and military editor of several important French publications. The sub-title of his book, *Personal Recollections and Essays in Military Psychology* quite accurately describes his book.

The introductory chapter *The Leaders of Our Army* is a severe arraignment of the system of selecting military leaders in France. The author maintains that, inherently in a republic, those who reach the top of the military scale are most likely to be mediocre. "The pinnacles of the military hierarchy are almost always occupied by generals against whom there is the least objection and who are more or less ordinary. Any officer who is really somebody is not likely to come out of the crowd on account of not being endowed with those personal qualities that are most appreciated in the ordinary run of life, and because those qualities most useful in war are, in a measure, undesirable in time of peace."

The essay on Joffre and Foch are a sequel to a book the author published in 1928, *Three Marshals*. His judgment of Joffre is severe. He considers him a man of very ordinary qualities who was pushed into high place by force of circumstance. He says that in the beginning of the 1914 campaign Joffre sent to *Limoges* (the equivalent for the French Army of *Blois* for the A.E.F.), many generals, while Joffre himself merited the same fate. The author believes that if Joffre had been relieved at the end of August, 1914, no one would have protested this action and posterity would have ranked



him, as a general, along with his adversary, von Moltke. The author credits Gallieni with having forced Joffre into a success at the battle of the Marne, and quotes a comparable incident in Joffre's march on Timbuctu when a Captain Lapperine forced the commander to take action that led to ultimate success. On the whole, the author's judgment on Marshal Joffre is quite as severe as that of the British author, Liddell Hart.

The author's criticism of Foch is somewhat more friendly than that of Joffre. However, he does take issue with Foch's doctrine of unlimited offensive action. He compares Foch with the German, Blücher, Napoleon's adversary, rather than with Napoleon or the elder von Moltke.

The essays on Percin, Lanrezac, and D'Amade are most interesting as studies in leadership. All three of these generals were relieved of commands in the early part of 1914. The article on D'Amade especially illustrates what the author considers to be a failure in leadership.

Sarrail is given as an example of a general with strong political tendencies. He was sent to command the French armies in the Balkans and the author states it was really done as a measure to get him out of France. However, he attributes several good qualities to Sarrail and indicates that the latter's lack of success was due more to poor cooperation on the part of the French War Department than to failure of the general himself.

The final essay on *The Probable Disappearance of Armies* sustains the rather extreme position that future wars will be chiefly in the air and by means of gas.

This book is recommended to any officer interested in the opening phases on the Western Front and to anyone making a study of the psychology of military leadership.

Rockwell, Paul Ayres.—**American fighters in the Foreign Legion, 1914-1918.** 1930. M 9403-E4-D.44-J

CONTENTS: Preface; In training; Up to the front; The first winter in the trenches; First attacks; The third marching regiments; Champagne; The second winter in the trenches; At La Valbonne; 'Les Hironnelles de la Mort'; The Somme; Escadrille Lafayette; The 'Swallows of Death' in the Somme and Alsace; Champagne and Alsace, 1917; The Lafayette Escadrille in the Somme; America enters the War; Verdun; Flyers; Jacob and Capdevielle; The Legion saves Amiens; Victory; After the War; Index.

*Reviewed by E. H. ALMQUIST*

This book is an interesting story of those American citizens who, in the early days of the World War, volunteered for service under the colors of France and joined the French Foreign Legion. The author is numbered among this group of volunteers, which was drawn from all walks of life and which represented all classes of society.

The book traces in great detail the personal history of the members of this volunteer force, both before entering the Legion and while serving with it during the War.

The percentage of casualties suffered by them was exceedingly high and the valor of these men is attested by the number of citations and decorations which were awarded them. However, no attempt has been made to spare those whose services proved unsatisfactory or discreditable. Throughout the book the heroic part played by the Foreign Legion is brought to the reader's attention.

This volume also includes a description of the service rendered by the Lafayette Escadrille in the World War and various exploits of its personnel.

From a military reader's viewpoint the vivid descriptions of trench life and the accounts of those battles in which these volunteers participated should prove interesting.

The author closes with a brief description of the careers of these men upon their return to civilian pursuits after the close of the War. The book contains many illustrations and has a very comprehensive index.

Butts, Colonel Edmund L.—**The keypoint of the Marne and its defense by the 30th Infantry.** 1930.....M 9403-G4-C.73-A5

CONTENTS: Preface; Introductory; Foreword: Before the Marne.

Reviewed by R. B. WOODRUFF

The keypoint mentioned is the Bois d'Apremont south of the Marne River and east of Chateau Thierry. This woods was in the sector held by the 30th U.S. Infantry at the time of the German drive, 15 July 1918. The writer, Colonel E. L. Butts, commanded the 30th Infantry during this defense. The first part of the book contains Colonel Butt's personal experiences and the rest of the document consists, to a large extent, of reports made by junior officers, mostly platoon commanders, of their actions during the engagement.

It is my impression that the book was written from notes made at or just after the events, so all statements are probably correct. Its purposes primarily seem to be to record the history of the 30th Infantry for the period covered, to emphasize the great importance of infantry-artillery teamwork in battle and, to a lesser extent, to show the 30th Infantry side of the controversy between that regiment and the 38th Infantry, as to who stopped the Germans south of the Marne. There is, however, a notable absence of acrimonious matter.

This book is good reading. History records plenty concerning large units but only too little about small ones. The troop leading of the commander of an infantry regiment in battle should be of interest to all officers on duty at this School and this document is of special interest to the Infantry and Artillery Subsections.

Woolnough, F.G.—**A brief history of the Royal Tank Corps.** London, 1925.....M 9403-G5-C.42-A3

CONTENTS: Preface; The origin of the tank; The Mark I tank; Battle of the Somme, July, 1916; Organization; The battle of Arras, April, 1917; Second battle of Gaza, April 17, 1917; The battle of Messines, June 1917; The third battle of Ypres, July-August, 1917; Third battle of Gaza, November, 1917; Cambrai, November, 1917; Tank auxiliary services; Second battle of the Somme, March, 1918; Villers-Bretonneux, April 24th, 1918; Hamel, July 4th, 1918; Moreuil, July 17th, 1918; Amiens, August 8th, 1918; Bapaume and the second battle of Arras, August-September 1918; Epehy, September 17th, 1918; Battle of Cambrai—St. Quentin, September 27th, 1918; Battles of the Selle and Maubeuge, October, 1918; Comparison of types of tanks; Present units of the Royal Tank Corps; Deeds which won the Victoria Cross; Summary of awards gained by the Royal Tank Corps, 1917-1918; Army order 368 of 1923.

Reviewed by W. E. CHAMBERS

This is a primer for present day recruits of the British Royal Tank Corps written to foster an *esprit du corps*. Brief accounts are given of the origin of the tank, the creation and changes in organization of the tank corps, and the operations of British tank units on the Western Front and in Palestine from July 1916 to November 1918. Four rather inadequate outline maps of sectors in which British tanks were employed are included in the book.

While the accounts of operations are interesting and set forth some of the technical and mechanical difficulties encountered and overcome, there is little of tactical value in the book.

Bourget, J.M.—**Si Napoleon en 1914.** [If Napoleon in 1914.] Paris, 1930.....M 9403-H3-A

CONTENTS: Les schemas de la victoire—bataille de frontiere—la Marne; La course a la mer, le schema mis au rancart; Le probleme de la rupture et le triomphe du materialisme; Artois—Champagne—Artois—Champagne—Artois. . . Et Russie entrevue—1916; Angoisses—doutes—espoirs—1917; Avant la grande bataille; Nouvel echec d'un nouveau schema allemand—la campagne defensive de 1918; La bataille de Foch; L'amerturne de la gloire.

Reviewed by A. T. MCCONE

Scene: The General Officers' Mess in the Elysian Fields. On the bank of a little stream wandering peacefully under the trees is a small

figure. The man is impatient, rapidly walking up and down. The Emperor waits. Soon another figure is seen. A larger man, a grey man in grey, wearing a marshal's red kepi—Foch.

Bourget's book is the dialogue between the two Frenchmen of two centuries. Bourget's Napoleon is Napoleon, brilliant in thought, blunt in word. His Foch is—Foch. New "Maxims of War" are born before the readers' eyes. Bonaparte is still able to turn a phrase.

Bourget gives Napoleon a large mistrust of twentieth century methods. Railroads seem to be an especial *bête noir* to the Emperor. "Slaves to your ribbons of steel." As a result of railroad lines armies are tied down in their movements. World War strategy comes in for its share of Napoleonic gibes. "Technique and tactics stifle strategy," and again, "You were victims of materiel."

The value of the book? To the reader of French: several pleasant hours in agreeable style. To the military student: many germs of thought and food for ideas. To the admirers of Napoleon and Foch—Napoleon and Foch off parade. "The essential, on the earth, is that each one fulfill with his best effort the task to which he is called. You have fulfilled yours with all your strength, with all your will. You are worthy of your destiny. You have supported it without fail. That alone is important." Napoleon to Foch.

Aston, Sir George.—**Secret service.** London, 1930.....M 9403-H5-E4

CONTENTS: Author's preface; The story of army 'Intelligence,' 1865-1914; Personal memories of the naval intelligence department, 1896-1930; Random recollections; 1914; Well-kept secrets of the war; The raid to Ostend in 1914; Sry-rumors and a real spy; The worst-kept secret of the war; A dangerous spy, 1915; Jutland, 1916; 1916; Memories of Lord Kitchener; Some women spies, 1915-1917; Third-party crimes in America, 1914-1917; The U.S.A. and the Great War; A tragedy of secret service in the East, 1917; Allenby in Palestine, 1917; The Fifth British Army in March, 1918; The raid in Zeebrugge, 1918; Zeebrugge, 1918; St. George for England! The climax on the Western Front, 1918; A well-kept secret of the war, 1918; August 1918; The day of mourning of the German Army; Information from prisoners; German morale in 1918; Allenby in Palestine and Syria, 1918; The finale on the Western Front; Retrospect, and a forecast; Appendix: Conveying secret information; Index.

Reviewed by H. F. NICHOLS

As Sir George Aston's experience in military intelligence and secret service work began in the 1880's, and as most of his eminent service for the British Empire was connected with both naval and military intelligence, his writings on subjects connected with those departments may well be accepted as authoritative. Although any authority writing on this general subject, must necessarily remain silent on many phases and details of his work, the author has written for the amateur a fascinating account of military and naval intelligence, phases of military and naval art which have almost wholly developed during his lifetime. Even to a seasoned intelligence or secret-service man this book should prove of considerable value.

The general reader will find much interesting reading in the author's story of his early experience in various parts of the world in connection with the British Naval Intelligence Department, and in his work during the World War in The Admiralty War Staff. Both the general and technical reader will find worthwhile material in the accounts of *The Worst Kept Secret of the War*—Gallipoli; *The Well-kept Secret*—the attack on 8 August 1918, of Rawlinson's Fourth Army; The raids on Ostend in 1914, and on Zeebrugge in 1918; Naval intelligence prior to, during, and after Jutland; The end of Kitchener; Third-party crimes in America; The British Fifth Army in 1918; Allenby in Palestine; and many other operations.

To the G-2 Section this book should be of particular value for its many historical examples of the success or failure of military intelligence; to all military readers it is highly recommended.

Hosse, Carl.—**Die englisch-belgischen Aufmarschpläne gegen Deutschland vor dem Weltkriege.** [English-Belgian concentration march plans against Germany before the War.] Wien, 1930.....M 9403-H6-C.42-C9G

CONTENTS: Vorwort; Die Dokumente; Die englisch-belgische Militär-konvention von 1906; Die militärischen Beziehungen zwischen England und Belgien seit 1906 bis zum Kriege 1914; Dokumente in Abschrift und Übersetzung.

*Reviewed by L. P. HORSFALL*

In Germany, war guilt is a subject charged with emotional dynamite. Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty makes Germany assume the blame for the War, and was intended to serve in a measure as ethical justification for reparations claims. Intellectually and historically, Article 231 has produced useful results in causing victor and vanquished alike to study and restudy the documents bearing on the causes of the War.

Carl Hosse, the author of this book says: "In the investigation of the causes of the World War, and in placing the blame for starting the War, the German invasion of Belgium has played an entirely one-sided role." He presents, therefore, a military analysis of certain documents, including those secret papers that the Germans seized in Brussels in 1914, and deduces that Belgian pre-war actions were not strictly neutral, and that the English expected to use Belgian territory, with or without Belgian consent, and irrespective of whether Germany violated the neutrality guarantee.

The documents, charts and maps reproduced are from photostatic copies, because the original secret papers were returned to Belgium in 1919 in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty of Versailles. These copies, it is claimed, have been examined for authenticity by the American historian, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes.

The author was engaged in a study of the English, French, and Belgian plans and objectives before the War, and at the end of the War he had access to the Belgian documents and other source material. He presents the results of his research in this book.

The author's method of analysis is unique, in that it brings out and emphasizes the military elements in a document, as distinguished from purely political features, and points out their application to the operations actually undertaken at the beginning of the War.

The book is of value to this School as source material in the study of events leading up to the World War.

Herbillon, Colonel.—**Du Général en Chef au Gouvernement.** Souvenirs d'un officier de liaison pendant la guerre mondiale. [From the commander-in-chief to the government. Recollections of a liaison officer during the World War.] Paris, 1930. 2 volumes.....M 9403-H6-C.44-C3B

CONTENTS: Tome I: Sous le commandement du Général Joffre. Tome II: Sous les commandements des Généraux Nivelle et Pétain.

*Reviewed by N. F. RAMSEY*

This book is the diary of a liaison officer between the commander-in-chief of the French military forces and the French civil government. It covers the period from the beginning of the World War to December 31, 1916. The author gives an insight to the interrelation of military and political affairs but aside from that the book has little military value. With the recent passing of Marshal Joffre the book has an increased interest at this time as it covers the entire period of his command of the French armies.

Mordacq, General.—**Pouvait-on signer l'armistice à Berlin?** [Could the armistice have been signed at Berlin?] Paris, 1930.....M 9403-J2-C.44

CONTENTS: Preface; La situation politique chez les alliés en novembre 1918; La situation politique en Allemagne en novembre 1918; La situation stratégique chez les alliés en novembre

## Book Reviews

1918; La situation strategique en Allemagne en novembre 1918; Preparation de l'attaque de Lorraine; Preparation des operations de Baviere et d'Orient; Les resultats probables d'une offensive generale alliee en novembre 1918; Pourquoi cette offensive generale ne fut pas declenchee; Les enseignements strategiques; Les enseignements politiques; Conclusions. [Preface; The political situation of the Allies in November, 1918; The political situation in Germany in November 1918; The strategical situation of the Allies in November 1918; Preparations for the offensive in Lorraine; Preparations for the operations in Bavaria and in the Near East; The probable results of an Allied general offensive in November 1918; Why this general offensive was not launched; Strategical lessons; Political lessons; Conclusions.]

Reviewed by D. M. BEERE

The thesis of this book is that, considering the relative political and strategical situation of Germany and the Allies, it would have been entirely practicable for the Allies to have demanded Germany's unconditional surrender, and in case of Germany's refusal, to have decisively defeated her armies in the field.

As a result of either outcome the Armistice could have been signed in Berlin with resultant moral advantages in France's future relations with Germany. The factors preventing consummation of this result were, the Allies' lack of knowledge of the bad political conditions in Germany, the tired feelings of the Allies after four years of war, and above all, the lack of agreement amongst the Allies in their war aims, or objectives.

The principal interest of this book lies in the fact that General Mordeacq's views (since he was what may be termed Clemenceau's military private secretary) may be taken as representing the French viewpoint on many interesting high lights in the conduct of the last phases of the War. Of particular interest to Americans, is the French viewpoint on what Mordeacq terms "the paralyzed condition" of the First American Army in the early stages of the Meuse-Argonne (page 6 *et seq.*); of especial interest also are chapters IX and X which describe the preparations for the offensive in Lorraine projected for 14 November in which were to participate over twenty French divisions, with their left covered by an American Army.

The book should be of interest to the G-2 Section in study of any subject covered in the book's table of contents.

Palat, General.—**La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental.**

Tome XII: L'Annee d'angoisse, 1917. [The World War on the Western Front. Vol. XII: The year of anguish, 1917.] Paris, 1927. M 9403-J.44-A.44

CONTENTS: Premier plan d'offensive pour 1917; Second plan d'offensive pour 1917; Le general Nivelle et le haut commandement britannique; Rapports du general Nivelle avec les Italiens et les Russes; Les deux adversaires jusqu'à la Mi-Mars; Le repli allemand; Derniere conception de l'offensive d'avril; Demission du general Lyautey; Le general Nivelle et M. Painleve; La preparation de l'offensive; Les attaques britanniques; Les attaques francaises du 14 au 16 avril; Les attaques francaises du 17 au 21 avril; Arrêt de l'offensive au 22 avril; Du 22 au 30 avril; Du 1er au 15 mai; Le commandement du general Petain; Les mutineries; Les negociations serees; Juin et juillet sur le front Francais; Les batailles des Flandres; Combats sous Verdun; Bataille de la Malmaison; Bataille de Cambrai; Reflexions finales.

Reviewed by J. A. WOODRUFF

This is the twelfth volume of a history of the World War on the Western Front. The author gives a very complete general history of the War on the Western Front for the year 1917. It is of more value to a general reader than to a student of history as the credibility of the sources has been well questioned by numerous comments of Cru in his book *Temoins* (see index page 718). The sources of most of the statements are given in footnotes.

A great deal of space is devoted to the difficulties of coordinated command of the operations of the Allies and to the difficulties that General Nivelle had with the Allied commanders and with his civil superiors.

The descriptions of the military operations are very general in character and difficult to follow on account of the poor maps in this volume. There are four maps at the end: one to show Nivelle's offensive on the 16th of April 1917; one for the battle of Moronvillers, 17 April to 20 May;

one for the battle of Malmaison; and one for the battle of Cambrai. The description of the American efforts and installations in France in 1917 is very brief.

The book is worth reading for a general history of the War but is not recommended for study by any Section of this School.

Bircher, Dr. E.—**Die Schlacht bei Etche-Virton am 22. August**

1914. [The battle at Etche-Virton, 22 August 1914.] Berlin, 1930.....M 9403-J.44:4N5

CONTENTS: Vorwort; Auffassung der Lage bei der 5. deutschen Armee; 9. Inf. Div. am 21. August; Vormarsch der 9. deutschen Inf. Div.; Virton; Tätigkeit des franz. Korps Kdo. 2; Kämpfe der 9. preusz. Div. am Nachmittag; 10. preusz. Div. am 22./23. August; Vormarsch der 8. franz. Div.; Vorgehen der 53. württemberg. Inf. Brig.; Angriff der 54. württemberg. Inf. Brig. am 22. August; Angriff des 5. franz. Korps (Skizze); Angriff der 26. württemberg. Inf. Div.; Tätigkeit der Sanität; Das Gefecht bei Bellefontaine; Betrachtungen. [Introduction: Bibliographies—German and French; Summary of the situation of the German Fifth Army; The 9th Division on 21 August; Advance of the German 9th Division; Virton; Activities of the French II Corps command; Battles of the 9th Prussian Division in the afternoon; The 10th Prussian Division on 22-23 August; Advance of the French 7th Division; Advance of the 53rd Wurtemberg Brigade; Attack of the 54th Wurtemberg Brigade on 22 August; Attack of the French V Corps; Attack of the 26th Wurtemberg Division; Activities of the Medical Corps; The battle at Bellefontaine; Conclusions.]

Reviewed by A. VOLLMER

This volume, by an officer of a neutral army—well known for his studies of the battle of the Marne—presents a cross section of the opening battles of the World War from a tactical standpoint.

The considerable literature in existence on this battle had been collected by the author over a period of several years and is presented in a four page bibliography. His chief reliance for French source material has been *Les armées françaises dans la grande guerre* (Ministere de la Guerre), Tome I, especially the annex volume, as well as Colonel Grasset's studies, of which he lists six titles; for German source material, Volume I, *Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918* (Reichsarchiv). Next of importance he considers the unit histories and personal narratives of participants on both sides.

The volume represents a careful consideration from an impartial viewpoint of the events on both sides. The narrative, replete with original orders, can readily be followed by reference to the maps. The operations of all units—patrols to army—are presented under an interesting variety of situations such as battles in woods, in fog, and in villages, approach marches, from bivouacs, and from positions of readiness to fortified positions, close and distant reconnaissance by cavalry, etc.

The subject matter is of value to the G-2 Section of this School in historical research on the battles of the frontiers 1914.

Bloem, Walter.—**The advance from Mons, 1914.** (Translation from the German) London, 1930.....M 9403-J.44:4N5

CONTENTS: Foreword, by Brig.-General Sir James E. Edmonds; Diary of main events of the campaign on the Western Front in 1914.

Reviewed by H. W. HUNTLEY

The author, Captain Bloem, was, during the opening phases of the World War in command of a company of the 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers Regiment.

On the 8th of August, this regiment left its barracks at Frankfurt, entrained, and detained at Elsdorf where it began its march through Belgium and France. As a part of the 5th Division and a leading element of von Kluck's army, it participated in the battle of Mons and was with the advanced echelons of this army which arrived on the 5th of September at Sancy, about 50 miles east and slightly south of Paris, at the high tide of the German invasion.

As part of the advance guard, Captain Bloem's company participated in the battles against the British and French which took place during this



rapid advance; and also, as a part of the rear guard, in the retreat from Sancy to Soissons where his company took part in the battle of the Aisne. In this latter engagement, Captain Bloem was seriously wounded and the tale is brought to a close.

The book is a personal narrative of the experiences of the author and his company during the portion of the War above referred to. A well known author at the beginning of the War, he gives a very vivid account of the actions of his company and its members, during the long marches and the engagements which took place in the van of this great turning movement of von Kluck's army.

It is a most graphic and dramatic account of the War and well worth reading.

Spears, Brigadier-General E. L.—*Liaison, 1914*. A narrative of the great retreat. London, 1930.....M 9403-J.44:4N5

CONTENTS: Preface; List of illustrations; Maps; Author's foreword. Part I—The outbreak of war to the beginning of the retreat: Paris (July 27—August 4, 1914); Grant quartier general, Vitry-Le-Francois (August 5—8, 1914); Plan XVII (August 9—14, 1914); Fifth Army headquarters, Rethel (August 14, 1914); The fighting about Dinant and its consequences (August 14 and 15, 1914); Sir John French meets General Lanrezac (August 16 and 17, 1914); The move to the north (August 17, 18 and 19, 1914); The Fifth Army in position on the Sambre (August 20—21, 1914); The eve of Charleroi (August 21, 1914); The battle of Charleroi begins (August 22, 1914—I); The battle of Charleroi (August 22, 1914—II); The centre of the Fifth Army driven back (August 23, 1914—I); The German Third Army attacks the I. Corps on the Meuse—Lanrezac orders the Fifth Army to retire (August 23, 1914—II). Part II—The retreat and the battle of the Marne: The first day of the retreat (August 24, 1914—I); The first day of the retreat (August 24, 1914—II); The second day of the retreat (August 25, 1914); The conference at St. Quentin (August 26, 1914); Joffre orders a counter-attack (August 27, 1914); The fifth Army prepares to counter-attack (August 28, 1914); The battle of Guise (August 29, 1914); The perilous situation of the Fifth Army (August 30, 1914); A German cavalry corps threatens to cut off the retreat of the Fifth Army (August 31, 1914—I); Lord Kitchener decides to go to Paris (August 31, 1914—II); How the Fifth Army learnt that von Kluck was advancing south-east (September 1, 1914—I); Joffre begins to make his plans for an offensive (September 1, 1914—II); Chateau-Thierry (September 2, 1914); The dismissal of Lanrezac (September 3, 1914—I); Joffre's first offensive move (September 3, 1914—II); General Franchet d'Esperey in command of the Fifth Army (September 4, 1914); The eve of the Marne (September 5, 1914); What made the victory of the Marne possible; Episodes of the battle of the Marne and the pursuit to the Aisne (September 6—12, 1914); The bombardment of Reims and the end of the advance (September 13—14, 1914). Appendices; Index.

Reviewed by V. MEYER

If you are looking for an absorbing narrative of the great retreat and of the subsequent victory of the Marne, if you desire a deeper insight into the open warfare phase of the World War, and, above all, if you want an authentic and highly readable character study of Joffre, French, Lanrezac, Franchet d'Esperey, and many other commanders of that period, read *Liaison, 1914*, General Spear's noteworthy and timely contribution to the literature of the World War.

General Spears, who was a lieutenant of Hussars in the regular British Army in 1914, was on a mission to the French War Office prior to the declaration of war. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, he was ordered to report to the headquarters of General Lanrezac's Fifth French Army as liaison officer for the British forces, and he remained with that Army throughout the retreat and the battle of the Marne. Hence his knowledge of events is first-hand, and best of all, he was in a position to observe the cooperation and lack of cooperation between the British Expeditionary Force and the Fifth French Army.

Though intensely British, General Spears possesses great admiration for the French people and for their armies, and nothing happened during the hectic days of the battle of the frontiers, the retreat and the subsequent events on the Marne to cause him to modify this opinion in any way.

His work is a powerful antidote to the writings of Winston Churchill, Liddell Hart and others of their kind who have done every conceivable thing to decry and discredit General Joffre.

That Lieutenant Spears performed service of an unquestionably high nature, and that he was possessed of great discernment and acumen are

evidenced by the eulogistic words of Field Marshal French, as used by Winston Churchill in his preface to this volume.

General Spears has written a truly great memorial of Joffre. He has given us an accurate appreciation of the magnitude of Joffre's task and the magnificent way in which Joffre held himself absolute and undisputed head during this frightfully trying period. You should read the book without passing up a single page, nor will you have any difficulty in so doing, for the style is vivid, realistic and completely absorbing. The book is a brilliant piece of literature.

How General Spears regards Joffre is shown by the following extract, wherein the former recounts a meeting on August fifth:

General Joffre was walking up and down talking to his A.D.C., Captain Muller. He said a few words of greeting as I was brought up to him, then resumed his slow walk. His hands were clasped behind his broad back, he wore the red and gold cap of a French general, and a black tunic that from about the third button down sloped gently outward. His red breeches were baggy and ill-fitting. The outfit was completed by cylindrical leggings.

He had a big face, rather soft in texture, though not flabby, the hinges and sides of the jaw forming a bold outline. His chin was marked and determined. The whiteness of his hair, the lightness of his almost colourless blue eyes, which looked out from under big eyebrows the colour of salt and pepper, white predominating, and the tonelessness of his voice coming through the sieve of his big whitish mustache, all gave the impression of an albino. His cap was worn well forward so that the peak protected his eyes, which resulted in his having to tilt his head slightly to look at one.

A bulky, slow-moving, loosely-built man, in clothes that would have been the despair of Savile Row, yet unmistakably a soldier.

He looked placid. Placidity and calm were his dominant characteristics. He was impenetrably calm. Very often this trait baffled his subordinates. At times when expected to speak he did not utter a word. He has been known to arrive at a headquarters, listen in silence to what was said, and step back into his car without opening his mouth, leaving queries, questions and requests for orders buzzing around unvoiced in the heads of those he left behind. When this happened the effect was extremely comic to the onlooker. The group of generals and staff officers would remain riveted to the ground, gazing in dismay at the fast disappearing motor. When Joffre had finally vanished in a cloud of dust they would look at each other with consternation, turn their hands out in the expressive French gesture that means "What will you?" and shrugging their shoulders re-enter the headquarters building.

This is not to say that when Joffre had something to say he did not say it, merely that he remained silent if he had no positive ideas to put forward and no suggestions to make. He was always prepared to listen, and curiously enough seemed to have time upon most occasions to do so; even though very urgent matters required his attention he would never hurry or fluster the individual speaking to him.

His anger when roused was terrific in its concentrated quiet force, and was never withouted. There were then a few short gestures of the arms, the muffled voice rose half a tone, whilst the head was thrown slightly back, and the words that came forth from under the shaggy mustache were never either disregarded or forgotten. To the very end of the time when he held active command he kept absolute discipline among his generals. A corps commander whom his direct chief, the army commander, might find difficult to deal with, invariably became wonderfully tractable after a talk with General Joffre.

He had another quality, untried as yet, which proved of inestimable value: a great clarity of vision built upon a powerful self-confidence that made him entirely proof against getting "rattled." He was a man of great courage. Events were to show that he possessed a capacity for taking punishment that might have turned Jack Johnson grey with envy. It was perhaps this trait which enabled him to maintain a robust optimism in face of the appalling events now so close upon him. His shoulders appeared strong enough and broad enough to bear any responsibility, as indeed they proved to be. His silence strengthened this impression of strength. He obviously required no confidant, and certainly no commander was ever less under the influence of his Staff.

Such was Papa Joffre, *Le Grand-père* as his Army later called him, the man who at the moment carried as crushing a burden as has ever weighed down human shoulders.

This burden had not yet assumed the frightful weight that it became a few weeks later, but one could not help a feeling of awe coming over one at the sight of that man, by virtue of his position, the greatest of all the great men on the Allied side, in whom the hope of so many nations rested, the centre of interest of a planet, walking up and down, like any elderly bourgeois of the uninteresting little town of Vitry, whose habit it was to stroll of a summer evening before putting on his slippers and lighting his lamp.

On August 27th, Joffre ordered Lanrezac, whose army was then behind the Oise, to stage a counter-attack with his entire force. This action actually took place on the 29th of August and has gone down in history as the Battle of Guise. No sooner had Joffre issued specific orders to Lanrezac,



than the former received a really terrible message from Colonel Huguet, who was head of the French mission attached to the British Expeditionary Force. The purport of this message was that the British government might demand that the whole British Army be withdrawn to its base at Le Havre to reorganize. How Joffre took it is graphically set down by General Spears:

To General Joffre, Huguet's report must have been a facer. It is remarkable, and typical of the man, that he adhered to his plan for an attack by the Fifth Army under the circumstances. He showed that day that he possessed the very greatest quality of all in a commander, the courage to adhere to his plan when everything is going wrong and the only means of safety seems to consist in giving way and accepting a situation imposed by the enemy's action. What is involved, what tempering of soul is required, may be guessed at by those who have stood near the responsible Commander at such a time, but can only be known to the man who has had to make the decision.

Perhaps the most important bit of writing in the entire book is where General Spears proves conclusively that to Joffre alone, belongs the full and unstinted credit for the conception and execution of the victory of the Marne. To quote in part:

For years a steady and at times a violent campaign has raged, with the object of robbing General Joffre of the credit for the victory of the Marne and giving it instead to Gallieni. The documents referred to above, and others to be given in subsequent chapters, prove irrefutably that the claims put forward for General Gallieni by his supporters cannot be sustained. Gallieni's part in fighting the battle was an important one, but the conception and the responsibility were Joffre's alone. The operation in its final form which had to be prepared for by many preliminary movements, was based on one factor only, the change in the direction of the advance of von Kluck's Army to the south-east, which was not dreamed of by Gallieni till the evening of the 3rd (September), and only confirmed to him by Sordet's Cavalry and the Sixth Army aviation on the 4th, whereas General Joffre had been aware of it since the 31st. From September 1st onwards, keeping his own counsel, Joffre took all the necessary steps to place in Gallieni's hands, with an object all unknown to the latter, the means to take advantage of the German mistake. As, however, the possibility of an offensive depended upon many and complex factors, Joffre could not foretell the exact time or the exact place at which it would be launched.

In addition, General Spears in Appendix XXXIII, shows the sequence of events leading up to the battle of the Marne, in which he summarizes in two parallel columns the actions taken by Joffre and Gallieni. This table conclusively proves that from the 25th of August to 6:30 P.M., the 3d of September, Joffre alone was carefully, methodically and accurately preparing the great counter-offensive of the Marne which began on the 6th of September, whereas Gallieni does not begin to appear in the picture until 6:30 P.M., 3d September. The Appendix is too long to be quoted but it is of inestimable value as a reference for the instructor or student who is interested in this phase of the War.

Another outstanding feature of the book is General Spear's description of Lanrezac, an absorbing word picture of that much-discussed commander. This picture begins on 14th August when Lieutenant Spears reported at Fifth Army Headquarters at Reithel, a little town north of Rheims overlooking the Aisne, and the picture is developed and finally completed when Lanrezac is dismissed by Joffre in person at Fifth Army Headquarters at Sezanne on the 3d of September. To quote General Spears:

At Sezanne, H.Q. was installed in a school in front of which was a playground. In the late afternoon General Joffre suddenly appeared and sent for General Lanrezac. When the latter came out, the two Generals began to walk up and down the courtyard, whilst I and others watched with fascinated interest.

General Lanrezac was obviously dispirited and depressed. He talked a good deal and interrupted his walk now and then to make a point, but did not look at the Commander-in-Chief, and it was evident that the vigour he generally displayed in conversation was absent. His arms hung limp, he made no gestures except for an occasional movement of his hands. General Joffre appeared to be talking a little more than was his habit, but even this unusual effort on his part did not amount to saying more than a few sentences. At first he seemed to be speaking emphatically, then, after long silences, to be remonstrating gently. One gathered he might be saying: "No, it is not as bad as that."

How the news got about I do not know, but the whisper passed round: "The Commander-in-Chief is dismissing the General." For some time such a possibility had been in the air, and now the moment had come the atmosphere was electric.

The two big stout men, one fresh-coloured and calm, the other gray and haggard, continued to walk up and down. If the Commander-in-Chief were really dismissing Lanrezac his manner appeared to be very soothing and fatherly now.

I have no idea how long the scene lasted. It may have been short but it appeared to be endless, every moment weighed down by the fate of the coming battle.

Suddenly the two Generals disappeared. Probably they walked out of the playground, but the picture left in my memory is that one moment they stood there and the next they were gone. I never saw General Lanrezac again; few of the Fifth Army Staff can have done so. He left for Paris almost immediately.

I know none now than I did then concerning this famous and painful incident. General Joffre told Lanrezac as soon as he saw him at Sezanne that he had decided to replace him, saying that because of their friendship, because of the faith he had had in him, this was a particularly painful decision for him to take. Indeed it was no easy matter for the Commander-in-Chief, who had believed in Lanrezac, advanced his career, and trusted him with a high command, to dismiss him now, for to do so meant admitting his own failure in judgment.

Joffre went on to say that he had watched Lanrezac and had come to the conclusion that when he received an order he hesitated and did not know how to carry it out. He had all too obviously lost his grip, and events had proved to be too much for him, had in fact submerged him. He had no longer the decision, the energy, the determination or the morale to lead an army. I know that Joffre received the impression (and was much astonished, for it seemed extraordinary to him) that Lanrezac's attitude when told he was no longer in command was that of a man immensely relieved, and that his whole face lighted up. General Joffre has been known to say that amazing as it might seem, Lanrezac told him in the courtyard at Sezanne that the decision he had taken to relieve him was the right one. General Lanrezac in his book gives a very different account, and I must say it was not my impression at the time that he appeared to be relieved or pleased. No one will ever know exactly what passed between the two men, for as so often happens, the picture left in the memory of the one was quite different from that remembered by the other.

That the dismissal of Lanrezac was unquestionably justifiable is plainly evident. During those agonizing weeks that Lanrezac was in command of the Fifth Army, his every action showed procrastination, and complete indecision. He did just one big thing: he correctly estimated the German movement through Belgium, promptly transmitted his estimate to French G.Q.G. and was disappointed and chagrined when Joffre and his staff failed to accept it. In this one episode, Lanrezac was right and Joffre was wrong. From then on, Lanrezac did nothing right, except his counter-attack at Guise which was made "with one eye on Joffre" as General Spears expresses it. Lanrezac lost confidence in G.Q.G., and gradually—very gradually—G.Q.G. lost confidence in him. He became querulous, disloyal, lost faith in the fighting qualities of his own troops, and antagonised Marshal French. The latter strongly suspected his good faith. As a result, cooperation between the British Expeditionary Force and the Fifth French Army was practically nullified, and might have resulted altogether fatally but for the succession of Franchet d'Esperey to the command of the Fifth Army in the very nick of time. Lanrezac never wanted to fight; his one aim was to find a piece of ground further to the rear where conditions for combat would be more ideal. He had the professor's mind, analytical and keen, but he also had what professors—especially military professors—should guard against, the inability to make a decision when confronted with a practical problem. Says General Spears:

Having been a lecturer, and a brilliant one, at the French Staff College, he had contracted the habit of expounding his views before an audience, and rather liked wandering into one of the rooms where the staff were working to expound his impressions and theories. . . . General Lanrezac knew his ability as a professor. He realised his power in argument. He had confidence in his own intelligence and in his effectiveness as a military critic. But these qualities only strengthened his tendency to cavil at the orders he received. The attitude of open criticism he allowed himself to adopt towards the Commander-in-Chief and the G.Q.G. made it impossible for him to retain his command.

In General Franchet d'Esperey, who succeeded to the command of the Fifth Army on the third of September, we find the very antithesis of Lanrezac. General Spear's highlights on his character are worth quoting. Says he:

I wager the war was not long enough to allow any of those who met the General that morning to forget the galvanic shock he gave them.

D'Esperey's words were short and to the point. He was going to tolerate no weakness amongst the troops. Any dereliction of duty would be visited with the extreme penalty. If this was to be the rule for the troops who were exposed to every danger and of whom so much was asked, was he to adopt a different standard for staff officers, especially for his own? Far from it. Slackness, mistakes, lack of zeal or of intelligence were crimes in staff officers. Anyone who failed in his duty would be shot. It was easy to see from the faces of the officers as they streamed out of the Army Commander's room that they knew he meant every word he said. A certain rather stout lieutenant colonel who had come in for d'Esperey's unfavourable notice looked as if he had fallen down several flights of stairs.

The officer of gendarmerie attached to H.Q. also got into trouble. The H.Q. premises were not kept tidy enough. He was threatened with condign punishment. From then on passages and courtyards were kept as neat as an old maid's front parlour.

General Franchet d'Esperey was short and square. His hair was cut *en brosse*. Seen from the back, his head reminded one of a howitzer shell. His broad face, with high cheek bones and straight jaw, was a series of parallel lines, straight top to his head, straight eyebrows, straight toothbrush moustache, straight chin. He moved quickly, almost fiercely, bent arms keeping time like those of a runner with the movement of his legs. His dark eyes were piercing, his voice sharp, his diction precise. Olympian, the whole weight of responsibility rested on his shoulders alone. He kept all in their place by his manner. Never did he solicit or permit advice or suggestions which indeed no one would have dared to offer. He was a genuine commander, the very man to lead the battered, discouraged but not demoralized Fifth Army.

As the stress of battle increased d'Esperey grew fiercer, more intolerant and more difficult of approach. He seemed almost to have instituted a reign of terror. Malik was appointed his A.D.C., but soon broke down under the strain.

Later in the war I found myself attached once more to General d'Esperey, and found him as the Commander of a Group of Armies an affable and even a jovial gentleman. I often spoke of his attitude in 1914 compared with that of later years to officers who served with him, and their conclusion was that in the early days of his command he adopted a fierce and uncompromising manner of set policy. To deal with a terrible emergency, when the fate of his country depended upon his success or failure, to give the Army depressed by retreat the sensation of a strong hand on the helm, he deliberately banished everything that was kindly in his nature, and became a fearsome demi-god of war. His success justified his method.

The book very properly deals with events as they occurred in chronological order. The third chapter goes into a detailed discussion of the *French Plan XVII*, which was based on the supposition that the French and German Armies would meet only on the common frontier and that there would be no violation of neutral territory. The author stresses the fact that this was a preconceived idea of the French high command and that the war proved time and again how difficult it was to eradicate preconceived ideas from the military mind. That is his explanation for Joffre failing to credit the Fifth Army intelligence reports of the German enveloping movement through Belgium. Not until the 15th of August did Joffre thoroughly appreciate the changed situation and then says Spears:

Once the French Commander-in-Chief abandoned his own plans and began to submit to the necessity of moving his troops to parry the German manoeuvre, his chance of dealing the enemy the first strategic blow on the ground he had chosen vanished. Although he did not realise it, although he struggled hard to adapt his dispositions to the new situation, he could now do nothing but attempt to ward off the danger until such time as a better knowledge of the German plans might enable him to deliver a counter-thrust. As will be seen, he made a bold attempt which failed, to turn the tables on the enemy by an attack on his centre; but from the moment General Lanrezac's Army turned north, General Joffre's hands were tied. He was compelled to cast aside his own conceptions. Groping in the dark, he was moving to meet a danger which had not yet assumed a definite form and was forced to concentrate on parrying the German movements as they gradually revealed themselves.

From this moment *Plan XVII* went by the board.

The volume contains 474 pages of text of extraordinary value, 100 pages of equally worth-while appendices, 14 well-executed maps and sketches, and a complete index. Part I deals with the period from the outbreak of the War to the beginning of the retreat on the 23d of August. Part II chronicles the retreat and the battle of the Marne.

If you fail to read this book, you are missing one of the great treats of World War literature, but worse than that, you are passing up a fund of intensely practical information set forth in absorbing fashion by General Spears.

**Documents allemands sur la bataille de la Marne.** [German documents on the battle of the Marne.] Paris, 1930

M 9403-J.44:4N-5M

CONTENTS: Preface; Mon rapport sur la bataille de la Marne par le General Feldmarechal von Bulow; Jusqu'a la Marne en 1914, par le General Tappen; La mission du Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch par le Lieutenant-Colonel Müller-Loebnitz; Croquis.

*Translation of Preface by N. B. BRISCOE*

[Note: References \* are to footnotes found at end of the translation.]

Of all the battles of the World War the battle of the Marne will go down in history, if not as the most costly and bloody, at least as the greatest by reason of the importance, both material and moral, of its results.

For us French it will be, in the eyes of foreigners and of future generations, the indisputable testimony of the valor of our troops and the superiority of our high command.

For our old adversaries it will be the eternal proof of the failure of their audacious plan of campaign, and, according to what they say, their first defeat.

This defeat they have always denied, deny now, and always will deny. But the ardent polemics which, across the Rhine, treat of the subject of the retreat of the German armies on the 9th and 10th of September, 1914, are themselves only an avowal. What were the causes, what were the responsible factors, of that retreat? Is it absolutely necessary to reply? Such are the essential points of these polemics in the course of which opinion has been led by consequence to seek the ones blamable for the "check at the Marne."

Five personalities have been viewed particularly: General von Kluck, ex-commander of the First Army; General von Bülow, ex-commander of the Second Army; General von Hausen, commander of the Third Army; Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, chief of the Information Section of the General Staff of General von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the armies in the Field; and finally General von Moltke himself.

With what is each one reproached? General von Kluck: (1) with not having executed the order of von Moltke of 2 September directing him to follow the Second Army (von Bülow) in echelon in order to cover, towards Paris, the right flank of the German dispositions; (2) with not having obeyed immediately, on 5 September, the new order of von Moltke directing him to place his army opposing Paris, between the Oise and the Marne; and (3), after having been surprised on his right flank, to the north of Meaux, by the French army of General Manoury, with having moved all his forces to the north of the Marne, thus opening between his own army and that of von Bülow a large gap into which the right wing of the English and the left wing of the French Fifth Army were able to penetrate.

Von Bülow is reproached for having initiated a retreat on 9 September on the basis of two inaccurate and unverified hypotheses to the effect that the position of the First Army, west of the Ourcq, was untenable and that the situation of his own right wing to the east of Montmirail was desperate; he is reproached also for not having kept in mind at this stage the success of his left wing at Fere-Champenoise.

To von Hentsch, sent on a mission on 8 September, by von Moltke, to the armies of the right wing to learn their situation and coordinate their eventual operations, is given reproach, on one hand for not having completely fulfilled his mission in not pressing von Bülow to continue to resist, and on the other hand for exceeding his authority in ordering the First Army to conform to the movements of von Bülow.

Reproach attaches to General von Bülow and his immediate assistants for abandonment of the Schlieffen plan, which, if it had been followed, would have assured victory to the German armies on the Marne.

The persons placed on trial have replied in various manners to these accusations.

General von Kluck has published his work, *The March on Paris* [\*1]; his Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl, his study on *The Campaign of the Marne in 1914* [\*2]; General von Bulow his *Report on the Battle of the Marne in 1914* [\*3].

Colonel Hentsch asked General Ludendorff in 1917, if he would be willing to have an inquiry made as to his (Hentsch's) role during the days 8 to 10 September 1914, and the Historical Service of the Reich committed itself, after the War, to a minute study of this question, and it was made the subject of a study entitled *The Mission of Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch 8 to 10 September 1914*, by W. Müller-Loebnitz, Colonel, Retired.

But the principal collaborator of General von Moltke, General Tappen, who, in 1914, was von Moltke's chief of operations, has published a short brochure on the first two months of the War, *Up to the Marne in 1914* [\*4], in which he exposes the principal reasons that led the Supreme Command to conduct the operations as it did.

Finally General von Hausen, who in 1914 commanded the Third Army, which was operating to the east of von Bülow's Army, has published also a work entitled, *Memories of the Campaign of the Marne in 1914* [\*5], to destroy the legend that his army, composed entirely of Saxon troops, did not efficaciously support the Prussian troops of von Bülow, and thus caused the retreat of the Second Army and consequently caused the "check at the Marne."

Among these works, three—those of von Kluck, von Kuhl, and von Hausen—have already been translated and published in French in the *Collection of memoirs, studies and documents*, serving as a history of the World War. The present volume contains the translation of three others, those of von Bulow, Tappen, and Müller-Loebnitz.

The French reader has, then, in addition, the possibility of judging for himself by these documents the conduct of German operations during the campaign of the Marne and of forming a personal opinion of the polemics arising across the Rhine.

#### FOOTNOTES

The works cited in the Preface above quoted are found in the C & GSS Library as indicated below.

- \*1. General von KLUCK: *The march on Paris and the battle of the Marne.* (Translation from the German) Class No.: M 9403-J.44:4-N5.43
- \*2. General von KUHLE: *La campagne de la Marne en 1914.* [The Marne campaign in 1914.] (Translation from the German into French) Class No.: M 9403-J.44:4-N5.43
- \*3. General von BULOEW: *Mon Rapport sur la Bataille de la Marne.* [My report of the battle of the Marne.] (Translation from the German into French) Class No.: M 9403-J.44:4-N5.43
- \*4. General TAPPEN: *Bis zur Marne 1914.* [Up to the Marne in 1914.] Class No.: M 9403-J.44:4-N5.43
- \*5. General von HAUSEN: *Souvenirs de la campagne de la Marne en 1914.* [Recollections of the Marne campaign in 1914.] (Translation from the German into French) Class No.: M 9403-J.44:4-N5.43

Larcher, Commandant M.—*La grande guerre dans les Balkans, direction de la guerre.* [The World War in the Balkans. The conduct of the War.] Paris, 1929.....M 9403-J.49-A

CONTENTS: Preface; Introduction. Le theatre de guerre des Balkans en 1914; Avant la guerre de coalition (1914 et debut de 1915); L'etape turque (1915); L'etape serbe (fin 1915); L'etape roumaine (1916); L'etape grecque (1917 a mars 1918); L'etape bulgare (mars 1918 a octobre 1918); L'etape decisive (octobre 1918); Conclusion generale; Tables des annexes; Appendices. [Preface; Introduction; Before the Coalition; The Turkish phase; The Serbian phase; The Roumanian phase; The Greek phase; The Bulgarian phase; The decisive phase; Table of annexes.]

Reviewed by J. C. DRAIN

The author contends that the Balkan States thought that they could stay out of the World War, as did the big states of the Allied Powers, but each in turn was forced to change its point of view. The purpose of this book is to prove that it would have been better for the Allies to have foreseen the big role the Balkan States were to play and to have exerted a direct control supervised by French authorities.

The work in spite of its length and detail is interestingly written and gives a broad background of the political and military situation in the Balkans.

To a student of military history this book is suitable for reference purposes.

Gorges, Brigadier General E. Howard.—**The Great War in West Africa.** London, 1930. M 9403-J-6-K

CONTENTS: List of illustrations. Soldiering on the "Coast" in the pre-war days—Seirra Leone—Freetown—The West African Regiment (W.A.R.)—The G.O.C.—The elements at play—Order to mobilise; The Governor and Commander-in-Chief—The garrison—The railway—Armament—The West India Regiment—The West African Regiment and its officers—"Digging in"—Pidgin or trade English—Togoland—German proposals for neutrality in Africa—Invasion of Togoland—Franco-British co-operation—Conquest and surrender of Togoland; The Cameroons—Brief history—Boundaries—The country—The climate—Towns and communications—Products and industry—Fauna—Inhabitants; The inception of the Cameroon Expeditionary Force—The situation in Nigeria—First step towards an offensive—A cruiser ordered to Duala—Allied conference of 15th August, 1914—Movements of H.M.S. "Cumberland"—Military plans—Modification of original plans—More German neutrality intrigues—Military forces in West Africa in 1914; Naval operations off the Cameroon Coast—The "Cumberland's" reconnaissance—The Nigerian flotilla—Description of Duala neighbourhood—Proposed base in Amba Bay—Operations in Amba Bay—Base established off Suellaba; German preparations at Duala—Native disaffection—Terrorism—Naval activity 10th to 12th September—The "Nachtigal" episode—Torpedo attack on the "Dwarf"—Sinking of the "Nachtigal"—Further boat reconnaissances—Clearance and buoyage of the main channel—Military operations on the Nigerian frontier; Formation of the Expeditionary Force—Its concentration at Suellaba—Operation in the Lungasi River—Surrender of Duala—Situation following the surrender—Clearing the neighbourhood; Continuance of amphibious operations—Capture of Jabassi, Edea, Victoria and Buea. Operations along the Northern railway—Advance from railhead to Dschang—Capture of Dschang Fort—Withdrawal from Dschang—Germans attack the French at Edea—Revival of enemy activity in the Bare district; Situation in March 1915—Naval activity—Brigadier General Cunliffe's operations in Northern Cameroons ending with the capture of Ngaundere—General Dobell's first advance against Yaunde—Jottings from the Northern Railway—Heavy rains impede operations in the south—Attempt to reduce Mora—Conference at Duala; Situation in October 1915—Converging columns move towards Yaunde—General Cunliffe's drive from the north—Capture of Banyo Mountain—Occupation of Fumban; Fall of Yaunde—Situation mid-January 1916—Germans escape into neutral territory—Capitulations of Mora—A medical memoir—Some acknowledgments and observations—"Thy kingdom is divided"—Valedictory. Appendices; Index.

Reviewed by J. C. WHITCOMB

A narrative account for the lay reader of the conquest of the German colony, the Cameroons, by native troops under British and French leadership, from its start in August 1914 to its completion January 1, 1916. The author commanded one of the three regiments of the British West African Frontier Force (WAFF).

The strategy of the campaign comprised the blockade of the coast and the capture of successive German positions from the coast inland.

The tactics are not described in detail, but usually involved long and difficult marches through the jungle and the capture of prepared positions after a short siege. Only small units were usually involved, containing very little artillery and no aviation. There is a brief resume of the diseases most prevalent. The maps are not very good.

Rawson, Geoffrey.—**Earl Beatty, admiral of the fleet, Viscount Boredale and Baron Beatty of the North Sea and of Brooksby.** London, 1930. M 942-B92 (BE)

CONTENTS: List of illustrations; The first ten years; The Nile; China; Critical years; Rear-Admiral; Opening of war to Scarborough raid; The battle of Jutland; The closing stages; Commander-in-Chief; First sea lord; Epilogue; Index.



Reviewed by J. A. O'CONNOR

This is an interesting and instructive account of the naval life of Admiral Beatty. As a setting for the story it includes a brief review of the development, and of the main problems, of the English navy during the period of Beatty's service. Attention is confined in general to the main events and conditions and the part Beatty takes, and their influence on his character and development.

This book is of value to this School because it is a story of a prominent naval leader and the essential characteristics of leadership are the same in both the military and naval professions.

Churchill, Winston S.—**A roving commission; my early life.** 1930

M 942-B92 (CH)

CONTENTS: Author's preface; Childhood; Harrow; Examinations; Sandhurst; The Fourth Hussars; Cuba; Hounslow; India; Education at Bangalore; The Malakand Field Force; The Mamund Valley; The Tirah expedition; A difficulty with Kitchener; The eve of Omdurman; The sensations of a cavalry charge; I leave the Army; Oldham; With Buller to the Cape; The armored train; In durance vile; I escape from the Boers; Back to the Army; Soion Kop; The relief of Ladysmith; In the Orange Free State; Johannesburg and Pretoria; The khaki election; The House of Commons; Index; Illustrations and maps.

Reviewed by L. H. WATSON

This book is an account of the life of Winston S. Churchill from his birth in 1874 until he entered Parliament in 1908. It consists of a narrative of personal experiences of the author, and his views on many persons and events during the period covered. It is very well written, makes interesting reading, and contains some valuable information, particularly about the activities of the British in India, Egypt, and South Africa.

The author describes events many of which he witnessed as a war correspondent. His training as an army officer made him particularly well fitted to describe the military events which he witnessed. His influence, due to his family (his father was Prime Minister of England), gave him access to important leaders, and files, and opportunities to observe events which less fortunate men could not obtain. The book was written many years after the events took place, but was written from the author's notes made at the time the events occurred. A summary of the topics covered, follows:

*Educational System in England.* A description of the life of a boy at English preparatory schools including St. James School, and Harrow. It explains at some length the subjects taught, the teaching methods employed, and details the daily life of a student at these schools. It explains how students at some of these schools may specialize for an army career, the method of entrance to Sandhurst, and describes the studies taught and the daily life at that school.

*Troop duty in England.* A description of the daily life, and methods of training in the Fourth Hussars while on duty in England.

*Polo.* The importance of polo in the life of a British cavalry officer is shown throughout the book. Some interesting facts with respect to methods of obtaining and training ponies, and of financing the game are stated.

*Politics.* Many important political events of the period are discussed, in many cases after interviews of the author with the political leaders concerned.

*Cuba.* The author narrates his experiences as an observer in 1895 with a Spanish force in Cuba which was engaged in guerrilla warfare with the Cuban rebels.

*India.* A description of the daily life on a British army post in India; of the relation between the British troops and the native Indian troops; of the methods employed by the British army in pacifying native tribes; including an interesting account of the Malakand Field Force in its campaign against Afridis and the other tribes in the Mamund and Tirah valleys.

*Egypt.* A vivid account of the campaign of Kitchener's army against the Dervishes which culminated in the battle of Omduran. This account is quite complete, including the organization of Kitchener's army, its method of advance up the Nile, its method of supply, a detailed account of the battle of Omduran, including the pursuit after the battle, and its political importance.

*South Africa.* An account of the events leading up to the Boer War and an estimate of the capabilities of the political and military leaders, both British and Boer. Included is a description of life in the Boer prison at Pretoria, and escape from the prison. A detailed account is given of the advance of General Buller's army to the relief of Ladysmith, and of the advance of Lord Roberts' Army from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.

The accounts of military events in Cuba, India, Egypt and South Africa are of particular interest to this School. The book has great cultural value and appears to be an accurate account of the events of the period covered.

MacMunn, Lieut. General Sir George.—**Behind the scenes in many wars.** Being the military reminiscences of Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn. London, 1930.....M 942-B92 (MA)

CONTENTS: List of illustrations; The King's gambit; Kashmir and the frontier; The Boer War and the Waziri border; Simla, under Lord Kitchener; Lahore, Simla and the Durbar; Duty at the War Office; Preparation—and 1914; The Dardanelles; Suvla Bay; The evacuation of Suvla and Anzac; Helles, Egypt and Sinai; Basra and the two rivers; The turn of the tide; The Mesopotamian command, 1919; Army headquarters in India after the War; Quarter-mastering the Army, India; Index.

*Reviewed by A. GIBSON*

This is Lieutenant General Sir George MacMunn's story of his thirty-six years as an officer in the British Army. It is told with humor and frankness and takes one into the atmosphere of the British Army as it was before the World War and as it became during the War and afterwards. The author had an exceptional opportunity to know and to evaluate many of the important leaders in the British Army and to gain an understanding of important events through his connection therewith in important general staff and administrative positions.

The author's career included service as: a subaltern in Indian border fighting, an artilleryman in the South African War, a general staff officer helping reorganize the Indian Army in accordance with Kitchener's ideas, a general staff officer at Whitehall working out the war plans for the remount service, a general staff officer for supply for the Dardanelles expedition, as Inspector General of communications in Mesopotamia and finally after the war as commanding general in Mesopotamia and later as Quarter-master General of the Indian Army.

The border fighting as a subaltern in India puts us in the atmosphere of Kipling's India. The varied experiences in the South African theater are told briefly but with graphic interest. Lord Kitchener and senior commanders in general, come in for a very frank evaluation that is not all on the plus side. Kitchener acted with harmful arbitrariness in situations where he had not informed himself of the facts. This criticism conforms to what has been leveled at Kitchener by others for certain acts during the World War.

General MacMunn after completing the Staff College course went out to India as a general staff officer to assist in carrying out Lord Kitchener's scheme for the reorganization of the Indian Army. An important feature of this reorganization was the institution of a General Staff along the lines of the General Staff of the British Army. Some insight is given to the Kitchener—Curzon controversy and also to the seemingly muddled system of staff and administration for the Indian Army previous to the Kitchener reforms.



An amusing sidelight is given on the General Staff situation in the Indian Army which might readily have been paralleled in our own pre-war army. Lord Kitchener asked the Chief of Staff for the plan for an Afghan war. There were plans for aiding Afghanistan in a war against Russia, but, strange as it may seem, no plan for a war in which Afghanistan might be an enemy. Lord Kitchener was informed that the plan was with the printer being revised and would be through the press in a few days. It was then that Col. MacMunn and his assistants worked three days and three nights to draw up a war plan against Afghanistan for presentation to Lord Kitchener at the time tentatively promised for the imaginary plan to be through the press. Col. Jack Cowans (afterwards Quartermaster General of the British Forces in the World War) was in charge of the Military Operations Section of the General Staff of the Indian Army. The work of Col. MacMunn on this war plan had its effect in causing Gen. Cowans to select Col. MacMunn later for many important missions both before and during the World War.

General MacMunn's estimate of certain qualities of the British soldier is instructive. He states: "There is another aspect of the British soldier which I have always noticed and which the World War has emphasized, and that is that he positively likes getting killed, which is a very useful trait, and his imperturbable good humour never fails if (and it is an important if), he is properly led and fed. L and F are what matters with plenty of stress on the F."

As a General Staff officer at Whitehall he prepared the war plan for the remount service and when the War broke, put it into execution.

As in this country so in Great Britain, the War Department General Staff, at the outbreak of the World War, sought service in the field. He states: "The cardinal fact that the General Staff jaunted to France and left no one to control the affairs of an Empire at war, will be ever remembered. The fact has been very bitterly referred to in Mr. Ashmead Bartlett's unpleasant but sadly accurate *Uncensored Dardanelles*, and there is no doubt that but for it the folly of the Dardanelles in the actual form the expedition took could not have taken place."

Soon after the Dardanelles expedition got under way and the supply situation was well snarled up, he was sent out (through the recommendation of Sir John Cowans), as a general staff officer to unsnarl the tangle. With station on the Island of Mudros he helped bring order out of the chaos of supply and continued upon this duty until the almost miraculously successful evacuation had been achieved. The problems of supply, the mistakes that were made and the solutions arrived at have important general lessons for any staff officer and especially for the supply services. His comments on the Dardanelles expedition as a whole are brief but valuable. His comments on the problems facing Sir Ian Hamilton and on his solutions are critically frank and illuminating. His estimate that the battle of Basra (at the start of the Mesopotamian campaign) will some day be recognized as one of the decisive battles of the War if not the world, is interesting. He considers that if the British had lost this battle the whole Moslem world might have risen in arms against the Empire.

Upon the completion of the Dardanelles affair, Col. MacMunn served for a time in Egypt and then upon the recommendation of Sir John Cowans, was sent to Mesopotamia to untangle the supply and transportation snarl there as Inspector General of communications. After the close of the War he was for a time commander-in-chief in the Mesopotamian area. The Mesopotamian job was an Augean stable performance. To follow him through is one way to obtain an excellent idea of the difficulties under which the British operated in this region and to gain some valuable lessons in principles of supply.

As Quartermaster General of India he gives an insight to the supply and transportation problems and systems of the Indian army and incident-

tally some sidelights on the problems of Indian administration in general and of the personalities carrying it on.

The book is particularly valuable to the G-4 Section.

Seeckt, General von.—**Thoughts of a soldier.** With an introduction by General Sir Ian Hamilton. (Translation from the German) London, 1930.....M 9403-B9 (SE)

CONTENTS: Foreword; Introduction; Catchwords. Symbols: Frederick's day; Schlieffen's day; Hindenburg; An old Swedish flag; The roll of honour. Problems: Statesman and soldier; The attainable object; Modern armies; Army and state; Modern cavalry; The chief of the General Staff. The essential thing.

*Reviewed by J. B. JOHNSON*

This book is a collection of short essays by an author whose experiences as Chief of the General Staff of corps and armies in campaign have covered wider fields of action in that capacity than any other living man. His chapters on *Statesman and Soldier* and *Army and State* are clearly expressed discussions of the proper relation of political and military establishments. His chapters on *The Chief of the General Staff* and *The Essential Thing* [i.e. Action] should be read by every officer. And finally his chapters on *Modern Armies* and *Modern Cavalry* present a point of view which no serious student of the art of war can afford to overlook. Briefly the one conceives warfare of the future as being waged by small super-efficient, super-mobile armies with the resources of the nation as a reservoir behind it. The other presents his view that cavalry if trained, equipped and led on modern lines is far more important today than it has ever been.

This book should be of interest to every Section in the School.

D'Auvergne, Edmund B.—**The prodigious marshal.** Being the life and extraordinary adventures of Maurice de Saxe, Marshal of France, son of the King of Poland, conqueror of the English, pretender to the dukedom of Kurland, and universal lover. 1931.....M 944-B92 (SA)

CONTENTS: Preface; Maurice's birth and parentage; Childhood; Maurice follows in his father's footsteps; Having made Saxony too hot for him, Maurice goes to Paris; Maurice falls in love; The Duchy of Kurland; The fight for a dukedom; Which princess does Maurice want?; The fight for the ducal crown; Adrienne welcomes back Maurice; The alleged poison plot; Adrienne Lecouvreur dies protesting her love for Maurice; The camp at Mühlberg; Death of Augustus the Strong; Beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession; Maurice visits Moscow; The French lose ground; Louis XV determines to assist the Pretender; Maurice takes command of an army in Flanders; Maurice takes Brussels; A third victory at Laufeld; Maurice de Saxe falls in love with an actor's wife and succeeds in seducing her; "Revenant de la revue"; Maurice dies.

*Reviewed by H. THOMPSON*

This is a narrative life history of Maurice de Saxe, Marshal of France, eldest illegitimate son of Augustus the "Strong," Elector of Saxony and King of Poland.

As the most famous of the 354 by-the-left-hand-offspring of Augustus II (his nickname "The Strong" is surely ironical!), Maurice of Saxony is not wholly unknown to the military student. His campaigns have been described by contemporary and by later French military officers. This book is of the life of the Marshal, the author treating him as a distinct personality, and there are reasons.

Comprehensive indeed is the picture presented of this Count of Saxony, against the background of eighteenth century Germany and France. We see the brief courtship of the Elector of Saxony and the Countess Aurora von Königsmark, a spinster abbess; the birth of their natural son, his early surroundings and his half-legitimised recognition, while still a youth.

This partial recognition had a great influence over nearly his whole life, for it surely stimulated his unfortunate ambitions. Early a soldier of fortune, his greatest exploits as a soldier were under the banners of

France. In between times his attempts to get the Dukedom of Kurland, and their near success are epic. His defense of the town-house at Mitau recalls Dumas.

Extremely intelligent, a Hercules in strength, cynical yet pitying, knowing men and despising them, Gargantuan eater, drinker and lover, he arrests and compels the attention. He whipped the British in three distinct actions, Fontenay among them; he nearly married two Princesses, one after another, of whom one became Empress of Russia; he had the confidence of Louis XV, to whose son, the Dauphin of France, Saxe married his niece; esteemed by the Great Frederic, surely his life challenges our interest, even if he was most selfish and callous.

This comprehensive history is of general interest.

Oman, Charles.—**A history of the Peninsular War.** Vol. VII:

August 1813-April 14, 1814. The capture of St. Sebastian, Wellington's invasion of France, Battles of the Nivelle, the Nive, Orthez and Toulouse. London, 1930

M 946-06-E3-C-42

CONTENTS: Preface; St. Sebastian and San Marcial; The east coast in the autumn of 1813; Wellington enters France; The battles of the Nive; Wellington on the Adour, December 1813-February 1814; End of the war on the east coast, January-April 1814; The campaign of Toulouse, March-April 1814; The place of the Peninsular War in history; Appendices; Index.

*Reviewed by W. C. PHILOON*

This is the final volume of the author's most excellent work on the Peninsular War, a work which has extended over a period of twenty-eight years. This last volume covers the period of Wellington's invasion of France to the close of the war. While there is less of interest to the student of tactics and of purely military strategy than in Volume VI, for example, this present work does deal with the relationship and bearing of this campaign on the one involving the allied nations against Napoleon, which was going on farther north at the same time. Wellington's dealings with, and his attitude toward, the French people are also well covered.

The professional knowledge of any officer will be broadened by reading this and the earlier volumes of the series.

Andrew, Prince of Greece.—**Towards disaster.** The Greek Army in

Asia Minor in 1921. (Translation from the Greek) London, 1930

M 956-095

CONTENTS: Preface; Introduction; List of illustrations; List of maps. From June 23rd to July 23rd; From July 23rd to August 13th; August 14th to September 30th. Epilogue; Index.

*Reviewed by P. MENOHER*

A detailed and interesting account of the Greek Army in Asia Minor in 1921 by a corps commander. The campaign toward Angora by the small Greek Army, across a desert, poorly supplied, poorly trained and poorly led, offers many illustrations of how not to conduct such a campaign. The account is a defense of the Prince's against certain charges made against him by others in the campaign.

Of general interest to all officers and of special interest as a study in command problems.

Joubert, Lieutenant J.—**Lettres du Maroc.** L'Offensive dans le

Riff, 1925. Le Tache de Taza, 1926. [Letters from Morocco.

The offensive in the Riff, 1925. The Tache de Taza, 1926.] Paris,

1930

M 964-04

CONTENTS: Preface. Dans le Riff (juillet 1925-juin 1926); La Tache de Taza, 1926.

*Reviewed by R. C. SMITH*

This collection of letters gives a very readable and interesting account of the campaign in the Riff country in 1925 and of the operations against Taza in the summer of 1926.

In the Riff campaign, the author was assigned to a "mobile group" consisting of three infantry battalions, a squadron of light cavalry, a company of tanks, and a battery of mountain artillery.

The descriptions of the country and of the incidents of campaign are interesting and of some value to a study of small wars. Otherwise there is little that is of practical military value.

Lejeune, Major General John A.—**The reminiscences of a Marine.**

1930.....M 973-B92 (LE)

CONTENTS: My forefathers; Boyhood and college days; The Naval Academy, 1884-1888; Two years' cruise as a naval cadet; I become a Marine and get married; The Spanish-American War; Pensacola and Panama; Washington, the Philippines, Japan; Army War College, New York; Expeditionary duty; Advanced base force maneuvers on Culebra Island, West Indies—Occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico; Duty as the Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps; Overseas, via Quantico; Service with the 35th and 32nd Divisions, A.E.F.; The Second Division; Nancy-Marbache, Colombey-Lea Belles; Battle of St. Mihiel; The battle of Blanc Mont Ridge; The battle of Meuse Argonne; After the Armistice and the march to the Rhine; Seven months on the Rhine; Homeward bound; Eight years and eight months as Major General Commandant; The Virginia military institute; Illustrations.

*Reviewed by S. C. GODFREY*

This is the story of a soldier, told simply and at times eloquently, as when the author says:

There is no substitute for the spiritual, in war. Miracles must be wrought if victories are to be won, and to work miracles men's hearts must needs be afire with self-sacrificing love for each other, for their units, for their divisions, and for their country.

But it is more than a personal narrative. General Lejeune is peculiarly fitted to tell the story of the Marine Corps and its notable contribution to our military history. Early attracted to that corps, he elected to join it after graduating from Annapolis. His service in the Spanish-American War, in Panama (during the days of the establishment of that state as a republic), in the occupation of Vera Cruz and in other expeditions to the Caribbean area, gave him an intimate understanding of the development of our Navy and Marine Corps which resulted inevitably from our expanding interests in the Caribbean. In Washington and at Quantico, early in the World War, he helped to shape the rapid expansion and preparation of the Marine Corps for service in France. After the war, he served with distinction for eight years as its Commandant. No one can speak of the Marines with more authority and greater devotion than can General Lejeune.

During the period from July 1918 (after Soissons) till August 1919, General Lejeune was a division commander of the United States Army. During this year all his interests and efforts were as intimately associated with the 2d Division as they had been previously with the Marine Corps. The story of St. Mihiel, of Blanc Mont Ridge, of the Meuse-Argonne, and of the outstanding accomplishments of the division in all three engagements, is convincingly told, from the divisional viewpoint. General Lejeune's feeling about the 2d Division is summed up in his words to General Summerall, the V Corps Commander, just before the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne:

"General, the Second Division officers will carry out orders because of their *esprit*, their pride in and love for their division, and their devotion to the cause for which they are fighting. In fact, we have come to feel that it matters but little what happens to us as individuals, and that the only things which really matter are the welfare of the great Division to which we belong and the speedy and decisive defeat of the enemy."

Worthy of special note are the author's comments on leadership. General Lejeune believes not in driving men through fear, but rather in the type of leadership that instills loyalty through consideration and fairness, and that inspires through personal example a desire to follow the leader through thick and thin. "Personally, I preferred to see the looks of affec-

tion in the eyes of the men when I went about among them than to know that they feared and dreaded my visits." A number of interesting incidents are related which illustrated this view-point. A very human book,—and one that should be of interest to every soldier.

## GENERAL

Pitkin, Walter B.—**The psychology of achievement.** 1930.....150

CONTENTS: To the lords of the great tomorrow; The Prince and the Pauper; Our problem; Success and achievement; The factors of achievement; Energy; Interest; Emotions; Intelligence and achievement; You and the great tomorrow; Glossary; Index.

Reviewed by O. WESTOVER

This book is an intensely interesting exploration into the broad field of human endeavor, for the announced purpose of analyzing those factors which are essential to high achievement and stressing the need for specialized education for those found to possess the qualities which make for achievement.

The author states in the beginning that he does not propose to teach the *ordinary man* how to achieve anything—that the ordinary man achieves nothing except by luck. Nor does the author undertake to exhort the ordinary man to drive onward and upward—to do so would incite him to false hopes, overstrain, and "all the perversions of the Success Club." He believes that only a few persons are endowed with that rare combination of energy, sensitivity, insight, and persistence which leads to high achievement, and that only *those* few should be encouraged thus to use their high powers. They are the few citizens upon whom the great future development in statecraft, finance, commerce, education, culture, and the sciences will depend. To find these few citizens is the first task; the author devotes his efforts in this volume to analyzing how this may be done (calling it "Euthenic psychology")—and promises another book later on the subject of training such selected individuals "along the lines of their maximal abilities" and how to "guide them into work where opportunities are best adapted to their abilities."

The author considers *Success* as embracing two sciences: "job analysis" and "personal analysis"; neither of which can be boiled down to a few pretty formulae. *Achievement*, on the other hand, is defined as "distinguished successful endeavor, usually in the face of difficulties. As such, it always possesses two characteristics; first, a certain superiority of *aim*; and secondly, exceptional skill in *execution*." The art underlying any given achievement is a "regulated process of *exceptional skill* in attaining a superior desired end."

As a further condition for success, the author states that a man must put his whole soul into some high endeavor, and then defines that soul as consisting of the entire system of traits, which men call his personality. He enunciates all of these in detail; a man's sensitivities, his general intelligence, his mechanical intelligence, his abstract intelligence, his social intelligence, his dexterities of hand, foot, mouth, and body, his interests, his training, his health, and his temperament; to all of which he adds those traits which make up a man's ego. He shows personality charts which are indeed interesting, but far from convincing. After citing many examples of personalities, with a view to bringing out the various factors of achievement, the author concentrates his attention to an analysis of the following especially important factors of high achievement: energy, interest, emotions, and intelligence.

His chapter on *Energy*, the most important of the four major factors, is extremely interesting, and includes a discussion of the sources of free energy (the endocrine glands and potassium), about which the average

man knows little or nothing. Next in interest in this book is the chapter on *Emotions and Achievement*, which gives an excellent analysis of those emotions which are favorable and those which are unfavorable to achievement. Among the important revelations of this chapter is the tabulation of those personal traits which cause a person to be generally disliked: failure to keep promises, being unwilling to go out of one's way to help others, indulging in exaggerations, being sarcastic, showing off how much one knows, exhibiting superiority, bossing people whom one does not employ, reprimanding people for acts one disapproves of, being caught at making fun of people behind their backs, and dominating.

In the chapter on *Intelligence and Achievement*, the author shows that although most achievements occur in some field such as industry, business, finance, and politics, where many individuals engage in teamwork, there are three factors that usually combine in obscuring the truth regarding the intellectuality of the great leader. These three factors are: first, the spotlight; second, the legitimate and illegitimate pooling of intellectual resources for group action; and third, ignorance as to the intelligence required for the leader's work. By previous analysis, the author shows that a man who achieves many things over a long span of years is more likely to achieve efficiently, whereas one who achieves something notable only once or twice in a life time is probably an inefficient worker.

The reader, in endeavoring to follow the analyses presented and illustrated with innumerable references to personalities, becomes thoroughly amazed at the depth and breadth of observation and accomplishment in human endeavor, and is not in the least pleased when he reads this statement: "In a word, I am trying to tell you that all achieving is a matter of relativity"; thus putting his book on a plane with the Einstein theory, which the reader now probably knows is about to be discarded by Professor Einstein himself.

The author is undoubtedly recognized as an authority on his subject. His previous educational training, both here and abroad, and his experience in psychological research, qualify him to write on the subject. He is a prolific writer, whose efforts are by no means confined to this particular field of research.

This book will hold the interest of any one who reads it. Like the study of astrology, the reader will find many favorable aspects and likewise a great number of unfavorable factors. After being initiated into a perfect maze of more or less conflicting illustrations of personalities, the reader will undoubtedly conclude with the author that after all achievement, as analyzed by the author, is but a matter of relativity.

Army and Navy officers will be interested in the author's analysis of the effect of service social life in stunting individual achievement, as follows:

If you wish to see how this rule fails where it is most sternly applied, look over the admirals and captains of any navy on earth; or the generals and colonels of any army. What a dead clutter of dunderheads! What titans of stupidity! They always have been the world's worst jokes. And, they do not know it, all because their spirits have been crushed and their personalities moulded to the form of dead submissiveness. Not a spark of aggressiveness, not a flicker of initiative, not a gleam of understanding for new ideas and bold projects.

Douglas, Norman.—**Good-bye to western culture.** Some foot-  
notes on East and West. 1930.....301

Reviewed by H. L. FLYNN

This book consists of a record of observations comparing the natives of European and Oriental culture. The reflections inspiring it were originally induced by a reading of *Mother India*, and continued as a result of observing some of the results of the imposition of the forms of western culture upon sections of Asiatic peoples. These results are not always, or even often, fortunate.

The author does not find oriental culture perfect, or altogether admirable, by any means, but he does not see that an alteration of the habits



and customs making up a mature civilization of the East, to conform to the recently evolved and rapidly changing ideas of the West, will produce an improvement. Rather he sees the wrecking of the culture of the West in the attempt.

There is no suggestion of remedies in the book; the author has no ambition as a reformer. The book is a series of observations and of implications deduced therefrom, as the sub-title says, *Some Footnotes*.

Wilkinson, Harold L.—**The world's population problems and a white Australia.** London, 1930.....312

CONTENTS: Preface; The population of the world; The over-populated continents: Europe; The over-populated continents: Asia; The under-populated continents: North and South America; The under-populated continents: Africa; The under-populated continents: Australia and New Zealand; Adjusting the world's population by migration; Immigration restriction laws; Interbreeding and segregation of races; Conclusions; The "White Australia" policy; Circumstances determining Australia's population; Historical record of immigration restriction in Australia; The peopling of Australia; Peopling tropical Australia; Development of industry in Australia; The finance of Australian development; The standard of living in Australia; Australia without restrictions to immigration; Conclusion; Appendix; Index.

Reviewed by L. D. DAVIS

While this book gives quite a thorough discussion of the subject it brings nothing essentially new, particularly as viewed from the world standpoint. The author is in general agreement with such authorities as East and Thompson. He believes, as strongly as does Thompson, that over-population in certain areas is a condition, and not a state of mind, and that within a few decades, if present tendencies are not checked, some new wars will find themselves generated.

If the book does fail to present any interesting new aspects of the general question, that cannot be said of its discussion concerning the more local Australian questions of immigration, population, and living conditions. Like all Australians, the author is strongly and determinedly against letting down the bars of their very restrictive immigration policies. But recognizing, as he does, that certain countries, Japan for example, have a real condition of over-population with limited natural resources in land, coal, and ores, the author advances the rather novel proposition that it might be considered to be Australia's duty to the world to grant such countries a preferential tariff, thus favoring them as a market for manufactured goods. By this means these over-populated countries will be enabled to care for their own people through the increased industrialization which would result from such extension of her foreign markets. However, for the real and lasting correction of over-population birth control is the preferred way.

Fischer, Louis.—**The Soviets in world affairs.** A history of relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. 2 volumes. London, 1930.....327.47 (A)

CONTENTS: Vol. I: The bolsheviks make peace; Ally and enemy; 'Big' allied intervention; The Paris Peace Conference; The Allies and the Whites; White Poland vs. Red Russia; The armistice between two worlds; America, Japan, and Soviet Russia; The Genoa conference; In the Royal Dutch capital; Disarmament and Bolshevism; Revolutionary Russia and revolutionary Turkey; Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia; The Curzon ultimatum; Ruhr, Russia, and revolution; The passing of Lenin.

Vol. II: Soviet Russia enters the comity of nations; Rapallo weighed in the balance; Locarno or Rapallo?; Anti-Locarno; Bright rays in France; Dark clouds over London; Moscow and the Chinese Revolution; The British rupture with Russia; The after-effects of the break with England; The Bolshevik war scare; Shall the world disarm? The Kellogg and Litvinov Facts; Moscow entertains a king; The Manchurian crisis; Soviet-American business; The presumption of Anglo-Soviet relations; Conclusion; Problems of a revolutionary foreign policy; Appendix I; Index.

Reviewed by R. O. BARTON

This book covers in considerable detail, the course of Soviet foreign relations from the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution to 1930. It is a cross section of post-war international relations and history in Europe, Asia, and America, with emphasis on the part played by Russia.

In tracing the Bolshevik foreign policy, the foreign policies (specifically relative to Russia, but generally among themselves) of Great Britain, France, America, Germany, Italy, Japan, and many smaller powers, are also traced.

Particularly interesting are the following:

- Early efforts of the various powers to destroy the Soviet.
- Efforts of the Soviets to incite world revolution.
- The influence of trade, and debt collection on foreign relations.
- The influence of fear of Bolshevik propaganda.
- The natural leaning of Russians and the people of the East toward one another; especially the sketch of the Turkish, and the very excellent study of the Chinese, revolutions.

The book is well annotated and seemingly authoritative. It is well worth reading. It is especially worth reading by the professional soldier in that it gives several historical examples of the breaking down of armies by means of propaganda, based on adverse conditions other than military; and it indicates the constant readiness of the Soviet to try to break down future "capitalistic" armies by similar means.

**Interpretations of American foreign policy. (Lectures on the Harris Foundation 1930). 1930.....327.73 (A)**

CONTENTS: Foreword; The foreign policy of the United States; Canada's concern in American foreign policy; Europe and the United States: I. The United States of Europe and of America. II. The United States and the United Kingdom; Latin America and the United States: I. The recognition of revolutionary governments. II. The Havana and Washington Conferences; The Far East and the United States: I. American foreign policy from a Japanese viewpoint. II. Japan at the crossroads. III. The balance of power in the Western Pacific. Index.

*Reviewed by O. ALLEN*

This is a series of eight lectures given by the Harris Foundation 1930. Lectures, at the University of Chicago, by recognized authorities and on the subjects indicated in the contents.

The first lecture gives a clear and understanding statement of the foreign policy of the United States. Each of the others covers in a concise way the interpretation placed upon the foreign policy of the United States from the viewpoint of the nationalities enumerated.

**Survey of American foreign relations, 1930. 1930.....327.73 (A)**

CONTENTS: Preface; The new Pacific: The United States in the Pacific and Far East; The emergence of modern China; Post-War Pacific diplomacy; Economic relations; The Philippines in Pacific relations; Islands of the Pacific; Migration in the Pacific area. World order and coordination: Limitation of armament; The first test of the Pact of Paris. Post-war financial relations: The Young Plan; War credits and war debt of Greece; Alien enemy property; Appendix; Index.

*Reviewed by J. C. WHITCOMB*

A reliable and authoritative text prepared under the direction of Charles P. Howland and published by the Council of Foreign Relations. Very interesting to the general reader; an indispensable reference for G-2 Section and students of modern history.

The work is divided into three sections. Section I, *The New Pacific* (342 pages), comprises two-thirds of the book and is an outline history of our Pacific relations from Samuel Shaw's arrival in Canton in 1784 to the present time. The detailed scope of this Section is shown in *Contents* above.

Section II, *World Order and Coordination*, is a survey of the attempts at disarmament with a brief discussion of each.

Section III, *Post-War Financial Relations*, is an outline discussion of the outstanding features of this matter under the chapter heads indicated in *Contents*.

The *Tables of Contents* include those of the *Surveys* of 1928 and 1929. There is an index which is excellent, complete.



Graham, John W.—**Britain and America.** The Merttens lecture, 1930. London, 1930.....327.73 (.42)

CONTENTS: Prefatory note; History: 1776-1914; The Great War; The League of Nations; The Kellogg Pact; Naval reduction; The freedom of the seas; War debts; Protection; The present day; Bibliography.

Reviewed by O. ALLEN

The first chapter outlines briefly the national development of the foreign policy of the United States, as viewed from the English standpoint. The subsequent chapters deal with the attitude of the United States towards the League of Nations, freedom of the seas, and other pertinent factors developed by the United States as a result of the World War, all from the English viewpoint.

To the student desiring to make a study of Anglo-American relations, as a result of American participation in the World War, this book gives in a brief scope the English viewpoint on the outstanding debatable questions such as war debts, naval reduction, the tariff question, and the necessity of American participation in the League of Nations.

Carman, Harry J.—**Social and economic history of the United States.** Vol. I: From handicraft to factory, 1500-1820. 1930. 330.973

CONTENTS: Preface; The old world expands; The colonial farmer; The colonial merchant and manufacturer; The conflict of interests; Revolution and independence; The struggle for control; The turn of the century; Two generations of western frontiersmen; Index.

Reviewed by H. S. MILLER

This work is an excellent, but abridged, social and economic history of the United States—"From Handicraft to Factory"—during the period terminating with the year 1820.

To furnish a suitable background the first chapter deals with the economic awakening of medieval Europe and the migration to colonial America. In the subsequent chapters the social and economic development of, first, the English colonies and, second, the United States is treated in an interesting and lucid manner.

The book is authoritative and well arranged, with numerous maps, charts and illustrations. A valuable feature is the comprehensive list of reliable sources—"Suggested Readings"—appertaining to and immediately following each chapter.

Early in the present century a movement was initiated by certain historians, such as James Harvey Robinson, Professor A. M. Schlesinger, and others, to change our history texts, both school and college, from being largely compilations of political happenings to more "balanced" presentations of human development. Some efforts in this direction were quite "pink" in complexion, minimizing or almost entirely eliminating war and its influences. This book is not in the latter category, but it faithfully adheres to the subject indicated by the title.

It is of value to anyone interested in the general history of the United States.

Flügel, Felix and Faulkner, Harold U.—**Readings in the economic and social history of the United States.** 1929.....330.973

CONTENTS: Introduction; Preface. Part I. The Revolutionary War and the struggle for economic independence—1775-1820: Some economic aspects of the Revolutionary War; Industrial progress, 1783-1820; Currency and banking—1791 to the establishment of the second United States Bank (1816); Commercial development—From the close of the Revolutionary War to 1820; Expansion into the West, 1783-1820. Part II. Economic expansion—1820 to the Civil War: Agriculture and the extractive industries—1820 to the Civil War; Development of commerce—1820 to the Civil War; Growth of manufacture—1820 to the Civil War; The tariff, money and banking; Development of the means of communication; The Westward movement after 1820. Immigration and the growth and distribution of population; Slavery and the Civil War. Part III. Economic expansion since the Civil War: Manufacturing and the tariff; Business consolidation; Transportation and communication; Finance, currency and banking; Recent agricultural tendencies; Labor and immigration; Economic imperialism; Index.

*Reviewed by H. S. MILLER*

This book is a very valuable and a historically reliable contribution to the literature on the social and economic history of the United States during the period from about 1775 to 1925.

Out of the great mass of analytical descriptive, statistical and controversial material on this subject it is extremely difficult to present in a book of 900 pages a satisfactory collection of readings on the economic and social history of the United States. However, the editors have shown noteworthy discrimination in their selections and commendable logic in their arrangement.

The organization of the book with a view to facilitating collateral reading is very satisfactory and should prove of great value to the student bent on attaining a comprehensive knowledge of any included period or topic.

This book is of special value to one who is making a detailed study of any phase of the economic history of the United States.

Lewisohn, S.A., Draper, E.G., Commons, J.R. and Lescoghier, D.D.—

**Can business prevent unemployment? 1925.....331.137**

CONTENTS: Prefatory note; A new attitude toward unemployment; How some of us have met unemployment; The facts of unemployment; The costs of unemployment; Public policies to relieve unemployment; Insurance against unemployment; Bibliography.

*Reviewed by R. R. WELSHMER*

Following exhaustive research by the authors, this recent book sets forth in a readable and concise manner the new attitude towards unemployment, its causes, its costs, and present and proposed remedies therefor.

The authoritative nature of the book may be judged from the facts that Mr. Lewisohn is Vice President of The Miami Copper Company, Mr. Draper the assistant to the President of the Hills Brothers Company, and Mr. Commons and Mr. Lescoghier are Professors of Economics, University of Wisconsin.

The book is of general interest to all officers and of particular interest to those connected with the courses in political economy.

Feis, Herbert.—**Europe, the world's banker, 1870-1914.** An account of European foreign investment and the connection of world finance with diplomacy before the war. London, 1930.....332.09

CONTENTS: Introduction; Preface: The record of capital movement: British foreign investment; French foreign investment; German foreign investment. Relations between finance and government in the lending countries: Finance and government in Great Britain; Finance and government in France; Finance and government in Germany. Studies in lending and borrowing: Introduction; Nonintercourse between France and the Central Powers; The financing of Imperial Russia; The financing of Italy by rival alliances; The financing of Portugal—a debtor with a noble past; The financing of the Balkan States; The financing of the Balkan railways; The Turkish Empire and European investors; The financing of railroads in Asiatic Turkey; The financing of Persia: Between two imperial ambitions; Finance and fate in North Africa; Japan is helped to become a great power; The financing of the Chinese government; Concluding observations—by way of apostrophe.

*Reviewed by H. C. INGLES*

The book is a publication of the Council of Foreign Relations. It takes up the extent and geographical spread of the foreign lending of the principal European powers before the World War. The nature of the international financial transactions of the bankers of each nation are clearly described. British bankers loaned from financial motives and to any government or foreign enterprise which offered a fair return and adequate security. French and German financial policy was carefully controlled by the governments. France endeavored to secure a political advantage for every loan. The French government endeavored to force French private capital to loan to governments with which France desired political alliances. The Germans loaned relatively small sums abroad and then only as dictated by their

government. They endeavored to use private loans as a means of German expansion.

The author traces the financial history of the principal debtor states of Europe. He shows how they secured their funds and the purposes for which they were used.

The book sounds a warning against politically controlled international finance. It leaves one with the distinct conclusion that only England exercised any reasonable financial acumen in her foreign lending.

The author does not advance the theory that the creditor-debtor situation of Europe was an underlying cause of the World War. However, he does demonstrate quite conclusively that the financial situation was the principal cause of the political alignments during the War.

The book is of value to the G-2 Section.

Beard, Charles A. and Beard, William.—**The American leviathan; the republic in the machine age.** 1930.....342.73

CONTENTS: Preface; Government in a technological society; The constitution of the United States; Fundamental principles of the federal system; Parties and opinions; The federal judiciary; The structure of Congress; Congress in operation; The nomination and election of the President; The office of President; Administrative organization and practice; Taxation, finance and supplies; Transportation; Communication; The promotion of business enterprise; Labor and immigration; Agricultural interests; Natural resources; Public health, safety, and morals; Measurements and planning; Federal relations with the states; Territories and empire; Nature and conduct of foreign relations; The war machine; Bibliographical note; Index.

Reviewed by E. O. SAUNDERS

*The American leviathan; the republic in the machine age* is a splendid consideration of the political machinery of the nation and its operation under present conditions. The authors have proceeded on the theory that under the pressure of the forces of technology, government has become an economic and technical business requiring scientific procedure as distinguished from "the instinctive, emotional, rule-of-thumb operations of historic politics."

In Chapter II they consider the Constitution in a matter-of-fact way that is easily understandable and is also illuminative and interesting. Every one of the twenty-three chapters of the text is equally interesting, instructive, but no consideration has been given to what might possibly have been in the minds of the founders of our government when the Constitution was adopted. On the other hand, the authors conclude that economic and social conditions existing today demand an intelligent utilization of the Constitution as a means to good government rather than the end of our governmental endeavors.

The last chapter is entitled *The War Machine*. In the opinion of the authors, "No function of government has been more completely revolutionized by technology than warfare." They consider this relation of civil and military authority in a way that will interest, even if it fails to convince, the military theorist who believes wars are won only on a field of battle.

The subject matter of the text is in my opinion, of particular interest and value to any military student or casual observer of national affairs.

Vassilyev, A.—**The Ochrana.** The Russian secret police. 1930. 351.740947

CONTENTS: Introduction; Author's introduction; Functions of the Ochrana; Secret collaborators or assistants; Agents provocateurs and provocation (direct incitement); The Central Agency; A police gazette for the Tsar; The government and the Jewish question; Russian dissenters; Spy-fever; Rasputin; The Tibetan Doctor Dadmeyev; Rasputin's murderers; The first inquiries made by the police, inquiries on all sides; From Nihilism to Socialism; My appointment as Chief of the Police; Disintegration of the Army at the Front; The morning of the Revolution; Difficult plight of the Imperial officials; The Revolutionary Regime in the fortress; Days of terror; Some pleasant recollections of my imprisonment; The Tsar's pocket-handkerchief; The Tscheka and its founder, Jershinsky; Collapse of Communist economic system; Social conditions in Bolshevik Russia; Index.

Reviewed by J. C. WHITCOMB

The author "grew up" in the *Ochrana*, to become its head, and finally the last Chief of Police (of all Russia) under the Tsar. He escaped from

Russia after the revolution and died in poverty in France in 1928. The book is extremely interesting though obviously colored by the author's fanatic belief that the *Ochhrana* could do no wrong.

The first five chapters contain a detailed account of the organization, training and technique of the organization, and several murders, plots, frustrations and so on. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the Jews, and the religious and political sects of Russia.

Chapter 8 deals with spies and spy fever at the beginning of the War. Herein is an interesting digression on the ineptitude of high command in the army with particular reference to railway logistics and its serious economic and moral effect on the country as a whole.

Chapters 9 to 13 inclusive will perhaps be of greatest interest to the general reader. Herein is an apparently honest description of Rasputin (a rare thing), his life, habits, power, weaknesses and historical importance. The detailed account of his murder is accompanied by extracts from depositions of witnesses taken during the investigation made by the author while Chief of Police.

The remaining chapters of the book, give the personal experiences of the author during the revolution, recite the present plight of Russia, and compare the *Ochhrana* with its Soviet successor, the *Tscheka*.

This book is a valuable addition to Russian history. Of its subject, the author was in a position to know more than any other man, and his honesty is generally conceded. His bias is his intense monarchism and sincere conviction of the moral justification of the Russian Secret Police.

Cain, James M.—**Our government.** 1930.....353

CONTENTS: Preface; The President; Congress; State government—the Governor; State government—the Legislature; The administration of justice—Counsel; The administration of justice—the Judiciary; The administration of justice—the jury; County government—the commissioners; County government—the school system; County government—the sheriff; Town government—the commissioners; The military forces of the United States.

*Reviewed by H. L. FLYNN*

This book is an examination of the operations of several of the branches of the American national, state, county, and city governments, treated humorously.

The method of handling the subject is to select some typical problem of a particular branch of government, usually on the basis of newspaper clippings, and then to reconstruct the manner in which it would be dealt with by the typical agents of that branch of government. Although the treatment in most instances is humorous the pictures presented do not in any way strain the credulity of an unprejudiced and obscure reader.

An exception, save for some superficial conversational embroidery, to the generally humorous trend of the book, is found in Chapter XII, *The Military Forces of the United States*, which is a narration of an experience of the author in attempting to deliver an attack order of the 79th Division to the commander of the 157th Brigade on the night of 26-27 September 1918.

Baeza, Senor Don L. de.—**Brighter Spanish.** London, 1930.....468

*Reviewed by H. THOMPSON*

This work is a successful presentation, although brief, of current Spanish expressions and idioms. Several well known texts exist on Spanish idioms (and few languages are richer than the Castilian in this respect), such as Becker and Mora, Monteverde, Belen and others. These however present the subject matter in compiled lists.

*Brighter Spanish* however is in a different form. No chapters, as such, appear, instead, we find sections with but vague dividing lines, but continuing in fair sequence.

The first forty-eight pages are devoted to simple idiomatic phrases and expressions, that are current and up to date. As stated, this phase is far

from complete, in comparison with the detailed table compilations of Becker and Mora.

From page 49 to page 63, we find simple idioms referring to the home, to man, the hand, arm and finger, the sea, the body and head. Follow some ten pages of appropriate proverbs.

Pages 76 to 89 are given over to descriptions of different Spanish provincial types, in themselves brief but interesting.

Beginning with page 92, we have a description of a trip made by a young married couple, from London to Spain. The various pictures presented include a London flat, a visit to the ticket agency, the arrival at Hendaya, the experiences at that port of customs, Madrid with its theatres, restaurants, art galleries and an automobile trip outside the capital, all in racy idiomatic Spanish. A brief resume of a bull-fight is found on pages 162-175, with brief explanations as to the terms used in *tauromaquia* (art of bull-fighting).

Examples of correspondence with explanations and a few pages on certain grammatical usages referring to gender, number, the subjunctive and the verbs *ser* and *estar*, with commercial phrases, complete this interesting work.

The text is of value to the student who has studied the language at least a year.

Villar, Emilio H.—**America sajona.** [Anglo-Saxon America.] Barcelona, [1931].....917.3

CONTENTS: Introduccion; La America del Norte Sajona.—Ojeada general comparativa; Estados Unidos.—El territorio; Estados Unidos.—Los habitantes; Estados Unidos.—Explotacion del territorio por los habitantes; Las Colonias Inglesas; Conclusion. [North America (The United States, Canada and other British possessions); The United States—the territory; The United States—the inhabitants; The United States—development of the country by the inhabitants; The British Colonies; Conclusions.]

Reviewed by H. THOMPSON

Although dating from 1910, this brief geographical hand-book is interesting in its presentation of geographic, economic and very limited historical data, to be expected in a so-called "pocket-size" book. The number of references is perforce brief.

The supplement on page 278, is perhaps the most interesting feature for the American reader, being a rapid summing up of the anthropologic, geographic, lingual, economic and cultural factors entering into the general make-up of the country. In all a very fair and unprejudiced viewpoint.

This book may be of interest to students of Spanish, as the style is easy of translation.

Koch-Weser, Erich.—**Germany in the post-war world.** (Translation from the German) 1930.....943.085

CONTENTS: Introduction; Part one: Probing the past; Present-day powers that be; Doctrines of the post-war world; Germany from 1919 to 1930. Part two: Scanning the future; A German foreign policy platform; The Central European situation; Pan-Europe; The German realm; Conclusion; Index.

Reviewed by H. L. FLYNN

This volume is a condensed account of German foreign relations since the World War and an attempt to indicate the future problems lying along the same line of development.

There is first a review of the economic and political conditions of the United States, Russia and the British Empire, as they affect the foreign relations of those nations, particularly their relations with Germany. This is followed by a discussion of the decline of European influence in world affairs, and a discussion of the status of the doctrines of nationalism, imperialism and pacifism throughout the world in the period since the War. Following this discussion there is an account of German political and economic conditions during the period from the Armistice to the present day, and of German foreign relations during the same time.

The second half of the book is an attempt to indicate Germany's future position in the world.

The conclusions presented are brief and very general in their nature. Their trend may be deduced from the following:

More than ever, cool deliberation should distinguish the foreign policies of all peoples. It is not only Germany's culture but that of the entire world that is seriously threatened. Today, it is no longer the vertical separation of Europe into different peoples that is fraught with danger, but rather the horizontal division of Europe into classes. . . . Never, in this world, was there enough wealth to go around . . . if there is not enough gold and goods in this world to go around, why are large amounts of national wealth squandered in unprofitable armaments?"

While the book is, in general, an expression of opinion, the authoritativeness of the author's acquaintance with the facts upon which are based the opinions he expresses is sufficiently indicated by the fact that he is chairman of the Democratic Party of Germany, has been vice-chancellor, minister of the interior and minister of justice of the republic, and is a scientifically trained, professional political leader, a student of law and political science in the universities of Lausanne, Bonn, Munich and Berlin. He has travelled recently in all the countries he discusses.

Chamberlin, William Henry.—**Soviet Russia.** A living record and a history. 1930.....947.09

CONTENTS: Introduction; The historical background; The face of the Russian land; The Communist Party; Personalities of the Revolution; The class state; The balance sheet of socialism; Labor as aristocracy; Karl Marx and the Peasant-Sphinx; The Babel Tower of nationalities; Main currents in foreign policy; The general staff of the world revolution; The revolution in education and culture; The struggle for the Russian soul; Young Russia; The tragedy of the Russian Intelligentsia; Russia and world capital; Daughters of the Russian Revolution; Liberty in the Soviet state; Whither Russia; Bibliography; Index.

*Reviewed by G. S. BROWNELL*

The author is an American journalist who has lived seven years in Russia. His book is an apparently unbiased effort to portray existing conditions in Soviet Russia against the historical background culminating in the revolution of 1917, which is given in the final chapter. It is an exceptionally interesting and readable account of present-day Russia and of the aim, organization and workings of the Soviet government.

There is only a brief account of the Red Army.

Dillon, E.J.—**Russia; To-day and yesterday.** An impartial view of Soviet Russia. 1930.....947.09

CONTENTS: Preface; Why I desired to revisit Russia; St. Petersburg and Leningrad—Reminiscences; How the foreigner fares in Sovietdom; Bookshops and books; The peasants; Soviet problems—The Gordian knot; The cultural campaign; Women; Museums; Theaters, music, and art books; Crime and punishment; Bolshevism.

*Reviewed by G. S. BROWNELL*

The author, Dr. Dillon, is an Englishman who lived in Russia under three Czars—from 1877 to 1914—as a student, university professor, and journalist. He revisited Russia in 1928, and in this book gives his impressions of present day Russia against the background of his knowledge of the old Russia.

The book gives an interesting and apparently unprejudiced picture of Russia under the Soviet regime with comparisons here and there to the Russia before the War.

The list of contents given above is suggestive of the scope of the book. In each chapter are many side-lights on the everyday life of Russia of to-day, which help to give the reader a vivid picture of existing conditions.

The book is considered of value to anyone interested in present day Russia.



Leach, Paul R.—**That man Dawes.** The story of a man who has placed his name high among the great of the world in this generation because he ruled his life by common sense. 1930...973-B92 (DA)

CONTENTS: The principal persons and events concerned in this story: Chapter one—An American family; Paul Revere and William Dawes; The Ohio company; Manasseh Cutler. Chapter two—Grandmother's letters; At Marietta; Schooling; Youth; On his own. Chapter three—Lincoln, Nebraska; Lawyer; Marriage; The Bryans; Pershing; Utilities; Pensioners; The Evanston Gas Company. Chapter four—Into politics; Illinois for McKinley; Hanna; Lorimer; Cullom; Lowden; Denen; Tom Reed; Platt; Quay; Edens. Chapter five—Nomination and election of McKinley; Comptroller; Roosevelt; Cortelyou; Dolliver; Kilkeny; Long. Chapter six—Senatorial ambitions; Czolgosz; Hopkins; Cannon; Yates; Mason; Sherman; Lorimer again; "Out of politics." Chapter seven—Central Trust Company; William R. Dawes; Joseph E. Otis; "To Hell with Platinides"; Sherman anti-trust law; The packers; More Lorimer; La Salle Street Trust and Savings Bank; Taft; Allied bonds. Chapter eight—World War; Wilson; Hughes; Pershing; Felton; Hoover; 17th Railway Engineers; A.E.F. Purchasing agent; The Allied Military Supply; Harbord; Foch; Lloyd George; Haig; Decorations. Chapter nine—Presidential possibility in 1920; Lowden; Johnson; Wood; League of Nations; Harding; "Hell Maria"; The budget. Chapter ten—Minute Men of the Constitution; The Dawes Plan; Sir Josiah Stamp; Owen D. Young; Coolidge; Rufus C. Dawes; Henry M. Robinson; Barthou; McKenna; Kindersley; Schacht. Chapter eleven—Vice Presidential campaign; Borah; Kenyon; Curtis; Burton; Hoover; Butler; "Brass Tacks"; La Follette and Wheeler; Davis and Bryan; "The Only Issue"; Plymouth Notch; The Ku Klux Klan; Election; Bartley. Chapter twelve—The Senate shocked; Filibustering; James A. Reed; Joseph T. Robinson; Caraway; Ashurst; Norris; Swanson; Underwood; Bruce; Willis; La Follette Bloc; An embarrassing map; Thomas J. Walsh; Overman; David A. Reed. Chapter thirteen—Closure campaign to the people; Faneuil hall; George H. Moses; Byron Patton Harrison; The McNary-Haugen bill; The McFadden bill; The President annoyed; The Nobel prize; Worms or flies for bait; "I do not choose." Chapter fourteen—The 1928 campaign; Presidential "Dark Horse"; Hughes; Hoover; Lowden; The peace bridge; Geneva Naval Conference; Closure campaign lost; Business of Senate expedited; The Dawes book; "To be or not to be"; The promise to Lowden; Al Smith and Robinson; "No regrets"; "I take back nothing." Chapter fifteen—British-American relations; Edward Price Bell; Dominican Commission; Ambassador to England; Court dress; Century of progress; James Ramsay MacDonald; Hoover; On a log at the Rapidan; The London Naval Conference of 1930. Appendix.

*Reviewed by W. C. McCHORD*

*That Man Dawes* contains incidents of the life and activities of former Vice-President, now United States Ambassador to London, Charles Gales Dawes.

The author is a newspaper man who traveled with General Dawes during his campaign for the vice-presidency. The author is apparently a close and intimate friend to whom General Dawes has made available records and to whom he has recited many intimate details of his life. The volume recites interesting, intimate, apparently authentic and, in most cases complimentary, incidents pertaining to General Dawes' family, early life and training, his life and activities as a young lawyer in Lincoln, Nebraska, a business man and banker in Chicago, a politician in Illinois, an officer in the World War, as vice-president and ambassador, and with regard to his home life. It also recites some interesting incidents with regard to some of the men with whom General Dawes has been associated.

The work is interesting and it apparently authentically, though in a complimentary manner, gives an insight into the character, activities and life of a man who has been and still is active in the political life of this country and who has had and probably will continue to have a prominent part in national and international politics and policies.

Malin, James C.—**The United States after the World War.** 1930. 973.91

CONTENTS: Foreword. Part One: The United States and the establishment of international government. Part Two: Domestic policies after the World War. Part Three: The United States foreign policies after the World War. Appendixes; Index.

*Reviewed by H. F. SPURGIN*

This book, in four parts, is a history of the United States from the close of the World War to 1930. The author has chosen to depart from the traditional narrative methods of presentation and has treated each problem by tracing its development through the period as an individual entity. This manner of presentation is a valuable aid to anyone interested in a research of any of the well chosen subjects covered by the author.

Part I deals solely with the League of Nations. Starting with the making of the Covenant, the author then records the battles for notification and compromise in the United States Senate. The texts of the Covenant and of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice are printed in full in the appendix.

Part II deals with our domestic economic problems as a direct result of the War.

Part III discusses our foreign political and economic problems. Included is a chapter on our military policy devoted to the 1916 National Defense Act with the important amendments passed in 1920 for reorganizing the Army.

Part IV summarizes political developments with particular reference to the problems of our political parties. The major planks in the party platforms and the campaign issues are briefly discussed.



## PART II PERIODICAL LITERATURE

### CONTENTS

Explanation.....	Page 61
Section 3—Directory to Catalog of Periodical Articles.....	63
Section 4—Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles.....	65
Section 5—Subject Index to Catalog of Periodical Articles.....	83
Section 6—Abstracts of Foreign-language Articles.....	107

### EXPLANATION

PART II covers the field of current periodical literature, so far as concerns this School in particular and the military profession in general, by cataloging and subject-indexing important articles from the periodicals received by the Library. Desired material having been thus located, the articles themselves can be read by consulting the specified periodical in the Library.

Section 4 catalogs and Section 5 indexes all articles of possible interest contained in the *military* and *naval* periodicals received [The complete list of such periodicals will be found in LIBRARY BULLETIN No. 1]. And, because the periodicals of this category are not covered by any other index agency, the articles selected therefrom comprise all those of professional interest, including extra-military. From the non-military periodicals received only such articles are included as are of military interest; for extra-military articles of professional concern in such periodicals, the appropriate index publications should be consulted [See LIBRARY BULLETIN No. 1].

Cataloged articles from foreign-language periodicals, in Section 4, have translations of the titles and concise digests of the contents. In Section 6 there are presented, within the limitations of School facilities, more complete abstracts of such articles as are of particular importance.

#### Directions for use

Each periodical has an **index number** which identifies that particular magazine throughout: in the Directory (Section 3); the Catalog (Section 4); and the Index (Section 5). [This same index number is used on the periodical file box, in the Library reading room, which contains the issues of the periodical specified.]

Primarily, a perusal of the Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles (page 65) serves to give a quick resumé of important military articles that have appeared during the quarter.

#### TO FIND THE ARTICLES SELECTED FROM A PARTICULAR PERIODICAL OR GROUP OF MAGAZINES:

Locate the desired periodical or group in the Directory (Section 3, page 63). This will give the page of the Catalog (Section 4) where will be found the desired articles.

#### TO FIND ARTICLES PERTAINING TO A PARTICULAR SUBJECT:

(1) Consult the Index (page 83) under the appropriate main subject heading. Under this heading will be found all entries (if any) on that subject. The entries thereunder give only brief titles of magazine articles to show scope. But each entry is referenced to the

Catalog for full particulars by the **index number** of the periodical and the serial number of the article in the periodical.

(2) Consult the Directory (page 63) for the identifying index number. This will give the name of the periodical and page of the Catalog where will be found the article.

(3) Turn to page of the Catalog indicated and under the periodical specified find the serial number of the article. This entry gives complete data of the article: Name of periodical; date; full title; author; and in the case of foreign-language periodicals, the translated title and brief digest of contents.

#### EXAMPLE

(Main heading).....**WAR PEACE**  
 (Subheading)..... **Abstract topics—General and special**  
 (Entry).....The inevitability of war. **102**:(8)

The boldface figure, **102**, is the index number of the periodical; the figure (8) is the serial number of the article. Referring to the Directory (Section 3) the index number identifies the periodical as the *American Mercury*; articles from which are found on page 81 of the Catalog. Turning to that page, the index number **102**, locates the periodical and the serial number (8) indicates the particular article desired, in full detail.

**Section 3**  
**DIRECTORY TO CATALOG**  
of  
Periodical Articles

**EXPLANATION**

(See also Explanation—Directions for Use, page 61)

General.—Included in this directory are only those periodicals from which articles have been selected during the current quarter for inclusion in this issue of the RCMW.

Arrangement.—Periodicals are arranged in two categories: (1) Military and Naval; (2) General. Within these categories they are grouped according to the particular fields covered.

An index number precedes the title of each periodical; it serves to identify references from the Index (Section 5) and to the Catalog (Section 4).

**MILITARY AND NAVAL PERIODICALS**

Index Number		Selected articles, Page
	<b>Joint Forces</b>	
1—American Legion.....		65
2—Army and Navy Journal.....		65
3—Army and Navy Register.....		65
4—Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette.....		65
5—Fighting Forces.....		65
6—Guerra y su Preparacion.....		65
7—Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.....		66
8—Journal of the United Service Institution of India.....		66
	<b>General military</b>	
12—Army Quarterly.....		66
13—Boletin del Ejercito.....		67
14—Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires.....		67
15—Canadian Defence Quarterly.....		67
16—Intelligence Summary.....		67
16a—De Re Bellica.....		68
17—Militär-Wochenblatt.....		68
18—Our Army.....		74
19—Pointer.....		74
21—Recruiting News.....		74
22—Revista Militar.....		74
23—Revue Militaire Francaise.....		75
	<b>Arms and Services</b>	
	<b>INFANTRY</b>	
32—Infantry Journal.....		76
34—Revue d'Infanterie.....		76
	<b>TANKS</b>	
35—Royal Tank Corps Journal.....		77
	<b>CAVALRY</b>	
36—Cavalry Journal.....		77
37—Cavalry Journal (Great Britain).....		77
38—Revue de Cavalerie.....		77

<b>ARTILLERY</b>	
39—Coast Artillery Journal.....	73
40—Field Artillery Journal.....	78
42—Revue d'Artillerie.....	78
<b>ENGINEERS</b>	
44—Military Engineer.....	79
45—Royal Engineers Journal.....	79
<b>SIGNALS</b>	
46—Signal Corps Bulletin.....	79
<b>QUARTERMASTER</b>	
47—Quartermaster Review.....	79
49—Speedometer.....	79
<b>MEDICAL</b>	
51—Military Surgeon.....	79
<b>ORDNANCE</b>	
52—Army Ordnance.....	79
<b>CHEMICAL WARFARE</b>	
53—Chemical Warfare.....	79
<b>Navy and Marines</b>	
54—Information Bulletin.....	79
55—Naval Institute Proceedings.....	79
56—Marine Corps Gazette.....	79
<b>GENERAL PERIODICALS</b>	
<b>Current Affairs</b>	
67—Current History.....	80
68—Foreign Affairs.....	80
69—Foreign Policy Association: News Bulletin.....	80
71—Illustrated London News.....	80
73—L'Illustration.....	80
74—Literary Digest.....	80
75—Living Age.....	80
76—Nation.....	80
77—National Republic.....	80
78—Outlook and Independent.....	80
79—Review of Reviews.....	80
80—Round Table.....	80
<b>Economics and Political Economy</b>	
84—American Economic Review.....	80
90—Journal of Political Economy.....	80
<b>History and Geography</b>	
98—Journal of Modern History.....	81
99—Mississippi Valley Historical Review.....	81
<b>Literary and Miscellaneous</b>	
102—American Mercury.....	81
103—Atlantic Monthly.....	81
107—Forum.....	81
110—Liberty.....	81
111—New York Herald Tribune Magazine.....	81
112—New York Times Magazine.....	81
113—North American Review.....	81
115—Saturday Evening Post.....	81
117—Scientific American.....	81

## Section 4

### CATALOG OF SELECTED PERIODICAL ARTICLES

#### EXPLANATION

(See also Explanation—Directions for Use, page 61)

This section catalogs the articles selected from Library periodicals for the current quarter. To locate a particular periodical, consult the Directory (page 63). Periodicals in this Catalog are arranged in sequence of identifying index numbers; this is similar to the order followed in the Directory.

The several issues of each periodical are listed in chronological order and the articles are serially numbered for the school (fiscal) year.

#### 1—AMERICAN LEGION

February 1931

- (4) WHEN MR. BAKER MADE WAR. (IV) Palmer  
March 1931
- (5) WHEN MR. BAKER MADE WAR. (V) Palmer  
April 1931
- (6) WHEN MR. BAKER MADE WAR. (VI) Palmer

#### 2—ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL

3 January 1931

- (6) ARMY PAY AND PROMOTION BILLS  
10 January 1931
- (7) WAR DEPARTMENT FORMS "GENERAL COUNCIL" TO PASS ON POLICIES AND AID COOPERATION  
17 January 1931
- (8) NO PHYSICAL CHANGES SEEN IN THE NEW AIR RULE  
24 January 1931
- (9) JOINT CONGRESSIONAL PAY COMMITTEE MAKES REPORT. [Includes, as appendices, reports from the six services; the promotion bill; and estimates.]

#### 3—ARMY AND NAVY REGISTER

3 January 1931

- (3) ARMY PAY AND PROMOTION BILLS  
10 January 1931
- (4) ARMY GENERAL COUNCIL  
17 January 1931
- (5) ARMY AND NAVY AIR FORCES

#### 4—ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE GAZETTE (Great Britain)

11 December 1930

- (16) THE SWEDISH AIR FORCE
- (17) THE FRENCH AIR SALON: MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF TO-DAY
- (18) TROOPS FED BY AIRCRAFT  
18 December 1930
- (19) SIRAJ-UD-DAULAH AS A GENERAL. The making of Clive. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy  
25 December 1930
- (20) THE CANADIAN GRENADEIER GUARDS. Major Phelan
- (21) A NEW TYPE ARMoured CAR

1 January 1931

- (22) THE RED ARMY AND A WORLD WAR
- (23) SOME CANADIAN FORTS
- (24) SPANISH MILITARY NOTES  
8 January 1931
- (25) MARSHAL JOFFRE, 1852-1931  
29 January 1931

- (26) A NEW VICKERS-ARMSTRONGS ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN  
5 February 1931

- (27) METHODISM IN TACTICS. New conceptions of war. Major Redway  
12 February 1931

- (28) POINTS TO REMEMBER WHEN DEALING WITH TACTICAL PROBLEMS. Captain Webb
- (29) A JUSTIFICATION OF SMITH-DORRIEN  
19 February 1931

- (30) THE ARMY AND THE ROYAL AIR FORCE. The need of closer co-operation. [A plea for amalgamation?]
- (31) GERMAN MILITARY EXPEDITION 1920-1930  
26 February 1931

- (32) REORGANIZATION OF ARMY EDUCATIONAL CORPS

#### 5—FIGHTING FORCES (Great Britain)

January 1931

- (9) THE AIR MINISTRY—AND AFTER

#### 6—GUERRA Y SU PREPARACION (Spain)

November 1930

By H. THOMPSON

- (18) CURSO DE PREPARACION DE CORONELES PARA EL ASCENSO, AÑO DE 1930. Toma de conjunto. Primera fase. [Preparatory course for colonels about to be promoted. (1930—first phase) (Spanish War Department).] This is a tactical problem, defense, for colonels on the promotion list. The general scheme includes, map references, general and special situations (North Central Spain), with considerable emphasis upon intelligence reports of the enemy. In general the material presented is similar to problems as given at the C & GS School. Required: Solution including general scheme of the Divisional defense, employment of the air service, reserves, details of organization of the terrain, disposition of auxiliary services and scheme of communications. The problem is presented with far

**6—GUERRA Y SU PREPARACION (Spain)**  
November 1930 (continued)

more detail than we are accustomed to give, but this is probably due to the fact that it is intended to be a model. Three overlays for use with the maps accompany the problem.

- (19) **ITALIA.—NOTAS DIVERSAS SOBRE PROTECCION CONTRA AGRESIONES QUIMICAS.** [Miscellaneous notes on protection against poisonous gases.] Commandante de Campos.

This article treats of generalities of the Italian Chemical Warfare Service, going into some detail in regard to the duties of company, battalion, regimental and division gas officers.

December 1930

By E. H. ALMQUIST

- (20) **LAS BATALLAS DE LA GUERRE DE LA INDEPENDENCIA DE 1808-1814,** segun el tratadista inglés Sir Charles Oman. [The battles of the War of Independence, 1808-1814, according to the English author, Sir Charles Oman.] (Collaboration of the Historical Section of the Geographical and Historical Archives of the Army.) This article deals with the impartiality and authenticity of Sir Charles Oman's A History of the Peninsular War; contrasts this work with that of Napier's Peninsular War which is charged with a pro-French attitude.

- (21) **CURSO DE PREPARACION DE CORONELES PARA EL ASCENSO. AÑO DE 1930.** Tema de conjunto. Segunda fase. [Preparatory course for colonels about to be promoted. (1930—Second phase).] A continued article giving the second phase (the offensive) of a map problem to be solved by colonels of the Spanish Army in their course of preparation for promotion. Solution requirements consist of plan of attack.

- (22) **ALEMANIA.—LAS MANIOBRAS DE FRANCONIA.** [Germany.—The maneuvers of Franconia.] Teniente Coronel Beigbeder.

This article describes war maneuvers held by the German Army in Franconia (northern Bavaria) in September 1930. Problem was one of command and staff duties and of communications. Two types of division organization were used. The Flag Division (Flagendivision) included the staffs of all units down to and including battalions and groupments. Troops were represented by flags. The Skeleton Division (Rahmendivision) comprised division headquarters and the necessary communications personnel. Troops were imaginary. Problem is accompanied by maps and overlays.

- (23) **FRANCIA.—LA NUEVA "INSTRUCCION PARA EL EMPLEO DE LOS CARROS DE COMBATE."** [The new "Instructions for the employment of armored cars."] Teniente Coronel Ungria.

This article deals with the new French Army regulations on the employment of armored cars. Treats principally of the use of medium and heavy tanks in offensive and defensive action and means of combating enemy armored cars.

- (24) **EL TREN DE EQUIPAJES MILITARES DEL EJERCITO FRANCÉS.** [The field trains of the French Army.] Teniente Coronel Ungria.

Outlines development of field trains in French Army. Deals with their employment and proper utilization from an economic viewpoint. The article stresses the importance of animal drawn transportation regardless of apparent efficiency of motor transportation. Outlines the general organization of trains adopted by French as a result of studies of the World War.

- (25) **INGLATERRA.—EJERCICIOS DE LAS FUERZAS AÉREAS DE 1930.** [England.—Exercises of the air forces in 1930.] Teniente Coronel Marvá.

A description of the exercise conducted by the British Air Forces in 1930. Problem deals with the aerial defense of Great Britain. Object of exercises was twofold. First: To give commanders and bombing squadrons practice in the direction and execution of bombing raids under conditions involving a large radius of action; Second: To give the commanders and pursuit squadrons practice in the execution of strategical offensives under conditions involving an overseas campaign.

**7—JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION (Great Britain)**

February 1931

- (28) **THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.** Lieutenant General MacMunn  
(29) **EIGHT YEARS OF BRITISH CONTROL IN IRAQ**  
(30) **REGIONAL CONTROL AND THE CO-ORDINATION OF AIR AND LAND FORCES.** Major Fink  
(31) **THE ARMY AS A CAREER.** Lieutenant Colonel Robertson  
(32) **THE JUNIOR DIVISION OF THE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS**  
(33) **POWER FUEL FOR THE SERVICES.** Brame  
(34) **THE DEFENCE OF POSTS.** Lieutenant Commander Prentice  
(35) **THE WORK OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AT ADEN.** Cochrane  
(36) **DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION AND COMMAND.** Captain Morgan  
(37) **THE CLOSE SUPPORT OF INFANTRY.** Major Beckett  
(38) **INSTRUCTION BY TALKING FILMS.** Major Macpherson

**8—JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA (Great Britain—India)**

January 1931

- (12) **THE DEFENCE OF "K" DEPOT (9TH AUGUST, 1930).** Captain Gordon  
(13) **PROBLEMS OF MECHANIZATION WHICH MAY CONFRONT INFANTRY OFFICERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.** Major Rich  
(14) **BABU TACTICS**  
(15) **THE BALTIC STATES.** Captain Goddard  
(16) **MODERNIZED MOUNTAIN WARFARE.** Major Blacker

**12—ARMY QUARTERLY (Great Britain)**

January 1931

- (21) **"THIS TERRITORIAL YEAR."** Captain Liddell Hart  
(22) **RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATION IN THE ARMY.** Major-General Bonham-Carter  
(23) **ORDERS.** Brigadier Collins  
(24) **CHANGES IN ARMY ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.** Brevet-Major Kennedy  
(25) **A CAMPAIGN IN THE ALPS IN 1799.** (With map) De Beer  
(26) **THE LAST GERMAN OFFENSIVE. RHEIMS, 1918.** (With map) [Critical review of German official monograph, Der letzte deutsche Angriff, Rheims 1918 (ordered for Library)]  
(27) **THE PRESTIGE OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.** By a Territorial Officer  
(28) **THE PASSING OF AN EMPIRE: THE FALL OF THE SULTANATE OF DARFUR.**  
(29) **OMAN'S PENINSULAR WAR.** [Critical review; this set is in the Library.]  
(30) **ALLENBY'S CAMPAIGNS IN PALESTINE.** [Critical review of, FALLS: Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine; June 1917 to the

- end of the War. (Second and concluding volume of the "Official History of the War in Palestine"; in the Library.)  
(31) THE GERMAN LANDING IN FINLAND, 3RD OF APRIL, 1918. (With map)

**13—BOLETIN DEL EJERCITO (Cuba)**

November 1930

By A. T. MCCONE

- (7) CRONICAS DE LA GUERRA DE CUBA. [Chronicles of the Cuban War.] Vol. III, Chapter XVI. General Argenter.

Another chapter in this phase of Cuba's long fight for independence.

- (8) LA GUERRA Y EL LIBRO. [War and books.] Capitán Ahumada.

A conference given at the Spanish Infantry School in 1920. Captain Ahumada gives as his theme that there is no rivalry in the progress of civilization between war and learning and that in fact throughout the ages civilization has advanced behind the bayonets of the conquerors.

December 1930

By J. C. WHITCOMB

- (9) LA VISITA DEL BRIGADIER EDUARDO F. LORES, DEL EJERCITO DE CUBA, A LA ACADEMIA MILITAR DE WEST POINT, U.S. [The visit of Brigadier General Eduardo F. Lores of the Cuban Army to U.S.M.A., West Point.] A football team of the Cuban Military Academy, coached by Maj. J. H. O'Hare, U.S.A., made a trip to West Point to play the Army. General Lores accompanied the team and made a speech. This article is the speech.  
(10) CRONICAS DE LA GUERRA DE CUBA. [Chronicles of the Cuban War.] Vol. III, Chapter XVI. General Argenter.

**14—BULLETIN BELGE DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES (Belgium)**

By L. P. HORSFALL

December 1930

- (23) LA DÉFENSE DE LA POSITION FORTIFIÉE DE NAMUR EN AOÛT 1914. [The defense of the fortified position at Namur in August, 1914.] The article gives extracts from a book about to be published by the Historical Section of the Belgian General Staff. It gives a description of the resistance at Namur, brief in time, but important in results.

- (24) CHRONIQUE DE L'INFANTERIE. [Annals of the infantry. Part XI: Mechanization and motorization; Chapter IV—Combination of mechanization and motorization.]

The tank becomes preponderant. The latest trend of mechanization and motorization, and more radical than any of the three developments discussed earlier, is that tanks take the place of infantry almost completely. The argument is, that tanks will save time, money and men.

- (25) CAS CONCRÈTE D'EMPLOI DE L'AÉRONAUTIQUE ET DE LA D.T.C.A. AU CORPS D'ARMÉE. [A concrete example of the employment of the aviation and antiaircraft artillery of an army corps.] (III) Cap. comdt. Van der Donckt.

Part III—Operations of 3 August. (1) Extracts from the information bulletins and the army orders; (2) Extracts from the operations orders of the II Corps; (3) Liaison and communications provided for the 3 August. The latter part of the article discusses certain phases, with pertinent remarks, discussion and comments.

- (26) LES ASPECTS MILITAIRES DE LA RÉVOLUTION DE 1830. [The military aspects of the Revolution of 1830.] (VIII) Capitaine Wanty. Chapter XIII—The organization of the Belgian forces; Chapter XIV—The period of tension. The volunteers could accomplish little against the regular troops.

- (27) LES RAVITAILLEMENTS ET LES ÉVACUATIONS PENDANT LA BATAILLE. [Supply and evacuation during battle.] The article merely brings together and codifies for convenient reference, instructions issued in various regulations (Belgian), pertaining to the services charged with supply and evacuation.

**15—CANADIAN DEFENCE QUARTERLY (Canada)**

January 1931

- (11) ROLES (OF) THE ARMED FORCES OF CANADA. . . (PRIZE ESSAY). Major Pope  
(12) THE SOVIET FIVE-YEAR PLAN  
(13) FROM EMPIRE TO DOMINION: THE INDIAN SITUATION. Captain Stedman  
(14) THE SECOND RED RIVER EXPEDITION, 1871. Lieutenant Stacey  
(15) THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMY CO-OPERATION SQUADRONS. Lieutenant Coghill  
(16) THE CANADIAN MILITIA: IMPERIAL ORGANIZATION  
(17) THE 1914 CAMPAIGN IN EAST PRUSSIA. Lieutenant Colonel Pearkes

**16—INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (War Department)**

2 January 1931

- (46) COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND SOVIET ARMIES  
(47) SOVIET RUSSIA: THE OGPU  
(48) CHINA: THE REMITTED BOXER INDEMNITIES

16 January 1931

- (49) BRITISH EMPIRE: FOREIGN RELATIONS  
(50) SPAIN: THE YEAR 1930  
(51) LATIN AMERICA: ISTHMIAN REVOLTS—GUATEMALA AND PANAMA

30 January 1931

- (52) ITALY AND THE BALKANS  
(53) RUMANIA: THE PASSING OF THE BRATIANUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
(54) GERMAN MINORITY PROBLEM IN UPPER SILESIA

13 February 1931

- (55) BRITISH EMPIRE: INDIA  
(56) THE SOVIET-JAPANESE FISHERIES DISPUTE  
(57) BRAZIL: OUTGROWTHS OF THE 1930 REVOLUTION  
(58) FRANCE: THE YEAR 1930 FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. (Frontier fortifications and antiaircraft defense organization; One-year service law; Reserve training; The covering force; Motorization; Air Force; Morale.)

27 February 1931

- (59) THE ITALIAN CONSCRIPTIVE ARMY AND VOLUNTEER FORCE  
(60) SOVIET RUSSIA: FINANCING THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN  
(61) CUBA: THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION

13 March 1931

- (62) EUROPE: DISARMAMENT: THE NEW NAVAL PACT  
(63) GERMANY: THE POLITICAL SITUATION AS INFLUENCED BY THE FASCIST BOYCOTT  
(64) CHINA: DOMESTIC PROBLEMS OF THE NANKING GOVERNMENT

## 16a—DE RE BELLICA (Germany—Spanish text)

By J. C. WHITCOMB

Number 5, 1930-31

- (1) CUESTIONES DE LA GUERRA AÉREA. LOS PROBLEMAS DE UNA POTENCIA AÉREA MODERNA. [Questions on aerial warfare. The problems of a modern air power.] Capitán Ritter.

A discussion of aerial strategy showing that "considerable harmony exists in technical circles of most countries" on this subject. Quotations from English, French and Italian authorities are discussed. Low altitude bombing (20-25 meters) is advocated.

- (2) LAS DIFERENTES FORMAS DE COMBATE. II—LA DEFENSA. [The different kinds of combat. II—Defense.] Mayor Siebert.

"The object of defense is to so damage the attacker by fire and counterattack as to repulse him before he enters or penetrates the defensive position." "Defense is justified only before a greatly superior enemy or to facilitate an attack at another place or time." The discussion is grouped under the following heads: object and nature of defense. The defensive position (sketch). Advance position and advanced combat posts (sketch). The fortified field position (sketch). The defense of nests and points of support. The main battle line (sketch). Division of a position into sectors (sketch). The counter blow (sketch). The counterattack (sketch). Example of occupation of a defensive position by a flank battalion (sketch).

- (3) EL GRUPO DE EXPLORACION EN LA CABALLERIA DE EJERCITO. [The exploration group in army cavalry.] General von Kayser.

A discussion of the cavalry exploration group touching mission, conduct, orders for, etc.

- (4) PROBLEMAS DE COMBATE. FAJAS DE COMBATE. [Combat problems, Combat sectors.] Colonel Hiehl.

A discussion of this subject with three examples, each with sketch.

- (5) EMPLEO TACTICO DE LOS CARROS AUTOMATIZADOS—CANNONES. [Tactical employment of armored machine gun and cannon cars.] Capitán Heigl.

The subject is divided as follows: mission; distant reconnaissance and security during march; blows on enemy flanks and rear guard; occupation of important points; with advance guard and rear guard. Examples of German employment in Roumanian campaign and of Russian use with advance guard. 1 sketch.

- (6) LA ARTILLERIA LIGERA DURANTE EL AVANCE. [Light artillery during the advance.] Capitán Meyer-Becherer.

The last of a continued series. Light artillery on the march.

- (7) SERVICIOS DE RETAGUARDIA. Mantenimiento y Abastecimiento del Ejército desde el Interior al Frente. [Services of the rear. Maintenance and supply of the Army from the interior to the front.] Coronel Soldan.

Third installment of a series. Covers: light columns; impedimenta; replacement of horses; munitions; subsistence. (3 charts)

- (8) EL SERVICIO DE SANIDAD EN LA GUERRA DE MOVIMIENTO. [Sanitary service in war of movement.] Discussion includes personnel, materiel, supply, positions, etc. 1 sketch.

- (9) INSTRUCCION TACTICA. [Tactical instruction.] Continued from previous number. A regimental order. Required: Dispositions of Bn. C.O.

- (10) LA GUERRA: SU BATALLAS Y SUS HOMBRES. Libro II—Concentraciones y operaciones

preliminares. [The war. Its battles and men. Book II—Preliminary concentrations and operations.] Second installment of a series. Contains: Liege (sketch); the preliminaries of the great operations in the west—the Battle of Mulhouse (sketch); the first battles in France—Longwi and Neufchateau (sketch); the battles of the German north wing—the advance on Belgium; The north wing on French soil—the battles of the Somme: Charleroy—Mons—Dinant. (sketch)

## 17—MILITAR-WOCHENBLATT (Germany)

By E. L. GRUBER

25 April 1930

- (61) DIE SCHWERE ARTILLERIE IN DER MARNE-SCHLACHT 1914. [Die Schlacht am Ourcq. [The heavy artillery in the Battle of the Marne, 1914. The Battle of the Ourcq.] Oberstleutnant Elschner.

An account of the employment of the corps artillery of the several corps composing the German First Army at the battle of the Ourcq 5-10 September 1914. The entry into action of the 15 cm howitzers enabled the German artillery to neutralize the superior French artillery and formed the basis of the counter-offensive.

- (62) DIE KRISE DES ANGRIFFS KANN ÜBERWUNDEN WERDEN. [The crisis of the attack can be overcome.] A reply to a recent article wherein it was maintained that the power of the defense has been so greatly increased that the attack will become stalemated as soon as it gets beyond the initial artillery ranges. This is disputed, the writer holding that the fast tank now offers the means for overcoming the power of the defense. However to insure success tanks must be used in mass in the main attack and given a distant critical objective.

- (63) "WASSERKÖPFE." ["Waterheads."] A criticism of the large staffs and numerous auxiliary units now included in the infantry regiment.

- (64) DAS ERGEBNIS DER LONDONER FLOTTEN-KONFERENZ. [The result of the London Naval Conference.] Kapt. Gadow

A discussion of the military and political consequences of the Naval Conference of January 1930.

- (65) DIE WEHRMACHT GRIECHENLANDS. [The military establishment of Greece.] An outline of Greece's army and its distribution in time of peace.

4 May 1930

- (66) KAVALLERIESPITZE UND KAVALLERIE-VERBINDUNGSPATROUILLE. [Cavalry points and connecting patrols.] By the German Chief of Cavalry who favors strong points and patrols so that they can lay down a pivot with a machine gun to pin the enemy down frontally while a maneuvering group pushes around the flank to drive the enemy away or get the information.

- (67) NEUZEITLICHER EINSAZ DER MINENWERFER. [Modern employment of trench mortars.] (I) Hauptmann Rosenbusch.

A discussion of the firing technique of trench mortars.

- (68) MOTORISIERUNGSPRAGEN. [Motorization questions.] Dipl.-Ing. Hofweber.

An outline of the developments made in heavy motor vehicles since the World War.

- (69) DIE LAHMUNG DES HIRNS. [The paralysis of the brain.] Oberstleutnant Benary.

A reply to Colonel Fuller, of tank fame, who gives as the principal tactical objection of tanks the paralysis of the command centers. The writer gives numerous examples in the



war where this was attempted by other means and usually failed to bring about any decisive results: first, because well trained units are always able to function temporarily until the command center is reestablished; second, because a command post can seldom be put out of action where surprise is lacking. Today measures for antitank and antiaircraft defense have been developed so efficiently that air or tank surprise will be difficult to attain.

- (70) DAS ÖSTERREICHISCHE BUNDESHEER. [The Austrian Army.] An outline of the organization, administration and control of the Austrian Army.

(71) EIN NEUER RUSSISCHER KRIEGSRoman. [A new Russian war romance.] To show that Remarque's *All quiet on the Western Front* is an exaggerated and distorted account of a diseased mind and a defamation of all good soldiers. A comparison is made to a recent Russian book by a young Russian officer who like Remarque left college to go to war, and found none of the sordid experiences which Remarque seems to date on telling. A nation that believes in its future should present to its youth not the heroes of Remarque but such as will inspire them to loyal service and sacrifice in war.

# 11 May 1930

- (72) "DER FELDEHRER WIDER WILLEN." [The commander-in-chief against his will.] Oberstleutnant v. Schäfer.

A review of Gen. Groener's strategical study covering the period from the battles of the frontier in August 1914 to include the battle of the Marne in September 1914. This study is a sequel to his first book entitled: *The Testament of Count Schlieffen*. These two books are the outstanding strategical studies covering the opening phase of the World War. The writer sharply criticizes the German high command. As chief of military railways at German G.H.Q. he was in close touch with the operations.

- (73) DIE DEUTSCHE KAVALLERIE UND DIE DER VERBÜNDETEN WESTGEGNER IM AUGUST UND SEPTEMBER 1914. [The German cavalry and that of the western Allies in August and September.] (I) Hauptmann Crisolli. (See abstract, page 114)

- (74) NEUSEITLICHER EINSATZ DER MINENWERFER. [Modern employment of trench mortars.] (II) Hauptmann Rosenbusch.

Continued from the previous number. In this installment the tactics of trench mortars in moving warfare is discussed. It is used as a weapon of opportunity particularly against machine guns.

- (75) STRATEGISCHE LÄHMUNG ALS ZIEL DES ENTSCHEIDUNGSUCHENDEN ANGRIFFS? [Strategic paralysis as the objective of the decisive attack?] Another article in which issue is taken with Colonel Fuller of tank fame, whose ideas are considered novel but not sound after an analysis. Fuller selects as the decisive objective the hostile command and nerve center which control the troops. The writer gives as a good example contradicting Fuller, the Russian-Polish campaign of 1920, when both sides repeatedly struck at the opposing command posts but were unable to gain a decision until the army in the field had been defeated. The only sure road to success is to follow Clausewitz' strategical principle of striking at the hostile army and defeating it in battle.

- (76) NOCH EINMAL: "DER RUCHSTOSZVERLAUF BEIM GEWEHR." [Recoil of the rifle.] Generalleutnant Neume.

A technical discussion of the energy and amount of recoil due to gas pressure and detonation.

- (77) ALKOHOL—NIKOTIN—KOFFEIN. [Alcohol, nicotine, caffeine.] A discussion of the effect of these stimulants on commanders and staff officers during the War and an admonition that they be used sparingly.

- (78) LUFTÜBERLEGENHEIT? [Air superiority?] Oberleutnant v. Wedel. (See abstract, page 107)

# 18 May 1930

- (79) WAS IST STOSZKRAFT? [What is assault power?] (I) (See abstract, page 126)

- (80) DIE DEUTSCHE KAVALLERIE UND DIE DER VERBÜNDETEN WESTGEGNER IM AUGUST UND SEPTEMBER 1914. [The German cavalry and that of the western Allies in August and September 1914.] (II) Hauptmann Crisolli. (See abstract, page 114)

- (81) NEUSEITLICHER EINSATZ DER MINENWERFER. [Modern employment of trench mortars.] (III) Hauptmann Rosenbusch.

A continuation from the previous number. The discussion of the tactical employment is continued with emphasis on the light trench mortar because of its great mobility. Conclusions reached are as follows:

- The light trench mortar should be used on objectives that cannot be taken under fire by artillery and heavy infantry weapons;
- The light trench mortar is an infantry weapon. It belongs forward in the infantry combat zone;
- Its fire must be regulated in close liaison with that of other supporting arms, particularly artillery and machine guns;
- In combat, its technique and tactics is similar to that of artillery—quick adjustment of fire, few changes of position, fire for effect delivered in short bombardments;
- It must always strive to gain surprise fire.

- (82) ZUR FRAGE DER "MASCHINENGWEPRE DER KAVALLERIE." [The question of machine guns for cavalry.] A plea for abolishing machine gun squadrons and allotting a suitable proportion of machine gun units to each rifle squadron with which they will normally fight.

# 25 May 1930

- (83) WAS IST STOSZKRAFT? [What is assault power?] (II) (See abstract, page 126)

- (84) DIE FEUERKRAFTIGKEIT DER 1. MG.-GRUPPE. [The fire action of the light machine gun squad.] The writer emphasizes the fact based on personal experience that in the modern fire-fight the rifle and light machine gun play only a very subordinate part. The artillery and heavy machine guns constitute the main elements of fire power. Under their protection the rifleman and light machine gunner must work their way to within assault distance. Hence, their fire is withheld until the latest moment. Success in the assault is based on a judicious combination of fire of the light machine gun and the rifle. The principal mission is assigned to the machine gun whose fire is then supplemented and supported by the riflemen.

- (85) PFERDEZUG UND FAHRZEUGBAU. [Animal draft and construction of vehicles.] Oberstleutnant Giesecke.

The author shows how existing animal-drawn vehicles may be improved as to mobility, loading and tonnage to be hauled.

- (86) DER BRITISCHE HEERESHAUHALT 1930/31. [The British military appropriations, 1930-1931.] A summary of the appropriation bill recently passed by Parliament to cover the Army, Navy and Air Force. Interesting is the

# 17—MILITAR-WOCHENBLATT (Germany) 26 May 1930 (continued)

attitude of the War Department toward mechanization. It feels that the whole matter is still in an experimental stage, that the transition from horse to motor, when and if made, will be very gradual, that the final form of mechanization can not be predicted at this time, and that for the coming year at least, mechanization will be given no new impulse but a careful study will be made of tests at home and in India.

4 June 1930

- (87) NEUEITLICHE MARSCHECHNIK. [Modern march technique.] (See abstract, page 116)  
(88) BEFEHLERTEILUNG IN KRIEG UND FRIEDEN. [Orders in peace and war.] Generalleutnant Fleck. (See abstract, page 118)  
(89) DIE KRIEGSGARBE. [The war pattern.] Oberst Fischer.

Based on his experiences in the War an officer gives his conclusions concerning the zone of dispersion of rifle fire. In general troops fire too high and the zone of dispersion is 3 or 4 times that obtained on the target range.

- (90) PRAKTISCHE VORBEREITUNG ZUR FRANZÖSISCHEN KRIEGS-AKADEMIE. [Practical preparation for the French Ecole de Guerre.] Before taking up the course at the Ecole de Guerre, each captain and lieutenant is detailed to take a practical course of instruction of six months duration with the other arms. The special courses in the infantry, cavalry, artillery and aviation are outlined. The instruction is under supervision of the regimental commander of the units to which the officer is detailed.

11 June 1930

- (91) FRANZÖSISCHE ANSICHTEN ÜBER FEUERPLANE DER INFANTERIE. [French ideas concerning infantry plans of fire.] An interesting discussion (with sketches) which clearly presents the French idea of an infantry plan of fire which is similar to the artillery plan of fire in the defense which it supplements. The basis of the plan of fire is the machine gun whose fire is concentrated on the open areas and ridges. Usually there are three systems of machine gun barrage fire, one in the outpost, one in front of the MLR and one within the battle position, each brought down on call or signal. The artillery and other infantry weapons then build up their fire around these m.g. barrage systems. An example is given of the defense by the 1st Battalion, 78th Infantry on the heights of Asiago against an attack by the 42d Hungarian Division on 15 June, 1918. This attack was completely broken up by the defense with heavy losses to the Hungarians. The 1st Battalion, 78th Infantry expended: m.g. fire 90,000 rounds, rifle fire 15,000 rounds, trench mortar 750 bombs, rifle and hand grenades 1800.

- (92) ORGANISATION DER PIONIERE. [Organization of the engineers.] A discussion of a suitable organization for division engineers based on the experiences of the War. About two battalions are required per division.

- (93) ERFOLGREICHES EINGREIFEN VON REITEREI GEGEN DEN RÜCKEN DES GEGNERS. [Successful intervention of cavalry against the enemy's rear.] A historical example from the battle of Komarow where the Russian V and XIX Corps were almost completely surrounded by the Austrian VI, IX and II Corps. Answering the call of the endangered corps, the commander of the Russian Fifth Army sent the

army cavalry 5th Don Cossack Division reinforced by the 2d Brigade of the 1st Don Cossack Division to attack the Austrian II Corps in rear and break the iron ring which was closing in on the two Russian Corps. The appearance of cavalry and the fire of artillery in its rear caused a panic in the Austrian II Corps. The Russians however failed to take advantage of this and permitted the Austrian corps to make its withdrawal.

- (94) DIE MARINEPOLITISCHE LAGE IN DER OSTSEE. [The politico-naval situation in the Baltic Sea.] Kapitän Gadlow.

Germany's diminished naval strength will compel her to accept the defensive in the North Sea. However, in the Baltic she is in a position to take the offensive or at least to maintain her armed naval position. The political conditions which influence Germany's naval position are well discussed.

18 June 1930

- (95) GROSSE ODER KLEINE KAVALLERIE-EINHEITEN? [Large or small cavalry units?] General v. Poseck.

Answering recent agitation to do away with cavalry divisions and substitute therefor reinforced brigades, the writer, General v. Poseck, former Chief of Cavalry and Richthofen's Chief of Staff during the War shows how the use of small cavalry units has always been a mistake. Army cavalry will suffer an attrition of 20% to 25% during the reconnaissance phase alone. If there is an unforeseen change of direction in the reconnaissance, the number of detachments must be practically doubled until the first detachments sent out are able to return. If cavalry must then engage in decisive combat in the envelopment, the ordinary march and combat casualties will bring about still more attrition. So that a division is fortunate to have available for combat even half its strength. This was the case with Gen. Garnier's Cavalry Corps (5 Divs) at the battle of Wilna, October, 1915. Most cavalry brigades were able to put in action for the dismounted fight not more than 100 men each. This was insufficient to block the Russian lines of retreat.

- (96) DIE IDEE DEUTSCHEN BERUFSSOLDATEN-TUMS. [The idea of the German professional soldier.] Hauptmann Hesse.

A discussion of the place of the soldier in the state, his relations toward society and to his work.

- (97) DIE POLNISCHE BEFESTIGTE FELDSTELLUNG. [The Polish fortified position.] The Poles have adopted the French system of field fortification. A division (9 battalions of infantry) can organize a position from 9 to 12 kilometers in frontage depending upon the terrain. Usually 4-5 battalions in the main battle position, 2-3 battalions in regimental reserve and 3-1 battalions in division reserve. The frontage of a battalion center of resistance is 1200 to 1500 m., interval between centers of resistance is 500 to 1500 m.

- (98) MOTORISIERUNG UND KAMPFWAGENVERWENDUNG. [Motorization and employment of tanks.] The mechanized force is the modern cavalry. Its employment is based on a careful study and reconnaissance of terrain. Tanks should be used in strength of at least battalions attacking in several waves. They may be withheld until the infantry has captured unfavorable terrain; after that the tanks should not be tied to the infantry. In the defense the tanks constitute a mobile reserve for striking a smashing counterstroke.

25 June 1930

- (99) DIE FRANZÖSISCHE LUFTDIVISION AM 15. JULI 1918. [The French Air Division on 15 July 1918.] (See abstract, page 111)
- (100) HINHALTENDER KAMPF UND VOLKSCHARAKTER. [Delaying action and character of people.] After discussing the reactions of the German people during different phases of the war, the writer endeavors to show that delaying action requires better trained troops, greater morale and less regard for national prestige than does offensive action. He believes that the people should be steered in their character to expect and endure the consequences of delaying action and that this is particularly true for the German people in view of their present politico-military situation.
- (101) TÄTIGKEIT DES INFANTRIE-NACHRICHTENOFFIZIERS IM GEFECHT. [Activities of an infantry communications officer in combat.] A very interesting discussion of infantry signal communications in combat, considered from the viewpoint of the tactical situation, the terrain and the nature of the available technical means. Frequent use is made of short wave radio.
- (102) SCHLIEFFENS RECHTER FLÜGEL UND DIE HEERESBESPAUNUNG. [Schlieffen's right wing and heavy draft teams.] A study which shows that the German heavy artillery could have kept up with the right wing had Schlieffen's plan been carried out. The basis used is a march of 15 miles per day with one rest day per week. One heavy battalion actually marched 300 miles in August losing only 31 out of 500 heavy draft horses. At the battle of the Marne another battalion medium howitzers made a march of 12 miles in less than 3 hours in order to intervene at the critical point of combat on the east flank.
- (103) DIE TURKSTANISCH-SIBIRISCHE EISENBAHN. [The Turkestan-Siberian railroad.] A description of this railroad which was recently opened to traffic and its political significance particularly as to Russia's position and policies in Central Asia with respect to China and India.

4 July 1930

- (104) STUDIEN ZUR VORSCHRIFT "F.U.G." [Studies on the German field service regulations.] (See abstract, page 121)
- (105) HINHALTENDER KAMPF—DER WEG ZUM SIEGE. [Delaying action—The way to victory.] Continuation from a previous number as to the value of delaying action for Germany in the early phase of a campaign and the importance of educating the people now to endure the hardships connected with hostile occupation.
- (106) ZWEI NEUE STRASSEN PANZER. [Two new armored cars.] Description of recent French and Czech types of armored cars.
- (107) AUS DER WERKSTATT DER TRUPPE. DIE KAVALLERIE-PATROUILLE. [Out of the workshop of the troops: The conduct of cavalry patrols.] (See abstract, page 119)

11 July 1930

- (108) ZUSAMMENARBEITEN DER WAFFEN MIT KAMPFWAGON. [Cooperation of other arms with tanks.] The writer comes to the conclusion that effective cooperation is impracticable unless all accompanying weapons are mounted on the same chassis as the tank, and can accompany it in battle because the modern tank must be employed like heavy cavalry to launch a sudden, heavy blow at a critical part of the battle front to gain the

decisive objective. This is the basic idea of the mechanized force.

- (109) STARKE UND BEWEGLICHE AUFMÄRSCHE. [Rigid and mobile strategic concentration.] A strategic concentration planned in time of peace should not bind the political branch of the government and provide the commander-in-chief a free decision as to his strategic plan of operations. It will be remembered that Germany realized in 1914 the rigidity of its plan of strategic concentrations and was engaged in preparing a variant of this plan when the war broke out. The Austrian plan of strategic concentration came nearer being a mobile plan because it was based on strategic concentration against any of its probable enemies. First there was a Balkan concentration of four corps; then a major concentration of nine corps against either Russia or Italy. This concentration was then supplemented by a third echelon that could be used to reinforce either plan B or R. The article is accompanied by a graphic chart showing the Austrian plan of railway concentration in 1914, and particularly how the concentration against Serbia was interrupted and reversed.
- (110) GEDANKEN ÜBER NAHKAMPPFAUSBILDUNG. [Thoughts on training for close combat.] Some hints on training for hand to hand combat by infantry.
- (111) LUFTÜBERLEGENHEIT? [Air superiority?] Confirming an idea expressed in a previous number that there is no such thing as absolute air superiority which is always temporary and must be constantly fought for in order to be maintained.
- (112) DER INFANTRIEZUG IN DEN HEEREN DER EUROPÄISCHEN HAUPTMÄCHTE. [The infantry platoon in the armies of the principal European powers.] A comparison of the organization, armament and combat tactics of the infantry platoon in different armies. Most nations have developed a routine tactics for the infantry platoon. Germany on the other hand has resisted this tendency, holding that combat is a living event of such variety that it can not be molded in a procrustean form.
- (113) SOZIALE HERKUNFT DER OFFIZIERE. [Social origin of officers.] The social records of over 11,000 German officers were examined and it was found that 80% came from the cultural upper class, 12½% from the big business class, and 7½% from the small trade and lower class. Over one-half of the first class were the sons of army officers, one-eighth the sons of public officials, the remainder the sons of the fathers engaged in a cultural profession.

18 July 1930

- (114) GEDANKEN ZUR SCHLACHT VON VILLERS-COTTERETS JULI 1918. [Thoughts on the Battle of Villers-Cotterets, July 1918.] (See abstract, page 122)
- (115) DAS LOSLÖSEN VOM FEINDE IN DER KAVALLERISTISCHEN KLEINTAKTIK. [Breaking off combat as it applies in cavalry minor tactics.] The practical experiences of a troop commander in the tactics to be followed by small cavalry in breaking off combat in order to regain mobility and freedom of action.
- (116) DAS MILITARISCHE PROBLEM IN INDIEN ALS ANGELEGENHEIT DER INDIENISCHEN VERFASSUNGSSCHLEIFEN. [The military problem in India as the crux of Indian constitutional reform.] A discussion of the military situation in India. The complications apparent therein will explain why any reform tending to give the people of India greater political freedom, will be difficult to solve.

17—MILITAR-WOCHENBLATT (Germany)  
(continued)

25 July 1930

- (117) "SOZIOLOGIE DES KRIEGES." [Sociology of war.] Review of a recent book by Dr. Steinmetz which shows that war has its purposes, is a natural phenomenon, could not be avoided in the past, and hence will not be avoided in the future in spite of all the so-called disarmament conferences.
- (118) DAS GEFECHT DER SCHÜTZEN- UND 1. MG.-GRUPPE. [The combat action of rifle and light machine gun squads.] A discussion of infantry minor tactics and technique.
- (119) ÜBER DAS OFFENHALTEN VON ENGEN. [Concerning the protection of defiles.] (See abstract, page 110)
- (120) BALKANFRAGEN. [Balkan questions.] A politico-military discussion of the Balkan situation, particularly as influenced by rail communications now under development for strategic purposes.
- (121) DER WERK KRIEGSGESCHICHTLICHER STUDIEN. [The value of studies in military history.] An officer made it a practice in reading military history to make a short note of the tactical principles involved. These he collected in a note-book to which he frequently referred during the war as the commander of a large unit. He gives two examples where in a crisis he referred mentally to the notes he had made and found a solution suggested thereby. He believes that in critical situations, a decision can be reached more quickly by a commander when he finds himself fortified by a similar situation in military history.

4 August 1930

- (122) SCHWERE ARTILLERIE IM BEWEGUNGS-KRIEG. [Heavy artillery in moving warfare.] (I) Oberstleutnant Elschner. (See abstract, page 115)
- (123) ÜBERHOLENDE VERFOLGUNG DURCH EIN VERSTÄRKTES INFANTERIE-BATAILLON. [Encircling pursuit by a reinforced infantry battalion.] A study in formal tactics showing how an infantry battalion should conduct its combat action in pursuit. While one echelon strikes the hostile retreating columns in flank, the other endeavors to block the route of retreat.
- (124) RAIDS. [Raids.] Hauptmann v. Borcke. An interesting study of the subject of cavalry raids. Considerable space is given to the methods used by Gen. J.E.B. Stuart during the Civil War.
- (125) DIE KRIEGSCHEMISCHE AUSBILDUNG DER ROTEN ARMEE. [The chemical war training of the Red Army.] A review of a recent official publication on chemical warfare which has been distributed to commanders of the Red Army.
- (126) DAS "KLINISCHE HEER." [The clinical army.] The average number of days on sick report is given as 11 days for the American soldier and 15 days for the German soldier. For the French soldier since the introduction of the one-year enlistment period the average is even greater. The French believe this can be corrected by having sick-call in the afternoon.

11 August 1930

- (127) SCHWERE ARTILLERIE IM BEWEGUNGS-KRIEG. [Heavy artillery in moving warfare.] (II) Oberstleutnant Elschner. (See abstract, page 115)
- (128) ZUSAMMENARBEITEN DER WAFFEN MIT KAMPFWAGEN. [Cooperation of other arms with tanks.] (I) (See abstract, page 110)

- (129) HINHALTENDER KAMPF UND VOLKSCHARAKTER. [Delaying actions and character of people.] Generalmajor Schulz.

A continuation of this subject from previous numbers. The writer who was a regimental commander with the German Sixth Army tells how his troops had little faith in delaying action and almost struck when such missions were assigned to them in August 1914. After the first battles, however, troops were not so impetuous. He believes it is all a matter of training that should be covered in time of peace so that not only the troops but also the nation will look upon delaying action as an essential phase of combined tactical operations.

- (130) STAATSBÜRGERLICHE ERZIEHUNG DES SOLDATEN. [Citizenship training of soldiers.] A discussion of the efforts to this end now being made in the German Army.

18 August 1930

- (131) EINE VERSÄUMTE SCHLACHT. [A neglected battle.] An account of the naval operations of 19 August 1916, about 2½ months after the battle of Jutland, when both the British and German battle fleets were on the high sea ready to give battle but failed to become engaged due to a breakdown of the German information service. The British had unusually accurate information but Jellicoe moved warily on account of the fear of German submarines and mine fields.
- (132) SCHWERE ARTILLERIE IM BEWEGUNGS-KRIEG. [Heavy artillery in moving warfare.] (III) Oberstleutnant Elschner. (See abstract, page 115)
- (133) DIE NEUEN AUTOCHENILLES DE CAVALERIE "M 28" UND "M 29." [The new cavalry "auto chenille" M 28 and M 29.] Major Heigl.

A description of the new French "auto-chenille" which is a combination of armored car and tank for use by cavalry.

- (134) ZU: VEREINFACHUNG DES SCHRIFTVERKEHRS. [Simplification of paper work.] A tirade against the enormous amount of paper work which now is flooding commanders of lower units. Evidently this trouble is perennial in armies besides our own.
- (135) ALKOHOL—NIKOTIN—KOFFEIN. [Alcohol—nicotine—caffeine.] Colonel Blech. An amusing but at the same time human and practical contribution to the subject of the use of stimulants by our genial friend Colonel Gustav M. Blech, Chief Surgeon of the 33d (US) Division during the War. Colonel Blech condemns the use of alcoholic drink, because, and probably as the result of personal experience, he feels it makes one too loquacious the night before and too depressed by its deleterious effects on the morning after. As to smoking and coffee, he finds both excellent mental stimulants without which the average man as himself cannot do his best work. A keen observer of men, Dr. Blech noted how officers and men enjoyed a smoke before going to battle. They did this more or less without conscious effort and thereby showed their absence of nerves.

25 August 1930

- (136) DAS FORMALE KAVALLERIE-EXERZIEREN. [The formal cavalry drill.] General v. Kayser. Answering previous articles in which the dearth of formal cavalry drills was pointed out, General v. Kayser points out why the new cavalry training regulations stood pedaled such drills. The present cavalry TR were prepared with but one goal in mind: prepara-

- tion for combat, and this end they are fulfilling.
- (137) SCHWEIZER BRIEF. [Letter from Switzerland.] A letter describing the existing politico-military situation in Switzerland.
- (138) LUFTSCHUTZ MARSCHIERENDER TRUPPEN. [Antiaircraft protection of marching troops.] The days of the long snake-like troop columns are past. In the presence of the enemy a large unit must advance in its zone developed in several columns of which the largest does not exceed a reinforced regiment. The advance will have to be made by bounds from one terrain line to another. March units will have to make their halts habitually in a formation and locality which will minimize discovery and attack by hostile aviation. Only the critical localities in the zone of advance can be protected by antiaircraft artillery.

- (139) KRISIS IM ANGRIFFSGEFECHT. [Crisis of the attack.] An account of the attack of the 81st Div. at the German breakthrough at Gorlice on 2 May, 1915. Here is a case which so often happened when a few hostile machine guns which the artillery preparation did not neutralize, held up the main effort for two hours. The following lessons were learned:

- a. The artillery preparation cannot neutralize every hostile machine gun;
- b. A few machine guns well located and masked, can hold up the attack of a superior force for hours;
- c. The moral effect of an accompanying battery is great even though its fire effect may not be decisive;
- d. A commander must be versatile to change his plan of attack to meet unexpected resistances.

- (140) ZUSAMMENARBEITEN DER WAFFEN MIT KAMPFWAGEN. [Cooperation of other arms with tanks.] (II) (See abstract, page 110)

#### 4 September 1930

- (141) SCHUSZLEISTUNG UND STOSZKRAFT. [Fire effect and assault power.] A historical study of the development of fire power until it now constitutes the major element of the assault.

- (142) BEGLEIT-ARTILLERIE. [Accompanying artillery.] Oberst Fischer.  
The writer proposes a new type of gun of about 47 mm caliber which besides close support of infantry can also execute antitank and antiaircraft missions. This artillery should not be an organic part of infantry units but should be attached thereto by the divisions as the situation demands.

- (143) ZUSAMMENARBEITEN DER WAFFEN MIT KAMPFWAGEN. [Cooperation of other arms with tanks.] (III) (See abstract, page 110)

- (144) FEINDÜBERWACHUNG UND OPERATIVE ÜBERRASCHUNG. [Surveillance of the enemy and strategic surprise.] Hauptmann Ritter. (See abstract, page 128)

- (145) DIE NEUE ÖSTERREICHISCHE GEFECHTS-VORSCHRIFT. [The new Austrian regulations concerning combat.] As a part of its field service regulations now in process of preparation Austria has just published the chapter on "Combat." In general, the principles of combat are similar to ours. The conception of a zone of action fixed by boundaries seems however to have been modified. The zone of action is determined by the area of deployment and the objective (area to be attacked or defended). Another principle is emphasized: In the attack always seek contact with the unit that has advanced farthest.

#### 11 September 1930

- (146) GEDANKEN ÜBER MARSCHSICHERUNG. [Thoughts concerning security on the march.] (I) (See abstract, page 121)

- (147) ÜBERGANG ZUR RUHE. [Security and halt for the night.] An account of the bivouac of the German Guard Division on the night of 8-9 September, 1914, when after capturing Fere-Champenoise by a surprise attack before dawn, it found itself attacked during the night by the French. Fortunately the French attacked on the only part of the front where there was an outpost otherwise the Guard Division would have been in a very serious situation.

- (148) REORGANISATION DER RUMÄNISCHEN WEHRMACHT. [Reorganization of the Rumanian Army.] As the result of pressure by France and Poland, Rumania has reorganized her army. The entire plan will be completed by 1930. Nearly all new armament will be provided by the Creuzot, Skoda and Schneider works.

#### 18 September 1930

- (149) DER LETZTE AUFMARSCH DER MITTELMÄCHTE. [The last concentration of the Central Powers.] (I) (See abstract, page 115)

- (150) GEDANKEN ÜBER MARSCHSICHERUNG. [Thoughts concerning security on the march.] (II) (See abstract, page 121)

- (151) PRAKTISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE IN DER WEHRMACHT. [Practical psychology in the Army.] Hauptmann Hesse.

The German Army is now applying psychiatric tests to its officers and men and rate them accordingly. The system is here being defended by Dr. Kurt Hesse who served during the war as a company officer and who is well known as a student of mass psychology. His book: *The Hero—Psychology* is a war study based on his observations in the field in which he clearly shows how fear, panic and other psychologic phenomena are brought about.

- (152) ZUSAMMENARBEITEN DER WAFFEN MIT KAMPFWAGEN. [Cooperation of other arms and tanks.] (IV) (See abstract, page 110)

- (153) DIE SCHLUSZMANÖVER DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN BUNDESHEERS. [The closing maneuvers of the Austrian Federal Army.] An account of the Austrian maneuver held west of Vienna 2-4 September 1930. During the maneuvers several important operations were executed involving the actual movement of brigades by truck and rail and the crossing of other brigades across the Danube. In addition, modern combat means were tried out and valuable experiences drawn therefrom.

- (154) DIE FRANZÖSISCHE "MARSHALLSCHULE." [The French Marshals' School.] An outline of the course at the French Centre des Hautes études militaires to which 30 selected colonels are sent each year. The officers sent have been marked for higher command.

#### 25 September 1930

- (155) DIE GROSSEN FRANZÖSISCHEN HEERÜBUNGEN IN LOTHINGEN. [The great French Fall maneuvers in Lorraine.] (See abstract, page 114)

- (156) DER LETZTE AUFMARSCH DER MITTELMÄCHTE. [The last concentration of the Central Powers.] (II) (See abstract, page 115)

- (157) DIE "ÜBERRASCHUNG" VOM 18. JULI 1918. [The "surprise" on 18 July, 1918.] General Marx who was chief of artillery of the German Seventh Army holding the Marne salient agrees with an article in a previous number that the Germans were not surprised but

**17—MILITAR-WOCHENBLATT** (Germany)  
25 September 1930 (continued)

expected the French counterattack on 18 July at Soissons. The Chief of Staff, Colonel Rhinehardt always referred to this prospective attack, and when the German offensive of 15 July failed, he counted upon it as certain within a short time.

- (158) DIE FRANZÖSISCHE "ANWEISUNG FÜR DEN GEBRAUCH VON KAMPFWAGEN" VOM 24. 1. 1929. [The French regulations for the employment of tanks of 24 January, 1929.] A review of the latest French tank regulations. It is apparent that the French carefully avoid any mention of the use of leading tanks and adhere to the principle of close liaison with the supported infantry and cavalry.

**18—CUR ARMY**

January 1931

- (3) THE FIELD ARTILLERY  
(4) HELL BENT FOR LEATHER. Peterson  
(5) ARMY AND NAVY FOREVER. [Joint operations] Winston

February 1931

- (6) PAY AND PROMOTION. [Inter-Departmental Board, bills]  
(7) THE EIGHTH CORPS AREA  
(8) WASHINGTON: "THE OLD FOX." Brilliant

March 1931

- (9) PERSHING: WHERE HE STANDS. Funnell  
(10) AMATEUR WARRIORS  
(11) THE CAVALRY DID FIGHT. Reklaw

**19—POINTER**

9 January 1931

- (6) THE WEST POINTS OF OTHER LANDS. II—St. Cyr

6 February 1931

- (7) THE WEST POINTS OF OTHER LANDS. III—THE BRITISH MILITARY SCHOOLS

20 February 1931

- (8) THE WEST POINTS OF OTHER LANDS. IV—ROYAL MILITARY CANADA

6 March 1931

- (9) THE WEST POINTS OF OTHER LANDS. VI—ROYAL AIR FORCE COLLEGE

20 March 1931

- (10) THE WEST POINTS OF OTHER LANDS. VI—GERMAN MILITARY SCHOOLS

**21—RECRUITING NEWS**

1 January 1931

- (18) THE ARMY SIGNAL SCHOOL. Lieutenant Clarke  
(19) "RIGHT OF THE LINE." [Brilliant fighting record of 14th Infantry earned signal honor.] Smith

15 January 1931

- (20) WATERVLIJT ARSENAL ARMY'S GUN FACTORY . . .  
(21) FOURTEENTH CAVALRY. Regiment played an important part in Philippine pacification. Richeson

1 February 1931

- (22) TWENTH-NINTH ENGINEERS. This unit produced 15 tons of maps within a month in France

15 February 1931

- (23) MEN OF THE ROLLING CAISSONS. 15th Field Artillerymen justly proud of regiment's history. Smith  
(24) THE STORY OF SPRINGFIELD. History of famous Army . . . Smith

1 March 1931

- (25) "CAN DO" MOTTO OF 15TH INFANTRY . . . Smith

15 March 1931

- (26) "NEW YORK'S OWN"—SIXTEENTH INFANTRY [U.S.] . . . Smith  
(27) CHILKOOT BARRACKS ALASKA. Cunningham

**22—REVISTA MILITAR** (Argentina)

November 1930

By M. B. NAVAS

- (37) SERVICIOS DEL EJÉRCITO. [Army services.]  
(1) Teniente coronel Giovanelli. Dealing with the organization, in time of peace, of the non-combatant branches of the Army.

- (38) EL SERVICIO DE COMUNICACIONES EN LA EXPLORACION CERCANA Y DE COMBATE. Forma general de su utilización. [Communication service in close reconnaissance and combat reconnaissance. General method of its employment.] Mayor González.

- Describes the difference between close reconnaissance and combat reconnaissance and the system of communication in each case.

- (39) TÁCTICA Y TÉCNICA. [Tactics and technique.] Teniente coronel Florit.

- Shows the relation between tactics and technique; states that technique can be adapted to meet any tactical situation.

- (40) LINEAS TELEFONICAS. [Telephone lines.] Teniente Lagos.

- A technical discussion dealing with wire communication.

- (41) OPERACIONES COMBINADAS. [Combined operations.] (I) Capitán Yaben.

- A continued article dealing with maritime and land operations; the Gallipoli campaign.

December 1930

By W. F. SAFFORD

- (42) SERVICIOS DEL EJÉRCITO. [Army services.]  
(1) Teniente coronel Giovanelli.

- Continuation of a series of articles on different services, pointing out the necessity of giving proper importance to organization and preparation. Present article discusses (V) Remount and Veterinary service and (VI) Military constructions. The former presents nothing new to anyone familiar with our mounted branches; the latter impresses the necessity of reorganizing the present (Argentine) Corps of Engineers, in order to modernize it and put it in a proper position to cope with its duties.

- (43) ADECUACION DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION DESDE EL PUNTO DE VISTA EN SU EMPLEO TÁCTICO. [Consideration of means of communication from the point of view of their tactical employment.] Mayor González.

- Discussion, in general terms, under the following headings:

- (1) Tactical situation;  
(2) Intentions of the commander;  
(3) Conditions of the terrain;  
(4) Means available;  
(5) Weather conditions;  
(6) Physical condition and morale of the troops (of communications).

- Nothing new presented but a very good article to give a general idea of the work of the troops of communications.

- (44) INSTRUCCIONES SOBRE EL MATERIAL DE "PUENTES RÁPIDOS SOBRE BOTES FLEGADIZOS" DE QUE DISPONEN LOS ZAPADORES PONTONEROS EN CAMPANA. [Instructions on the material of "Quick Bridges on collapsible boats" with which the Sapper-



Pontoneers are equipped in the field.] Capitán Chichizola.

Continuation of a series of articles. This article is written to serve as a guide and instructs in the detailed handling, construction, use, nomenclature, personnel, etc., of these particular bridges. From the text and pictures it would seem that this is a very practical thing.

- (45) ALGO SOBRE LOS ASPIRANTES A OFICIALES DE RESERVA. [Something about the candidates for officers of the reserve.] Teniente del Cioppo.

An appeal to change the wording of the regulations respecting Reserve Officers in order to allow more active duty and the reasons why advisable.

- (46) EL EMPLEO DE LA "COLUMNA DE TIRADORES" COMO FORMACION DE COMBATE DE NUESTRA INFANTERIA. [Employment of the "column of riflemen" as a combat formation of our infantry.] Mayor Lozano.

Author points out erroneous use of what corresponds to our "line of squad columns," i.e., men in squads too close together, resting by lying down after a rush instead of taking the walk to regain breath, fault of formation in crossing ground swept by artillery fire. Favors a "chain of riflemen" echeloned and with greater depth. Illustrates this with diagrams and gives reasons for his deductions by an analysis of artillery fire. Formations seem reasonable and worth an experiment.

- (47) CÁLCULO DE LOS ELEMENTOS DE UN PUENTE TIPO SOBRE PILOTES PARA 10 TONELADAS. [Calculation of the elements of a typical bridge on piles, for 10 ton loads.] Teniente Orona.

Continuation of a series. Technical formulas, mathematical computations, tables, and drawings.

- (48) OPERACIONES COMBINADAS. [Combined operations.] (II) Capitán Yaben.

Continuation of a series. In this installment the author discusses the taking of the Baltic Islands in the Great War, by combined action of the German land and naval forces. The account is very detailed and extremely interesting and instructive. The whole should be translated, if no such article is now on hand, and kept on file for reference.

- (49) LA GRAN GUERRA EN EL FRENTE ITALIANO, SEGUN LAS MEMORIAS DEL GENERAL CADORNA. [The Great War on the Italian front, according to the memoirs of General Cadorna.] Marfil.

The author argues that we are too prone to study the campaign of 1914-1918 in France and to neglect other fields. The memoirs of General Cadorna are well worth the study. The author then gives a brief review of this book showing the difficulties encountered by the Italian Army, and incidents of the War.

#### January 1931

By A. T. MCCONE

- (50) CURSO ABREVIADO DE TÁCTICA APLICADA. [A short course in applied tactics.] Capitán Ornestein.

The beginning of a correspondence course in tactics for officers preparing for the Staff School. Covers estimate of a situation, plan and decision of commander. No appreciable differences from our own.

- (51) INDICACIONES PARA LA PREPARACION DE LOS OFICIALES QUE DESEAN INGRESAR A LA ESCUELA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA. [Hints on preparation for officers desiring to enter the Staff School.] Teniente coronel Sosa.

Various explanations of the course and methods used in the school.

- (52) ARMAS. [Arms.] Teniente coronel Florit. A discussion of the use of the various arms by an infantry commander with an illustrative problem.

- (53) EL SERVICIO DE COMUNICACIONES EN ALGUNOS EJÉRCITOS MODERNOS. [Communication Service in some modern armies.] Teniente coronel Daul.

A study of the Signal Services in the American, English and German Armies. Slightly inaccurate in the case of the American Army.

- (54) ORGANIZACION MILITAR. [Military organization of the great air powers.] Teniente coronel Espindola.

A study of the Air Forces of Great Britain, France, United States, Italy and Japan. Written as a rather sketchy outline.

- (55) PUNTOS DE APOYO. [Strong points.] Teniente Cuarenta.

A discussion of the mission, location, and composition of mutually supporting strong points in a defensive scheme.

- (56) FEDERICO EL GRANDE—NAPOLEON—MOLTKE. [Frederick the Great, Napoleon and Moltke the elder.] Translated from the German by Capitán Muniz.

A study of the conduct of war in the 18th and 19th centuries with a discussion of the politico-military conditions confronting each leader.

#### 23—REVUE MILITAIRE FRANCAISE (France) November 1930

By S. C. GODFREY

- (25) LE 10<sup>e</sup> CORPS À CHARLEROI. (1) Commandant Larcher. (2 maps)

A detailed description of the fighting around Charleroi, 20-24 August, 1914, when the French X Corps, with its offensive spirit initially high, first met the shock of the advancing German invaders.

- (26) LA JOURNÉE DU 9 SEPTEMBRE 1914 À LA GAUCHE DE LA 9<sup>e</sup> ARMÉE. [Operations on the left of the Ninth Army, 9 September, 1914.] Général Réquin. (10 maps)

A detailed description of the movements of the 42d, 51st (reserve), and Moroccan divisions on the left of Foch's Ninth Army, during one phase of the Battle of the Marne. The 42d Division, upon being relieved by the 51st Division, was ordered to move laterally behind the Moroccan Division and attack farther east. This bold maneuver, executed by tired troops, throws light on Foch's "will to attack."

- (27) L'EFFORT MILITAIRE DE LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE EN 1914-1918. [The military effort of Great Britain on the Western Front.] Capitaine Cammas.

A discussion of the extent of the British military effort in France, its development from the initial 5 divisions to a maximum of 52 divisions in 1917. In comparing these figures with those of the French forces, it is pointed out that England's principal role was on the sea.

- (28) L'HIVER 1925-1926 AU MAROC DANS UN SECTEUR DU FRONT NORD. [The winter of 1925-1926 in Morocco in a sector of the North Front.] (1) Général Vanbreemsersch.

A description of winter operations on a sector of the northern front in Morocco, 1925-1926. This is concerned largely with consolidating the gains of the preceding campaign, and preparing for operations the next spring.



**23—REVUE MILITAIRE FRANCAISE (France)**  
(continued)

December 1930

By N. F. RAMSEY

- (29) LA COMBINAISON DES ARMES. [The combination of the arms.] Général Brossé.  
This article shows the necessity for the teamwork of all arms and examples of cooperation between the various arms.

- (30) LE 10<sup>e</sup> CORPS À CHARLEROI (20 AU 24 AOÛT 1914). [The X Corps at Charleroi.] (II) Commandant Larcher. (4 maps)

This is the second of a series of articles dealing with the operations of the X Corps at Charleroi, 20-24 August 1914.

- (31) L'HIVER 1925-1926 AU MAROC DANS UN SECTEUR DU FRONT NORD. [The winter of 1925-1926 in Morocco in a sector of the North Front.] (II) Général Vanbreemsch.

This is the concluding number of an article dealing with operations in the field in Morocco against the Riffs.

January 1931

By F. M. BARROWS

- (32) LA 9<sup>e</sup> DIVISION EN 1918. [The 9th Division in 1918.] (I) Général Gamelin et Commandant Petitbon. (See abstract, page 117)

- (33) SUCCÈS STRATÉGIQUE, SUCCÈS TACTIQUES. [Strategic success; tactical success.] (II) Colonel Loizeau. (See abstract, page 120)

- (34) LE 10<sup>e</sup> CORPS À CHARLEROI (20 AU 24 AOÛT 1914). [The X Corps at Charleroi.] (III) Commandant Larcher.

This installment deals with the attack of the 20th Division on the front: Falisolle—Menorcy.

- (35) BAILLEN (21 JUILLET 1808). [Bailen (21 July 1808).] (I) Colonel Grasse.

The history of a French Army Corps blockaded in Spain by the British fleet and forced to combat a revolutionary uprising of the Spanish people, while Napoleon with his main army was engaged elsewhere.

**32—INFANTRY JOURNAL**

January 1931

- (55) THE TACTICAL USE OF SMOKE BY THE INFANTRY REGIMENT. (I) Major Almond

- (56) ANTIAIRCRAFT RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT. Captain Layman

- (57) READING MAPS, MESSAGES AND FIRE CONTROL INSTRUMENTS AT NIGHT. Captain McFadyen

February 1931

- (58) THE TACTICAL USE OF SMOKE BY THE INFANTRY REGIMENT. (II) Major Almond

March-April 1931

- (59) THE PROGRESS OF INFANTRY DEVELOPMENT. (Projects which have been studied and tested by the Infantry Board and Department of Experiment) Brigadier General King

- (60) THE PRESENT STATUS OF INFANTRY EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT. Captain McFadyen

- (61) AMERICAN TROOPS IN CHINA—THEIR MISSION. Captain Cope

- (62) NATIONAL DEFENSE AND TRANSPORTATION. Lofe

- (63) MILITARIST OR PACIFIST? Lieutenant Colonel Lang

- (64) THE COST OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. Colonel Waldron

- (65) PAN AMERICANISM, ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT. Wilgus

- (66) TANK AND MECHANIZATION LITERATURE. Lieutenant Jicks

- (67) MOTORIZATION OF THE 34TH INFANTRY. Colonel Smith

- (68) THE ROTC AND EDUCATION. Major Meredith

**34—REVUE D'INFANTERIE (France)**

November 1930

By J. H. VAN VLIET

- (24) ESSAI DE CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DU TIR DES MITRAILLEUSES PARDESSUS LES TROUPES AMIES ET DANS LES INTERVALLES. [A study of machine gun fire: overhead and through intervals.] Discussion of overhead fire, required safety angles, and how applied.

- (25) AU SUJET DE LA LIAISON INFANTRIE-ARTILLERIE. [The subject of infantry-artillery liaison.] Lieutenant-colonel Duhourcau.

Methods to be used by the infantry in designating the location of targets for the artillery.

- (26) LE TIR MASQUÉ DES MITRAILLEUSES. [Masked fire by machine guns.] (II) Lieutenant-colonel Roze des Ordon.

Beginning of an article, that claims machine guns firing by means of a sight defilade method (similar to the method used with the 37 mm gun) are as effective as when fired by direct laying.

- (27) LA COOPÉRATION DE L'ARTILLERIE AU COMBAT DE L'INFANTRIE EN HAUTE MONTAGNE. [Artillery support for infantry in mountainous regions.] Commandant Regnault.

Resumé of the difficulties to be encountered in mountain warfare, followed by a map problem and discussion.

- (28) LA 1<sup>re</sup> ARMÉE ALLEMANDE DANS LA BATAILLE DE L'OURCQ (5-9 SEPTEMBRE 1914). [The German First Army in the battle of the Ourcq, 5-9 September 1914.] (I) Lieutenant-colonel Koeltz.

An account of this operation apparently based on German official sources. Illustrated with maps and pictures.

- (29) COMMANDEMENT DES PETITES UNITÉS AU COMBAT. [Command of small units in combat.] Commandant Pamponneau.

Map reading and map making essential. Maps and sketches can take the place of long orders. Shows samples of maps and orders used in maneuver by the 18th Infantry in August 1928, and includes a training schedule.

December 1930

By R. C. SMITH

- (30) AU SUJET DES DEMANDES DE TIR DE L'INFANTRIE À L'ARTILLERIE. [On the subject of requests for fire from the infantry to the artillery.] Lieutenant-colonel Albaouille.

An infantry battalion commander, criticized in a man maneuver for making a faulty request for artillery fire, discusses with the author, who is an artilleryman, the proper form or rather the elements that should be covered in a request for fire. The author emphasizes that it is not enough to say "Request concentration on machine gun at (397.4-729.8)." It is of vital importance to inform the artillery of the location of the friendly front line. Further, a plan should be made to exploit the results of the artillery fire as soon as it is completed.

- (31) LA 1<sup>re</sup> ARMÉE ALLEMANDE DANS LA BATAILLE DE L'OURCQ (5-9 SEPTEMBRE 1914). [The German First Army in the battle of the Ourcq, 5-9 September 1914.] (II) Lieutenant-colonel Koeltz.

A continuation of the very valuable monograph, begun in the issue of October 1930.

- (32) LE TIR MASQUÉ DES MITRAILLEUSES. [Masked fire by machine guns.] (II) Colonel Paquet and Lieutenant-colonel Roze des Ordon.

Sequel to the article begun in November 1930. The authors state, that because of the great vulnerability of a machine gun firing in the open by direct fire, the normal type of action in future war will be by indirect fire. They believe it can be made almost as effective as direct fire. The subject is discussed at considerable length and an illustrative problem is given in which a machine-gun platoon fires through a gap in the line between two rifle platoons. This article is worthy of study by any infantryman.

- (33) LA REFORME DE LA RÉGLEMENTATION RELATIVE AUX CHARS DE COMBAT. [The re-casting of the regulations bearing on tanks.] Commandant J. P.

A review of Tank Regulations, this section being especially devoted to light tanks. The author says the two dominating ideas that run through these new regulations are: (1) Permit the tank units to attack rapidly; (2) In order to increase the combat efficiency and to assure the desired rapidity in battle, make the tank officers the effective combat leaders.

- (34) ETUDE SUR LE MORAL DE L'INFANTERIE FRANCAISE PENDANT LA GUERRE DE 1914-1918. [A study on the morale of the French infantry during the War of 1914-1918.] Capitaine Brosse.

The author begins with a general discussion of morale and its influence on the psychology of the combatant. He analyzes the factors that make for high morale in an organization and stresses the importance of the leader's influence. He cites the high morale in certain units that would be reduced to a small fraction of their strength by battle losses, but that could quickly regain their high morale even when filled up with new men. The second part of the essay is a concrete study of morale during the War. The section on the rebuilding of morale by Petain is of special interest.

January 1931

By J. H. VAN VLIET

- (35) LA DÉFENSE DES COURS D'EAU ET LA BATAILLE DÉFENSIVE DU 15 JUILLET 1918 SUR LE FRONT DE LA MARNE. [Defense of river lines and the defensive battle of 15 July 1918, along the Marne.] (I) Colonel Baillis and Capitaine Garin.

General discussion of defense principles. Most effective means, is to have supporting centers of resistance prepared so as to stop crossing about the time that attacking troops are reaching the limit of supporting artillery fire. Stresses the idea that the main effort of the defense is to gain time for counter-attacking troops to come up. Résumé of German attack along the Marne and French defense. Author has selected his material from official French sources.

- (36) LES INFANTERIES ÉTRANGÈRES.—III.—L'INFANTERIE POLONAISE. [Foreign infantries. III.—Polish infantry.] Capitaine R. Report on organization, armament, types of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officers and training of the present Polish infantry.

- (37) LA 1<sup>RE</sup> ARMÉE ALLEMANDE DANS LA BATAILLE DE L'OUREQ. [The German First Army in the battle of the Ourcq.] (III) Lieutenant-colonel Koeltz.

Continuation of a report of the operations of the First German Army in the battle of the Ourcq. Maps and orders.

- (38) L'INSTRUCTION DU SOLDAT EN VUE DU COMBAT. [Combat instruction for the soldiers.] Commandant Guigues.

End of a series of articles on combat instruction. Stresses need of training the in-

fantryman in the use of his weapons, the benefit derived from combat practice problems, and the need for close supervision of the individual during a problem.

35—ROYAL TANK CORPS JOURNAL (Great Britain)

January 1931

- (6) SOME LITTLE KNOWN FRENCH, GERMAN AND AMERICAN TANKS OF THE GREAT WAR PERIOD. (I) Lieutenant Icks

February 1931

- (7) SOME LITTLE KNOWN FRENCH, GERMAN AND AMERICAN TANKS OF THE GREAT WAR PERIOD. (II) Lieutenant Icks

- (8) ARMOURD FIGHTING VEHICLES IN WAZIRISTAN OPERATIONS, MAY-AUGUST, 1930. (With map) Major Kenchington

March 1931

- (9) Thoughts on tanks. Captain Butler

36—CAVALRY JOURNAL

January 1931

- (11) CAVALRY PACKS AND MARCHES. Colonel Phillips

- (12) DEFENSE AGAINST TANKS. Lieutenant Colonel Edmunds

- (13) BORDER CAVALRY STATIONS

- (14) COORDINATION OF THE ATTACK. Major General Fuller

- (15) THE NATIONAL GUARD. Colonel Vestal

February 1931

- (16) CAVALRY PACKS AND MARCHES. (II) Colonel Phillips

- (17) THE NATIONAL GUARD RECRUITING PROBLEM. Lieutenant Rose

37—CAVALRY JOURNAL (Great Britain)

January 1931

- (4) SIGNALS AND THE CAVALRY. Major Parsons

- (5) NAPOLEONIC CAVALRY AND ITS LEADERS.

- (IV) Captain Sheppard

38—REVUE DE CAVALERIE (France)

By N. B. BRISCOE

November December 1930

- (10) EXPLORATION STRATÉGIQUE. LE 4<sup>E</sup> CORPS DE CAVALERIE ALLEMANDE EN AOÛT 1914. [Strategical reconnaissance. The German IV Cavalry Corps in August 1914.] (I) Capitaine Gazin. (2 maps)

- (11) L'ÉCOLE DE PERFECTIONNEMENT DES OFFICIERS DE RÉSERVE DE CAVALERIE À PARIS. [The Higher School for Cavalry Reserve Officers at Paris.] Chef d'escadrons Villemain

- (12) LE COMBAT DE CAVALERIE. Une conférence du général Chinkarenko sur la cavalerie pendant la guerre civile en Russie. [Cavalry combat. A conference by General Chinkarenko on cavalry during the Civil War in Russia (1921).] Capitaine Moslard. (3 maps)

- (13) DIVISION DE CAVALERIE ET AVIATION SANITAIRE. [The cavalry division and air ambulance service.] Capitaine Gilla. (2 maps)

- (14) LA LIAISON DANS LES A.M.C. [Liaison in the armored cars.] Lieutenant Licart. (2 photos)

- (15) LA CHARGE DU LIEUTENANT SAISON À MITTERSHEIM (19 AOÛT 1914). [The charge of Lieutenant Saison at Mittersheim, 19 August 1914.] An account of reconnaissance by an officer's patrol in the gap between two armies confronting the German advance through Lorraine.

38—REVUE DE CAVALERIE (France) (contd)

January-February 1931

- (16) LA CAVALERIE MODERNE. ÉTUDES TACTIQUES (VIII). L'action retardatrice. L'emploi des formations automobiles de combat. Modern cavalry. Tactical studies (VIII). Delaying action. The employment of automobile units in combat. Commandant Keime. (1 map)

The final section of a most interesting series of illustrative problems of the modern cavalry division (French) composed of two brigades mounted ("hippomobile"), a regiment of dragoons portée (without horses), horse artillery, a battalion of cyclists, and a "Groupe-ment Automobile" including armored cars, 105 mm. portée, and cyclist pioneers. A very intimate association of cavalry and a "mechanized force" in one permanent unit.

- (17) LE CENTENAIRE DES CHASSEURS D'AFRIQUE. [The centenary of the Chasseurs d'Afrique.] Colonel Herchet.

Accompanied by six photos. Interesting to note the change of headdress between 1831 and 1853 and the lack of change until after 1913.

- (18) EXPLORATION STRATÉGIQUE. LE 4<sup>e</sup> CORPS DE CAVALERIE ALLEMAND EN AOÛT 1914. [Strategic reconnaissance. The German IV Cavalry Corps in August 1914.] (II) Capitaine Gazin.

Accounts of combat at Phillon and Mangiennes, with maps. These articles carry von Poseck's account of the German operations to the next stage where the French forces in opposition are shown, and some conclusions are drawn.

- (19) L'ESCADRON MOTOCYCLISTE. [The motorcycle squadron.] Commandant X. . .

The article gives the organization, armament and equipment of a new unit used in 1930 in maneuvers in Lorraine. Aggregate strength 151, transportation 62 sidecars with some other vehicles. Discussion includes technical characteristics, tactical characteristics, employment of motorcycle units, particular cases of employment in the 1930 maneuvers in Lorraine and in the 8th Region. The missions are those usually assigned to armored cars, and the employment is the same as that of armored cars.

- (20) RECONNAISSANCE ET CHARGE DU SOUS-LIEUTENANT ROZAY À CHERISY (29 SEPTEMBRE 1914). [Reconnaissance and charge of Lieutenant Rozay at Cherisy, 29 September 1914.] A very interesting narrative of the exploits of an officer's patrol reconnoitering from the vicinity of Arras towards Cambrai. Quite an exciting account of small cavalry combat.

39—COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

January 1931

- (13) THE ROLE OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS. Brigadier General Embick  
(14) THE MARCH OF THE 61ST COAST ARTILLERY (AA). Major Cunningham  
(15) INDUSTRY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE. Major General Moseley  
(16) HARBOR DEFENSES OF SAN FRANCISCO ARMY-NAVY JOINT EXERCISES. Captain Swett  
(17) THE NICARAGUA CANAL SURVEY. Lieutenant Colonel Sultan  
(18) TANK DIVISIONS. Major Benson  
(19) THE PHILIPPINES. Major Lim  
(20) SUCCESS IN WAR. Major Patton  
(21) THE COLLEGE TRAINED ARMY. Lieutenant Palmer

- (22) COAST ARTILLERY TARGET PRACTICE. Lieutenant Colonel McReynolds

February 1931

- (23) THE EFFECT OF AVIATION UPON THE MISSIONS OF THE COAST ARTILLERY. Colonel Bishop  
(24) NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN WARFARE. General Summerall  
(25) THE BRITISH ARMY EXERCISE OF 1930. Captain Liddell Hart  
(26) INDUSTRY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE. Major General Moseley  
(27) PRACTICAL PEACE-TIME LEADERSHIP. Major Griswold  
(28) WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH THE RESERVE? Major Baum  
(29) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION FOR THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT REGIMENT

40—FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL

January-February 1931

- (11) ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF FIELD ARTILLERY—1930  
(12) NATIONAL GUARD DUTIES IN AID OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES. Brigadier General Bush

March-April 1931

- (13) THE TREND OF FIELD ARTILLERY. Major General Bishop

42—REVUE D'ARTILLERIE (France)

By D. M. BEERE

November 1930

- (17) LE COMBAT DE SCHÖNHOLZ (1917). [The fight at Schönholz.] Chef d'escadron Didelet. A description of the artillery support given to a limited objective attack. This attack was made by two battalions of infantry supported by 8 battalions of light, 6 battalions of medium and heavy artillery, and 5 batteries of trench mortars.

- (18) L'ARTILLERIE DANS L'OFFENSIVE EN GUERRE DE POSITION. [Artillery in the offensive in position warfare.] (XI) (By Colonel Bruchmüller, translated into the French by Major Brunet and Captain Aizier [See also, Abstract of Series, page 109])

This installment is headed "Lessons of the World War." In it Colonel Bruchmüller summarizes the general principles of artillery employment in the offensive in position warfare. He also takes occasion to show that the Germans were the first to properly conform to these principles. Also discussed is the influence of improper artillery employment in the failure of the attack of the German Seventeenth Army.

- (19) CARACTÉRISTIQUES GÉNÉRALES DE MATÉRIELS D'ARTILLERIE MODERNES. [General characteristics of modern artillery materials.] Chef d'escadron Desrousseaux.

This is an excellent brief summary of the considerations which influence the design of modern field artillery pieces, under the following headings: (1) Power (power of the shell, range, lateral field of fire, rapidity of fire); (2) Mobility (horse traction, motor traction).

December 1930

- (20) NOTE RELATIVE À LA VULNÉRABILITÉ DES CHARS PAR LE FEU DE L'ARTILLERIE LOINTAINE. [Notes relative to the vulnerability of tanks to long range artillery fire.] Général Estienne and Capitaine Le Gall.

The first part, by General Estienne, contains data on French tank losses, from April, 1917 to the Armistice. 29.8% of heavy tanks engaged, and 13.2% of the light tanks, were put out of action. The percentage of losses

constantly decreased. At the time of the Armistice it was 20% for heavy and 10% for light tanks. General Estienne is of the opinion that long range artillery fire caused but few of these losses but that the antitank gun was the great enemy of tanks.

In the second part there is a theoretical calculation by Captain Le Gall of tank losses which would be caused by an artillery barrage. (21) L'ARTILLERIE DANS L'OFFENSIVE EN GUERRE DE POSITION. [Artillery in the offensive in position warfare.] (XII) (By Colonel Bruchmuller, translated into the French by Major Brunet and Captain Aizier) (See abstract, page 108) [See also, Summary of series, page 109]

#### 44—MILITARY ENGINEER

##### January-February 1931

- (15) THE LINE AND STAFF PRINCIPLE IN INDUSTRY. Mooney
- (16) TREND OF DESIGN IN HEAVIER-THAN-AIR CRAFT. Lieutenant Mazet
- (17) THE STATUS OF PONTON BRIDGE DEVELOPMENT. Captain Kohloss
- (18) ALEXANDER V. SUVOROV, GENERALISSIMO. Major General Uzefovich
- (19) SOME MEMORIES OF THE A.E.F. Captain Peixotto

##### March-April 1931

- (20) THE SIXTH ENGINEERS IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE. Captain Crane
- (21) SOME FACTS ABOUT THE SWISS ARMY. Lieutenant Colonel Nusschelet
- (22) CAPTAIN JOHN POPE'S ROUTE TO THE PACIFIC. Colonel Crimmins

#### 45—ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL (Great Britain)

##### March 1931

- (13) ORGANIZATION OF HIGHER COMMAND IN WAR. Major General Maurice
- (14) A SUBALTERN IN THE INDIAN MUTINY. Colonel Thackeray
- (15) WATER SUPPLY IN THE FIELD. Lieutenant Colonel Martel
- (16) NOTES ON THE ENGINEERS OF THE ITALIAN Army

#### 46—SIGNAL CORPS BULLETIN

##### January-February 1931

- (7) THE ARMY BUILDS ITS OWN TELEPHONE SYSTEMS. Major General Gibbs
- (8) SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE THIRD CORPS AREA COMMAND POST EXERCISES OF 1930. Lieutenant Colonel Seoane
- (9) MILITARY TELEGRAPH IN THE CIVIL WAR. Lieutenant Colonel Matheny

#### 47—QUARTERMASTER REVIEW

##### January-February 1931

- (7) THE ARMY SHOE. Captain FitzGerald
- (8) MUSEUM OF THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS. Major Wilson
- (9) WHOLESOMENESS OF CANNED FOODS. Captain Blake
- (10) THE NATIONAL MATCHES. Captain Wright
- (11) PATENTS. Captain Doyle

#### 49—SPEEDOMETER

##### February 1931

- (5) CONTROL AND OPERATION OF MOTOR TRANSPORTATION IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS. [Lecture delivered at War College] Major General DeWitt

#### 51—MILITARY SURGEON

##### January 1931

- (5) THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. Colonel Bispham
- (6) THE DAYS GONE BY—SLOW PROMOTION. Colonel Ashburn

##### March 1931

- (7) MILITARY OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION. Major General Ireland

#### 52—ARMY ORDNANCE

##### January-February 1931

- (10) THE MECHANIZATION OF WAR. Is it necessary? Will it last? What will it lead to? Major General Fuller
- (11) NATIONAL STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES. Are our defense policies suited to our probable needs. Captain Nickerson
- (12) THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMY ORDNANCE. Investigations and results in the improvement of weapons. Brigadier General Tschapstad
- (13) ARMY ORDNANCE DURING 1930. Extracts from annual report of Major General Hof
- (14) NAVAL ORDNANCE DURING 1930. Extracts from annual report of Rear Admiral Leahy

#### 53—CHEMICAL WARFARE

##### December 1930

- (2) CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING IN THE INFANTRY SINCE THE WAR

##### January 1931

- (3) EXPANSION OF CHEMICAL TROOPS

##### February 1931

- (4) THE EFFECT OF SMOKE ON INFANTRY RIFLE FIRE
- (5) SMOKE CLOUDS—ON THE CAVALRY HORIZON
- (6) SURVEILLANCE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
- (7) A SMALL TECHNICAL LIBRARY

##### March 1931

- (8) AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROBLEM AGAINST COAST ARTILLERY

#### 54—INFORMATION BULLETIN (Navy Department)

##### December-January 1931

- (5) EASTWARD EXPANSION OF ITALY
- (6) EVOLUTION OF THE GERMAN NAVAL WAR PLANS

#### 55—NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

##### January 1931

- (13) NAVAL AIRCRAFT IN COASTAL WARFARE. Commander Frost
- (14) "AS BEFORE EXCEPT." [U.S.S. Oregon, Spanish-American War] Lieutenant Commander Cosnell
- (15) COMMUNICATION ORGANIZATION

##### February 1931

- (16) FARRAGUT AT THE CROSSROADS. Mordell
- (17) THE REICH CALLS A HAND. Captain Fisher

##### March 1931

- (18) THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. Jahncke
- (19) A STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM SITUATION. Lieutenant Skillman
- (20) THE FLEET AND THE MARINES. Lieutenant Commander Broadbent

#### 56—MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

##### February 1931

- (5) THE TEMPORARY DEFENSE OF A FLEET BASE. Brigadier General Williams
- (6) SALIENT HAITIAN FACTS. Colonel Evans

**56—MARINE CORPS GAZETTE February 1931 (continued)**

- (7) THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS PROBLEM
- (8) THE USE OF GAS IN MINOR WARFARE. Major DelValle
- (9) BULL CART TRANSPORTATION IN THE TROPICS. Major Peard
- (10) THE TAKING OF FORT RIVIERE. Major Thrasher
- (11) MARINE CORPS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL. Captain Paul
- (12) AVIATION IN GUERRILLA WARFARE. Captain Campbell

**67—CURRENT HISTORY**

January 1931

- (4) DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF AMERICA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR. Seymour

February 1931

- (5) GUERRILLA WARFARE IN NICARAGUA. Hackett

March 1931

- (6) BRITAIN'S MILITARY PROBLEM IN INDIA. Major General Fuller

April 1931

- (7) THE 'RIGHT OF REVOLUTION' IN LATIN AMERICA. Rippy

**68—FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

April 1931

- (4) THE CHINESE AS A FIGHTING MAN. Magruder
- (5) IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF NAVAL REDUCTION. Admiral Richmond
- (6) NICARAGUA: IN AGAIN, OUT AGAIN. Dennis

**69—FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION: NEWS BULLETIN**

27 February 1931

- (2) THE EVACUATION OF NICARAGUA

20 March 1931

- (3) THE FRANCO-ITALIAN NAVAL AGREEMENT. MacCallum

**71—ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS (Great Britain)**

7 February 1931

- (3) BRITAIN'S NEW DEFENSE AGAINST AIRCRAFT. (Pictures of new gun)

7 March 1931

- (4) ITALY'S CAPTURE OF THE SENUSSI STRONGHOLD—A GREAT MARCH ACROSS 500 MILES OF DESERT

**73—L'ILLUSTRATION**

7 March 1931

- (3) L'ACCORD NAVAL FRANCO-ITALO-BRITANNIQUE. [Franco-Italian-British naval agreement.]

- (4) L'EUROPE EN ARMES. Un document allemand tendancieux. [Europe in arms.]

14 March 1931

- (5) LE CENTENAIRE DE LA LÉGIION ÉTRANGÈRE. [The centenary of the Foreign Legion.]

- (6) LA FLOTTE AMÉRICAINE ET LA DÉFENSE AÉRONAVALE DE PANAMA. [The American fleet and the aero-naval defense of Panama.]

**74—LITERARY DIGEST**

28 March 1931

- (3) WHAT ACTION—OR INACTION—ON WAR DEBTS WILL DO

**75—LIVING AGE**

March 1931

- (2) THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR DEBTS. Horne

**76—NATION**

25 March 1931

- (3) THE CONFERENCE MUST SUCCEED. [Disarmament Conference, February 1932] Cecil

1 April 1931

- (4) HAITI MARCHES TOWARD FREEDOM. Gruening

**77—NATIONAL REPUBLIC**

January 1931

- (8) AMERICA'S NATIONAL GUARD. McKee
- (9) WHAT ABOUT WEST POINT? Charge that only 'slight smattering' of learning is given cadets outside of military instruction is said to be without foundation. Major Griswold

- (10) THE BICENTENARY OF STEUBEN. Moore

March 1931

- (11) PATRIOTIC WOMEN GATHER TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DEFENSE

- (12) WAR ON MILITARY TRAINING. McNulty

April 1931

- (13) UNCLE SAM'S NURSE CORPS. Adams

**78—OUTLOOK AND INDEPENDENT**

11 February 1931

- (3) OUR STATUS IN THE AIR. Does America lead or lag in military type planes? Allen

18 February 1931

- (4) THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REPARATIONS. Greer

**79—REVIEW OF REVIEWS**

February 1931

- (5) REICHSWEHR AND RED ARMY. Eeccard. (From Revue des Deux Mondes, Paris)

March 1931

- (6) A VISIT TO THE POLISH CORRIDOR. Simonds

April 1931

- (7) THE WINNING OF SAN JUAN HILL. Lee. (Colonel Roosevelt's peacetime victory in Porto Rico recalls a famous exploit of his father)

**80—ROUND TABLE**

March 1931

- (1) INDIA: CONSTITUTION OR CHAOS
- (2) RUSSIAN REALITIES

- (3) CHINA: A BRIGETER OUTLOOK. I—The Civil War—The Communist-Bandit movement; II—Reform: The first steps—The four men of 1930; III—Foreign relations.

- (4) THE UNREST ON THE INDIAN FRONTIER

**84—AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW**

March 1931

- (1) ECONOMIC CONFLICT AS A REGULATING FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Hammond

- (2) RUSSIAN ECONOMIC SITUATION. (March 1931, supplement)

**90—JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY**

February 1931

- (1) A FILIPINO'S POINT OF VIEW. (Forbe's, The Philippine Islands)

**98—JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY**

**March 1931**

- (1) RECENT STUDIES ON THE 30 YEARS WAR. Beller

**99—MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW**

**March 1931**

- (1) THE OHIO CAMPAIGNS OF 1782. Quaife  
(2) THE CHICAGO TIMES AND THE CIVIL WAR. Sanger

**102—AMERICAN MERCURY**

**April 1931**

- (8) THE INEVITABILITY OF WAR. Nickerson

**103—ATLANTIC MONTHLY**

**April 1931**

- (3) FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE WAR OF 1812. Wilson

**107—FORUM**

**April 1931**

- (2) LET'S CANCEL THE WAR DEBTS. Hanson  
(3) THE WAR DEBTS. What their cancellation would mean. Adams

**110—LIBERTY**

**3 January 1931**

- (11) THE AMERICANS' FIRST SHOT IN THE WAR—A HEADLINE HUNTER ADVENTURE. Gibbons

**10 January 1931**

- (12) WOUNDED. Gibbons

**31 January 1931**

- (13) IS ANOTHER WAR COMING SOON? Powell

**7 February 1931**

- (14) IS ANOTHER WAR COMING SOON? II—Clouds above the Adriatic. Powell

**14 February 1931**

- (15) IS ANOTHER WAR COMING SOON? III—The danger on the Danube. Powell

**28 February 1931**

- (16) GERMAN SPIES IN AMERICA. Sutherland

**7 March 1931**

- (17) IS ANOTHER WAR COMING SOON? IV—The threat of the Bear. Powell

- (18) GERMAN SPIES IN AMERICA. (II) Sutherland

**14 March 1931**

- (19) GERMAN SPIES IN AMERICA. (III) Sutherland

**21 March 1931**

- (20) GERMAN SPIES IN AMERICA. (IV) Sutherland

**28 March 1931**

- (21) GERMAN SPIES IN AMERICA. (V) Sutherland

**4 April 1931**

- (22) GERMAN SPIES IN AMERICA. (VI) Sutherland

**111—NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE MAGAZINE**

**15 March 1931**

- (3) WILL THE WORLD DISARM? Cecil

**112—NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE**

**18 January 1931**

- (4) ARE WE A PEACEFUL OR WARLIKE NATION? O'Ryan

**1 February 1931**

- (5) TRAINING ARMY PIGEONS TO DO THEIR WORK. Thomas

**15 March 1931**

- (6) A LESSER TRAGEDY OF ARNOLD'S TREASON. The story of Joshua Smith whose innocence in the fatal meeting of the traitor with Andre is again asserted. Heyward

**22 March 1931**

- (7) A ROOSEVELT'S BIG TASK IN PORTO RICO. Gruening

**29 March 1931**

- (8) WAGING PEACE AS THE NATIONS WAGE WAR. O'Ryan

**113—NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW**

**April 1931**

- (1) OUR EMPIRE—THE HAPHAZARD NATURE OF OUR INSULAR GOVERNMENT. Strockbein

**115—SATURDAY EVENING POST**

**3 January 1931**

- (6) IF THE AMERICANS HAD NOT BEEN DISCOUNTED AS AMATEURS: Inner story of the Marne Drive in 1918. Captain Liddell Hart

**14 February 1931**

- (7) IF FOCH HAD LISTENED TO PERSHING INSTEAD OF TO HAIG. Captain Liddell Hart


**21 February 1931**

- (8) AN ISSUE OF BLANKETS. Nason (War story)

**117—SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN**

**April 1931**

- (1) AN AWAKENING DUE. (U.S. naval status)





## Section 5 SUBJECT INDEX

to  
Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles

### CONTENTS

	Page
Subsection A—Index to Military Subjects.....	84
Subsection B—Index to Subjects of Collateral Professional Interest.....	103

### EXPLANATION

(See also Explanation—Directions for Use, page 61)

**GENERAL.**—This section constitutes the subject index to the selected periodical articles which are cataloged in Section 4 (page 65). The purpose of this index is to enable the ready finding of all periodical articles, on any particular subject, which have been published during the current quarter. As indicated by the above table of contents this index is divided into two parts:

(1) *Subsection A* indexes, under appropriate subject headings, all articles pertaining to *military* (and naval) matters. These articles are selected from all periodicals received by the Library—general magazines as well as the professional ones.

(2) *Subsection B* similarly indexes articles which, while not of strictly military bearing, are of collateral *professional* interest. The articles in this category, however, are confined to those appearing in military and naval periodicals because such magazines are not indexed in any periodical-index publications issued commercially. For the greater number of articles in this category appearing in general (non-military) magazines the appropriate periodical indexes in the Library should be consulted. [These are listed in LIBRARY BULLETIN No. 1.]

**SUBSECTION A—MILITARY SUBJECTS.**—In this category the subject headings are arranged, alphabetically, according to the Library system of subject-indexing books and periodicals. All military subjects are grouped under certain main headings and these, in turn, are divided into subheadings pertaining to the major group. Therefore, in locating periodical articles on military subjects, they should be looked for under the following main headings:

<p>ARMIES [Of the world] [General subjects]</p> <p>ARMIES UNITED STATES [Other countries similarly]</p> <p>ARMS AND SERVICES</p> <p>ARMS AND SERVICES INFANTRY [Other branches similarly]</p> <p>ARMS AND SERVICES INFANTRY UNITED STATES [Other countries similarly. For topics peculiar to an individual country]</p> <p>AUXILIARY MILITARY FORCES [General. Includes such elements as: CMTG; Constabularies; National Guard; Reserves; ROTC; etc.]</p> <p>AUXILIARY MILITARY FORCES UNITED STATES [Other countries similarly]</p> <p>FIELD FORCES</p> <p>FIELD FORCES ADMINISTRATION.</p> <p>FIELD FORCES ART OF WAR</p> <p>FIELD FORCES LARGE UNITS</p> <p>FIELD FORCES TACTICS OPERATIONS COMBAT</p> <p>HISTORY MILITARY-NAVAL [Confined to general subjects; includes military biography and military geography, general]</p>	<p>HISTORY MILITARY-NAVAL UNITED STATES [Includes military biography and military geography. Other countries similarly]</p> <p>JOINT FORCES IN CAMPAIGN [Joint military operations in war; Armies, Navies (and Air Forces).]</p> <p>NATIONAL FORCES ARMIES NAVIES AIR FORCES [General subjects; peace time]</p> <p>NATIONAL FORCES UNITED STATES [Other countries similarly]</p> <p>NAVIES</p> <p>NAVIES UNITED STATES [Other countries similarly]</p> <p>TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY [General subjects]</p> <p>TECHNOLOGY, MILITARY AERONAUTICS [Similarly for: Automotive; Buildings Construction Grounds; Chemicals Gas; Engineering; General supplies; Medical; Meteorology; Ordnance; Photography; Signals; Vessels; Veterinary.]</p> <p>WAR PEACE</p> <p>WARS [Includes all wars]</p>
---	--

Most military material, to the professional mind, will fall readily under one of the main headings listed. However, to provide for ready finding of any military subject, there was published a Supplement to RCMW No. 38 which contains an Alphabetic List of Military Terms in common use, with specifications as to where such material is located in the subject index. This Supplement, obtainable on request, will not be republished and should be retained for reference purposes by those who desire this information.

**DIRECTIONS FOR USE.**—In looking up a military subject, select the appropriate main heading and find this in Subsection A. Or, consult the definite term desired, in the Supplement which will direct to the appropriate heading in Subsection A, under which printed articles are entered.

If the subject matter is non-military in character, consult Subsection B, under appropriate headings.

**ENTRIES.**—Most material is entered under several subject headings; to avoid the necessity of printing many times the full data of an article, these are covered only once, completely, in the Catalog (Section 4).

The entry under a subject heading gives only the short title of the article with reference numbers to the Catalog for full data. The figure in **boldface** is the identifying index number of the periodical; that (in curves) following the colon, is the serial number of the particular article in that periodical. The procedure then:

(1) With the **index number** in mind, turn to the Catalog (page 65) and find the name of the periodical and page number of cataloged articles therefrom;

(2) On the latter page, the particular article is established by the serial number.

### Subsection A

#### Index to Military Subjects

#### A

##### ARMIES [Of the world]

###### SEE ALSO:

Armies . . . Name of country;  
Arms and Services;  
Auxiliary Military Forces (National Guard,  
ROTC, Reserves, etc.);  
Field Forces;  
Technology, Military.

###### General subjects

[Only matters of general applicability entered under this heading; SEE: Armies . . . Name of country, for particulars.]

###### COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH

Militarist or Pacifist? 32:(63)

###### FINANCE

Militarist or Pacifist? 32:(63)

###### PERSONNEL, MILITARY

###### Abstract topics

Die Idee deutschen Berufssoldatentums. 17:(96)

SCHOOLS, ARMY EDUCATION (For Special Service Schools, See: Arms and Services)

Der Werk Kriegsgeschichtlicher Studien. 17:(121)

###### SUPPLY

Transportation supplies (Vehicles)  
Pferdezug und Fahrzeugbau. 17:(85)

###### TRAINING

Abstract topics  
Instruction by talking films. 7:(38)

##### ARMIES Argentina

###### Schools, Army Education

###### ESCUELA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA

Indicaciones para la preparación de los oficiales que desean ingresar a la Escuela Superior de Guerra. 22:(51)

###### Supply

###### TRANSPORTATION SUPPLY

###### Animals

Servicios del Ejército. 22:(42)

##### ARMIES Austria

###### Abstract topics—General

Das österreichische Bundesheer. 17:(70)

###### Composition Organization Strength

Das österreichische Bundesheer. 17:(70)

##### ARMIES Canada

###### Composition Organization Strength

###### ABSTRACT TOPICS

Roles [of] the armed forces of Canada . . . (Prize essay). 15:(11)

###### Forts and military establishments

Some Canadian forts. 4:(23)

###### Schools, Army Education

###### MILITARY ACADEMY

###### Royal Military Academy

The West Points of other lands. IV—Royal Military Academy. 19:(8)

**ARMIES Ch. na**

**Personnel**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

The Chinese as a fighting man. 68:(4)

**ARMIES Europe**

**Abstract topics—General**

L'Europe en armes. 73:(4)

**ARMIES France**

**Composition Organization Strength**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

France: The year 1930 from a military point of view. 16:(58)

**History**

L'hiver 1925-1926 au Maroc dans un secteur du front Nord. 23:(28) (31)

**Schools, Army Education**

CENTRE DES HAUTES ETUDES MILITAIRES  
Die französische "Marschallschule." 17:(154)

ECOLE SUPERIEURE DE GUERRE

**Entrance**

Praktische Vorbereitung zur französischen Kriegsakademie. 17:(90)

**MILITARY ACADEMY**

**St. Cyr**

The West Points of other lands. II—St. Cyr. 19:(6)

**Training**

France: The year 1930 from a military point of view. 16:(58)

**ARMIES Germany**

**Abstract topics—General**

Reichswehr and Red Army. 79:(5)  
Cooperation between the German and Soviet armies. 16:(46)

**Abstract topics—Special**

**CORRESPONDENCE RECORDS**

Zu: Vereinfachung des Schriftverkehrs. 17:(134)

**Administrative regulations**

Zu: Vereinfachung des Schriftverkehrs. 17:(134)

**Composition Organization Strength**

The Reich calls a hand. 55:(17)

**Finance**

**APPROPRIATIONS**

German military expenditures 1920-1930. 4:(31)

**Personnel**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Die Idee deutschen Berufssoldatentums. 17:(96)

**OFFICERS**

Soziale Herkunft der Offiziere. 17:(113)

**Schools, Army Education**

**MILITARY ACADEMIES**

The West Points of other lands. VI—German Military Schools. 19:(10)

**ARMIES Great Britain**

**Composition Organization Strength**

**COMBAT STRENGTH**

Das militärische Problem in Indien als Angelpunkt der indischen Verfassungsreformen. 17:(116)

**Finance**

**APPROPRIATIONS**

Der britische Heereshaushalt 1930/31. 17:(86)

**History**

**COLONIES**

**India**

Britain's military problem in India. 67:(6)

**Personnel**

**OFFICERS**

**Abstract topics**

The Army as a career. 7:(31)

**Promotion**

The Army as a career. 7:(31)

**Schools, Army Education**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Recent developments in education in the Army. 12:(22)

Reorganization of Army Educational Corps. 4:(32)

**MILITARY ACADEMIES**

The West Points of other lands. III—The British Military Schools. 19:(74)

**Training**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Recent developments in education in the Army. 12:(22)

Reorganization of Army Educational Corps. 4:(32)

**ARMIES Greece**

**Abstract topics—General**

Die Wehrmacht Griechenlands. 17:(65)

**Composition Organization Strength**

Die Wehrmacht Griechenlands. 17:(65)

**ARMIES India**

**Abstract topics—General**

Britain's military problem in India. 67:(6)

**Composition Organization Strength**

**COMBAT STRENGTH**

Das militärische Problem in Indien als Angelpunkt der indischen Verfassungsreformen. 17:(116)

**ARMIES Italy**

**Composition Organization Strength**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

The Italian conscriptive army and volunteer force. 16:(59)

**History**

Italy's capture of the Senussi stronghold—a great march across 500 miles of desert. 71:(4)

**Personnel**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

The Italian conscriptive army and volunteer force. 16:(59)

**ARMIES Poland**

**Abstract topics—General**

Les infanteries étrangères.—III.—L'infanterie polonaise. 34:(36)

**ARMIES Rumania**

**Composition Organization Strength**

Reorganisations der rumänischen Wehrmacht. 17:(148)

**ARMIES Russia**

**Abstract topics—General**

Reichswehr and Red Army. 79:(5)

Cooperation between the German and Soviet armies. 16:(46)

**ARMIES Russia (continued)**

**Composition Organization Strength**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

The Red Army and a world war. 4:(22)

**ARMIES Spain**

**Composition Organization Strength**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Spanish military notes. 4:(24)

**ARMIES Switzerland**

**Abstract topics—General**

Schweizer Brief. 17:(137)

**Composition Organization Strength**

Some facts about the Swiss Army. 44:(21)

**ARMIES United States**

**SEE ALSO:**

Arms and Services;

Auxiliary Military Forces US (for National

Guard, Reserves, ROTC, CMTC, etc.);

Field Forces;

Technology, Military.

**Corps Areas and Departments (US)**

**CORPS AREAS**

**Third Corps Area**

Signal communications in the Third Corps Area

Command Post Exercises of 1930. 46:(8)

**Eighth Corps Area**

The Eighth Corps Area. 18:(7)

**DEPARTMENTS**

**Panama Canal Department**

La Flotte américaine et la défense aéronavale de Panama. 73:(6)

**Philippine Department (China)**

American troops in China—Their mission. 32:(61)

**Finance**

**PAY AND ALLOWANCE**

Army pay and promotion bills. 3:(3)

Army pay and promotion bills. 2:(6)

Joint congressional pay committee makes report. 2:(9)

Pay and promotion. 18:(6)

**Forts and military establishments**

[Bliss, Fort] Border cavalry stations. 36:(13)

[D. A. Russell (Marfa, Texas)] Border cavalry stations. 36:(13)

[Huachuca, Fort] Border cavalry stations. 36:(13)

**ARSENALS**

Watervliet Arsenal Army's gun factory . . . 21:(20)

The story of Springfield. 21:(24)

**FORTS**

Chilkoot Barracks Alaska. 21:(27)

**Military law**

**MILITARY AID TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT**

National Guard duties in aid of civil authorities. 40:(12)

**Personnel**

**OFFICERS**

**Promotion**

Army pay and promotion bills. 3:(3)

Army pay and promotion bills. 2:(6)

Joint congressional pay committee makes report. 2:(9)

Pay and promotion. 18:(6)

The days gone by—slow promotion. 51:(6)

**Schools, Army Education**

**SEE ALSO:**

Armies US—Training;

For Special Service Schools, SEE: Arms and Services.

**MILITARY ACADEMY**

**Abstract topics**

La visita del Brigadier Eduardo F. Lores, del Ejército de Cuba, a la Academia Militar de West Point, U.S. 13:(9)

What about West Point? 77:(9)

**Supply**

**SEE ALSO:**

Field Forces

**CLOTHING**

The army shoe. 47:(7)

**SUBSISTENCE**

**Food**

Wholesomeness of canned foods. 47:(9)

**War Department**

For Chiefs of branches, SEE: under Arms and Services;

**SEE ALSO:**

Armies US—Finance;

Armies US—Military law;

Auxiliary Military Forces US—National Guard.

**AGENCIES**

**Abstract topics**

Army general council. 3:(4)

War Department forms "General Council" to pass on policies and aid cooperation. 2:(7)

**SECRETARY OF WAR**

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

**ARMS and Services**

**Branches**

[Includes topics pertaining to more than one branch]

**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**

Servicios del Ejército. 22:(37) (42)

**ARMORED CAR UNITS**

**SEE ALSO:**

Arms and Services Cavalry France;

Arms and Services Cavalry US;

Arms and Services Tanks Great Britain;

Technology, Military Ordnance—Armored cars.

Tactics Training Combat methods

Francia.—La nueva "Instrucción para el empleo de los carros de combate." 6:(23)

Empleo táctico de los carros auto-ametralladoras-canones. 16a:(5)

**MARKSMANSHIP (Small arms)**

**Abstract topics**

Die Kriegsgarbe. 17:(89)

The effect of smoke on infantry rifle fire. 53:(4)

The National Matches. 47:(10)

**SOLDIERS ENLISTED MEN (all branches)**

**Citizenship training**

Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung des Soldaten. 17:(130)

**ARMS and Services Air Arm**

**SEE ALSO:**

National Forces Air Forces;

Technology, Military Ordnance.

**Abstract topics—General and special**

Troops fed by aircraft. 4:(18)

## Periodical Literature—Subject Index

- Organization**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS**  
 Organización Militar. 22:(54)  
 Regional control and the co-ordination of air and land forces. 7:(30)  
     Great Britain  
     The Army and the Royal Air Force. 4:(30)  
     The Air Ministry—And after. 5:(9)  
**Tactics Training Combat methods**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**  
 Luftüberlegenheit? 17:(78) (111)  
 New developments in warfare. 39:(24)  
 The employment of Army co-operation squadrons. 15:(15)  
     Aerial warfare  
 Cuestiones de la Guerra Aérea. Los problemas de una potencia aérea moderna. 16a:(1)  
     Applicatory exercises  
 Cas concret d'emploi de l'Aéronautique et de la D.T.C.A. au Corps d'Armée. 14:(25)  
     Applicatory exercises (Great Britain)  
 Inglaterra.—Ejercicios de las Fuerzas Aéreas de 1930. 6:(25)  
     Applicatory exercises (Map problems)  
 Luftüberlegenheit? 17:(78) (111)  
     Attached arms and services (Tanks)  
 Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampfwagen. 17:(108) (128) (140) (143)  
     Liaison with artillery  
 The employment of Army co-operation squadrons. 15:(15)  
     Liaison with cavalry  
 The employment of Army co-operation squadrons. 15:(15)  
     Liaison with infantry  
 The employment of Army co-operation squadrons. 15:(15)  
**COMBAT TOPICS IN GENERAL**  
     Air superiority  
 Luftüberlegenheit? 17:(78) (111)  
     **SPECIAL WARFARE**  
         Abstract topics  
         Regional control and the co-ordination of air and land forces. 7:(30)  
         Desert warfare  
         Eight years of British control in Iraq. 7:(29)  
         The work of the Royal Air Force at Aden. 7:(35)  
         Small wars  
         Aviation in guerrilla warfare. 56:(12)  
         The work of the Royal Air Force at Aden. 7:(35)  
     **Transport Trains**  
     Troops fed by aircraft. 4:(18)  
**ARMS and Services Air Arm Great Britain**  
**Tactics Training Combat methods**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**  
     Applicatory exercises (Great Britain)  
 Inglaterra.—Ejercicios de las Fuerzas Aéreas de 1930. 6:(25)  
**ARMS and Services Air Arm Sweden**  
**Abstract topics—General and special**  
 The Swedish Air Force. 4:(16)  
**ARMS and Services Air Corps United States**  
**Abstract topics—General and special**  
 Army and Navy air forces. 3:(5)

- No physical changes seen in the new air rule. 2:(8)  
 Our status in the air. 78:(3)  
**ARMS and Services Artillery**  
 SEE ALSO:  
     Coast Artillery:  
         Technology, Military Ordnance.  
     **Antiaircraft artillery**  
         **ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**  
         The effect of aviation upon the missions of the Coast Artillery. 33:(23)  
         **ORGANIZATION**  
             Regiment  
         Table of organization for the antiaircraft regiment. 39:(29)  
         **TACTICS TRAINING COMBAT METHODS**  
             Abstract topics  
         Cas concret d'emploi de l'Aéronautique et de la D.T.C.A. au Corps d'Armée. 14:(25)  
             Troop movements  
         Luftschutz marschierender Truppen. 17:(138)  
         The march of the 61st Coast Artillery (AA). 39:(14)  
     **WEAPONS ARMAMENT TECHNIQUE**  
         Abstract topics  
         Britain's new defense against aircraft. 71:(3)  
         The effect of aviation upon the missions of the Coast Artillery. 39:(23)  
     **Organization**  
         **ABSTRACT TOPICS**  
         The trend of Field Artillery. 40:(13)  
         **Tactics Training Combat methods**  
         **ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**  
         Schwere Artillerie im Bewegungskrieg. 17:(122) (127) (132)  
         Die schwere Artillerie in der Marneschlacht 1914. 17:(61)  
         Artillery units—Mortars  
         Neuzeitlicher Einsatz der Minenwerfer. 17:(67) (74) (81)  
         Attached arms and services (Tanks)  
         Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampfwagen. 17:(108) (128) (140) (143)  
         Liaison with Air Arm  
         The employment of Army co-operation squadrons. 15:(15)  
         Liaison with infantry  
         Au sujet de la liaison infanterie-artillerie. 34:(25)  
         Au sujet des demandes de tir de l'infanterie à l'artillerie. 34:(30)  
         With large units  
         The trend of Field Artillery. 40:(13)  
         **OFFENSIVE COMBAT**  
         Abstract topics  
         Le combat de Schönholz (1917). 42:(17)  
         L'artillerie dans l'offensive en guerre de position. 42:(18) (21)  
     **PROTECTIVE AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES**  
         Antitank  
         Defense against tanks. 36:(12)  
         **SPECIAL WARFARE**  
         Mountain warfare  
         La coopération de l'artillerie au combat de l'infanterie en haute montagne. 34:(27)  
         **TROOP MOVEMENTS**  
         Marches  
         La artillería ligera durante el avance. 16a:(6)

**ARMS and Services Artillery (continued)**

**Transport Trains**

Caractéristiques générales des matériels d'artillerie modernes. 42:(19)

**Weapons Armament Technique**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Caractéristiques générales des matériels d'artillerie modernes. 42:(19)

The trend of Field Artillery. 40:(13)

**ACCOMPANYING GUNS**

Begleit-Artillerie. 17:(142)

**GUNNERY FIRING**

Note relative a la vulnérabilité des chars par le feu de l'artillerie lointaine. 42:(20)

**MORTARS**

Neuzeitlicher Einsatz der Minenwerfer. 17:(67)

(74) (81)

**ARMS and Services Artillery US Field Artillery**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

The Field Artillery. 18:(3)

**Chief of Field Artillery**

Annual report of the Chief of Field Artillery—1930. 40:(11)

**History**

**REGIMENTS**

[15th F.A.] Men of the rolling caissons. 21:(23)

**ARMS and Services Cavalry**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

Hell bent for leather. 18:(4)

**Command and staff**

**SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS**

Signals and the cavalry. 37:(4)

**Drill Ceremonies**

Das formale Kavallerie-Exerzieren. 17:(136)

**Equipment**

**SADDLES, PACK**

Cavalry packs and marches. 36:(11) (16)

**Organization**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Grosze oder kleine Kavallerie-Einheiten? 17:(95)

**MACHINE GUN UNITS**

Zur Frage der "Maschinengewehre der kavallerie." 17:(82)

**Special cavalry**

**ARMORED CAR UNITS**

**Tactics Training Combat methods**

La liaison dans les A.M.C. 38:(14)

Francia.—La nueva "Instrucción para el empleo de los carros de combate." 5:(23)

Empleo táctico de los carros auto-ametralladoras-canonas. 16a:(5)

**MOTORCYCLE SQUADRONS**

**Tactics Training Combat methods**

L'escadron motocycliste. 38:(19)

**Tactics Training Combat methods**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**

Das Loslösen vom Feinde in der kavalleristischen Kleintaktik. 17:(115)

Le combat de cavalerie. 38:(12)

**Attached arms and services (Medical)**

Division de cavalerie et aviation sanitaire. 38:(13)

**Liaison with Air Arm**

The employment of Army co-operation squadrons. 15:(15)

**COMBAT TOPICS IN GENERAL**

**Gas and smoke**

Smoke clouds—On the cavalry horizon. 53:(5)

**DEFENSIVE COMBAT**

**Delaying action**

La cavalerie moderne. Etudes tactiques. 38:(16)

**OFFENSIVE COMBAT**

**Abstract topics**

Erfolgreiches Eingreifen von Reiterei gegen den Rücken des Gegners. 17:(93)

**PROTECTIVE AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES**

**Antigas**

Smoke clouds—On the cavalry horizon. 53:(5)

**RAIDS**

Raids. 17:(124)

**RECONNAISSANCE SCOUTING PATROLLING**

Kavalleriespitze und Kavallerie-Verbindungspatrouille. 17:(66)

Aus der Werkstatt der Truppe. Die Kavallerie-Patrouille. 17:(107)

Exploration stratégique. Le 4e corps de cavalerie allemand en août 1914. 38:(10) (18)

El grupo de exploración en la caballería de ejército. 16a:(3)

**SECURITY**

**Security on the march**

Kavalleriespitze und Kavallerie-Verbindungspatrouille. 17:(66)

**TROOP MOVEMENTS**

**Marches**

Cavalry packs and marches. 36:(11) (16)

**Weapons Armament Technique**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Zur Frage der "Maschinengewehre der Kavallerie." 17:(82)

**AUTOCHENILLE**

Die neuen Autochenilles de Cavalerie "M 28" und "M 29." 17:(133)

**ARMS and Services Cavalry France**

**History**

**REGIMENTS**

Le centenaire des chasseurs d'Afrique. 38:(17)

**School, Cavalry**

**RESERVE OFFICERS**

L'école de perfectionnement des officiers de réserve de cavalerie à Paris. 38:(11)

**ARMS and Services Cavalry Germany**

**Manuals Regulations**

Das formale Kavallerie-Exerzieren. 17:(136)

**ARMS and Services Cavalry United States**

**History**

**REGIMENTS**

[14th Cav.] Fourteenth Cavalry. 21:(21)

**ARMS and Services Chemical**

**Organization**

Expansion of chemical troops. 53:(3)

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

**Italy**

Italia.—Notas diversas sobre protección contra agresivos químicos. 6:(19)

## Periodical Literature—Subject Index

**Tactics Training Combat methods**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**  
 Italia.—Notas diversas sobre protección contra agresivos químicos. 6:(19)  
 Expansion of chemical troops. 53:(3)  
 New developments in warfare. 39:(24)

**COMBAT TOPICS IN GENERAL**  
 Chemical warfare in general  
 Die kriegsschemische Ausbildung der Roten Armee. 17:(125)

**SPECIAL WARFARE**  
 Small wars  
 The use of gas in minor warfare. 56:(8)

**ARMS and Services Chemical Italy**  
**Abstract topics—General and special**  
 Italia.—Notas diversas sobre protección contra agresivos químicos. 6:(19)

**ARMS and Services Coast Artillery**  
**Tactics Training Combat methods**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**  
 The role of seacoast fortifications. 39:(13)  
 Harbor defenses of San Francisco Army-Navy joint exercises. 39:(16)

**COMBAT TOPICS IN GENERAL**  
 Gas and smoke  
 An analysis of the chemical warfare problem against coast artillery. 53:(8)  
**FORTIFICATIONS, PERMANENT (Attack and defense)**  
 Defense

The defence of posts. 7:(34)  
**OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS**  
 Defense of coast lines

The effect of aviation upon the missions of the Coast Artillery. 39:(23)  
**PROTECTIVE AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES**  
 Antigas

An analysis of the chemical warfare problem against coast artillery. 53:(8)

**Weapons Armament Technique**  
**GUNNERY FIRING**  
 Coast Artillery target practice. 39:(22)

**ARMS and Services Coast Artillery United States**

**Abstract topics—General and special**  
 The effect of aviation upon the missions of the Coast Artillery. 39:(23)

**History**  
**REGIMENTS**  
 [61st CA] The march of the 61st Coast Artillery (AA). 39:(14)

**Manuals Regulations**  
 Table of organization for the antiaircraft regiment. 39:(29)

**ARMS and Services Engineers**  
**Organization**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Organisation der Pioniere. 17:(92)  
 Servicios del Ejército. 22:(42)

**ARMS and Services Engineers Argentina**  
**Manuals Regulations**  
 Servicios del Ejército. 22:(42)

**ARMS and Services Engineers Italy**  
**Abstract topics—General and special**  
 Notes on the engineers of the Italian Army. 45:(16)

**ARMS and Services Engineers US Engineer Corps**

**History**  
 The Nicaraguan Canal survey. 39:(17)  
**REGIMENTS**  
 [29th Eng.] Twenty-Ninth Engineers. 21:(22)  
 [6th Eng.] The Sixth Engineers in the Meuse-Argonne. 44:(20)

**ARMS and Services Infantry**  
**SEE ALSO:**  
 Arms and Services Infantry United States (and other countries);  
 Arms and Services Tanks United States (and other countries).

**Command and staff**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS**  
 "Wasserköpfe." 17:(63)

**COMMANDERS COMMAND**  
 Abstract topics  
 Commandement des petites unités au combat. 34:(29)

**SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS**  
 Abstract topics  
 Tätigkeit des Infanterie-Nachrichtenoffiziers im Gefecht. 17:(101)

**Equipment**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS**  
 United States  
 The present status of infantry equipment development. 32:(60)

**COMMUNICATIONS**  
 The present status of infantry equipment development. 32:(60)

**Organization**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS**  
 "Wasserköpfe." 17:(63)  
**PLATOONS**

Der Infanteriezug in den Heeren der europäischen Hauptmächte. 17:(112)

**Special Infantry**  
**MECHANIZATION OF INFANTRY**  
 Problems of mechanization which may confront infantry officers in the near future. 8:(13)

**MOTORIZED INFANTRY**  
 Motorization of the 34th Infantry. 32:(67)

**Tactics Training Combat methods**  
**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**  
 Die Feuerfähigkeit der 1. MG.—Gruppe. 17:(84)  
 Points to remember when dealing with tactical problems. 4:(28)

Attached arms and services (Tanks)  
 Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampfwagen. 17:(108) (128) (140) (143)

**Infantry units**  
 Commandement des petites unités au combat. 34:(29)  
 Instrucción táctica. 16a:(9)

**Infantry units—Mortars**  
 Neuzeitlicher Einsatz der Minenwerfer. 17:(67) (74) (81)



**ARMS and Services Infantry—Tactics Training Combat methods (continued)**

- Infantry units—Platoons  
Der Infanteriezug in den Heeren der europäischen Hauptmächte. 17:(112)  
Infantry units—Squads  
Das Gefecht der Schützen- und 1. MG.—Gruppe. 17:(118)  
Liaison with Air Arm  
The employment of Army co-operation squadrons. 15:(15)  
Liaison with artillery  
Au sujet de la liaison infanterie-artillerie. 34:(25)  
Au sujet des demandes de tir de l'infanterie à l'artillerie. 34:(30)

- Mechanization  
Chronique de l'Infanterie. 14:(24)  
Motorization  
Chronique de l'Infanterie. 14:(24)  
Training  
L'instruction du soldat en vue du combat. 34:(38)

**COMBAT TOPICS IN GENERAL**

- Frontages Formations  
El empleo de la "columna de tiradores" como formación de combate de nuestra infantería. 22:(46)  
Gas and smoke  
Chemical warfare training in the infantry since the war. 53:(2)  
The effect of smoke on infantry rifle fire. 53:(4)  
The tactical use of smoke by the infantry regiment. 32:(55) (58)

**DEFENSIVE COMBAT**

- Abstract topics  
Französische Ansichten über Feuerpläne der Infanterie. 17:(91)

**NIGHT OPERATIONS**

- Abstract topics  
Reading maps, messages and fire control instruments at night. 32:(57)

**OFFENSIVE COMBAT**

- Abstract topics  
Was ist Stoszkraft? 17:(79) (83)  
Pursuit  
Überholende Verfolgung durch ein verstärktes Infanterie-Bataillon. 17:(123)

**PROTECTIVE AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES**

- Antigas  
Chemical warfare training in the infantry since the war. 53:(2)

**Antitank**

- Defense against tanks. 36:(12)

**SPECIAL WARFARE**

- Mountain warfare  
La coopération de l'artillerie au combat de l'infanterie en haute montagne. 34:(27)

**Small wars**

- The use of gas in minor warfare. 56:(8)  
The taking of Fort Riviere. 56:(10)

**Transport Trains**

- Abstract Topics  
United States  
The present status of infantry equipment development. 32:(60)

**Weapons Armament Technique**

- SEE ALSO:  
Arms and Services—Branches—Marksmanship;  
Technology, Military Ordnance.

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

- Die Feuerfähigkeit der 1. MG.—Gruppe. 17:(84)  
Armas. 22:(52)  
The effect of smoke on infantry rifle fire. 53:(4)

**Close combat**

- Gedanken über Nahkampfausbildung. 17:(110)

**Combat practice**

- Die Kriegsgarbe. 17:(89)

**United States**

- The progress of infantry development. 32:(59)  
The present status of infantry equipment development. 32:(60)

**ACCOMPANYING GUNS**

- Begleit-Artillerie. 17:(142)  
The close support of infantry. 7:(37)

**CANNON, INFANTRY**

**Mortars**

- Neuzeitlicher Einsatz der Minenwerfer. 17:(67)  
(74) (81)

**MACHINE GUNS**

- Essai de contribution à l'étude du tir des mitrailleuses par-dessus les troupes amies et dans les intervalles. 34:(24)  
Le tir masqué des mitrailleuses. 34:(26) (32)

**RIFLES**

**Abstract topics**

- Antiaircraft rifle marksmanship training and equipment. 32:(56)

**ARMS and Services Infantry Canada**

**History**

**REGIMENTS**

- The Canadian Grenadier Guards. 4:(20)

**ARMS and Services Infantry United States**

**Chief of Infantry**

**INFANTRY BOARD**

- The progress of infantry development. 32:(59)

**History**

**REGIMENTS**

- [34th Inf.] Motorization of the 34th Infantry. 32:(67)  
[15th Inf.] "Can do" motto of 15th Infantry . . . 21:(25)  
[16th Inf.] "New York's Own"—Sixteenth Infantry . . . 21:(26)  
[14th Inf.] "Right of the line." 21:(19)

**Schools, Infantry**

- The progress of infantry development. 32:(59)

**ARMS and Services Medical**

**Organization**

**VETERINARY CORPS**

- Servicios del Ejército. 22:(42)

**Tactics Training Combat methods**

- ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL  
Division de cavalerie et aviation sanitaire. 38:(13)  
El Servicio de Sanidad en la guerra de movimiento. 16a:(8)

## Periodical Literature—Subject Index

### ARMS and Services Medical US Medical Department

#### Abstract topics—General and special

Military obligations of the medical profession. 51:(7)

#### NURSE CORPS

Uncle Sam's Nurse Corps. 77:(13)

### ARMS and Services Ordnance US Ordnance Department

#### Chief of Ordnance

Army ordnance during 1930. 52:(13)

#### History

Watervliet Arsenal Army's gun factory . . . 21:(20)

The story of Springfield. 21:(24)

### ARMS and Services Quartermaster US Quartermaster Corps

#### Abstract topics—General and special

Museum of the Quartermaster Corps. 47:(8)

### ARMS and Services Signals

#### Abstract topics—General and special

Marine Corps communications personnel. 56:(11)

#### Organization

##### ABSTRACT TOPICS

El servicio de comunicaciones en lagunos ejércitos modernos. 22:(53)

#### Signal technique

Training army pigeons to do their work. 112:(5)

Signals and the cavalry. 37:(4)

#### Tactics Training Combat methods

##### ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL

Apresiasi de los medios de comunicación desde el punto de vista en su empleo táctico. 22:(43)

Signal communications in the Third Corps Area Command Post Exercises of 1930. 46:(8)

#### Applicatory exercises

Signal communications in the Third Corps Area Command Post Exercises of 1930. 46:(8)

#### Attached to cavalry

Signals and the cavalry. 37:(4)

#### Historical examples

Development of communication and command. 7:(36)

#### RECONNAISSANCE SCOUTING PATROLLING

El servicio de comunicaciones en la exploración cercana y de combate. 22:(38)

### ARMS and Services Signals Germany

#### Organization

##### ABSTRACT TOPICS

El servicio de comunicaciones en lagunos ejércitos modernos. 22:(53)

### ARMS and Services Signals Great Britain

#### Organization

##### ABSTRACT TOPICS

El servicio de comunicaciones en algunos ejércitos modernos. 22:(53)

### ARMS and Services Signals US Signal Corps

#### Abstract topics—General and special

The Army builds its own telephone systems. 45:(7)

### Organization

#### ABSTRACT TOPICS

El servicio de comunicaciones en lagunos ejércitos modernos. 22:(53)

#### School, Signal

The Army Signal School. 21:(18)

### ARMS and Services Tanks

#### Abstract topics—General and special

##### BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tank and mechanization literature. 32:(66)

### ARMS and Services Tanks

#### Tactics Training Combat methods

##### ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL

Die Krise des Angriffs kann überwunden werden. 17:(62)

Motorisierung und Kampfwagenverwendung. 17:(98)

Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampfwagen. 17:(108) (128) (140) (143)

Die französische "Anweisung für den Gebrauch von Kampfwagen" vom 24. 1. 1929. 17:(158)

La refonte de la réglementation relative aux chars de combat. 34:(33)

Francia.—La nueva "Instrucción para el empleo de los carros de combate." 6:(23)

Note relative a la vulnérabilité des chars par le feu de l'artillerie lointaine. 42:(20)

Tank divisions. 39:(18)

Defense against tanks. 36:(12)

Armoured fighting vehicles in Waziristan operations, May-August, 1930. 35:(8)

Thoughts on tanks. 35:(9)

#### DEFENSIVE COMBAT

##### Counterattack

Defense against tanks. 36:(12)

#### OFFENSIVE COMBAT

##### Abstract topics

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts Juli 1918. 17:(114)

### ARMS and Services Tanks France

#### Manuals Regulations

Die französische "Anweisung für den Gebrauch von Kampfwagen" vom 24. 1. 1929. 17:(158)

La refonte de la réglementation relative aux chars de combat. 34:(33)

### ARMS and Services Tanks Great Britain

#### History

Armoured fighting vehicles in Waziristan operations, May-August, 1930. 35:(8)

### AUXILIARY Military Forces [Secondary components]

#### SEE ALSO:

Armies . . .

Auxiliary Military Forces . . . Name of country.

### AUXILIARY Military Forces Argentina

#### Organized reserves

Algo sobre los aspirantes a oficiales de reserve. 22:(45)

### AUXILIARY Military Forces Canada

#### Militia

##### ABSTRACT TOPICS

Roles [of] the armed forces of Canada . . . (Prize essay). 15:(11)

The Canadian Militia: Imperial organization. 15:(16)

**AUXILIARY Military Forces France**

**Colonial Forces Native troops**

**LÉGION ÉTRANGÈRE**

Le centenaire de la Légion Étrangère. 73:(5)

**AUXILIARY Military Forces Great Britain  
ROTC**

The Junior Division of the Officers' Training Corps. 7:(32)

**Territorial Armies**

"This Territorial year." 12:(21)

The prestige of the Territorial Army. 12:(27)

**AUXILIARY Military Forces Italy**

**Volunteers [Volunteer defense forces]**

The Italian conscriptive army and volunteer force. 16:(59)

**AUXILIARY Military Forces United States**

**National Guard**

America's National Guard. 77:(8)

**ARMS AND SERVICES**

**Medical**

The Medical Department of the National Guard. 51:(5)

**FINANCE**

**Appropriations**

The cost of the National Guard. 32:(64)

**HISTORY**

The National Guard. 36:(15)

**MILITARY LAW**

Military aid to civil government

National Guard duties in aid of civil authorities. 40:(12)

**PERSONNEL**

The National Guard recruiting problem. 36:(17)

**Organized Reserves**

What is the matter with the Reserve? 39:(28)

Amateur warriors. 18:(10)

**ROTC**

War on military training. 77:(12)

The college trained army. 39:(21)

The ROTC and education. 32:(68)

**F**

**FIELD Forces Administration [Theater of operations]**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

**GREAT BRITAIN**

Changes in army organization and administration. 12:(24)

**Evacuation and hospitalization**

Les ravitaillements et les évacuations pendant la bataille. 14:(27)

**Replacements**

**ANIMALS**

Servicios de retaguardia. 16a:(7)

**Supply**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Les ravitaillements et les évacuations pendant la bataille. 14:(27)

Servicios de retaguardia. 16a:(7)

Troops fed by aircraft. 4:(18)

**Mountain warfare**

Modernized mountain warfare. 8:(16)

**AMMUNITION**

Servicios de retaguardia. 16a:(7)

**WATER SUPPLY**

Water supply in the field. 45:(15)

**Transportation**

**AIR TRANSPORT**

Modernized mountain warfare. 8:(16)

**HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION**

**Abstract topics**

El Tren de Equipajes militares del Ejército Francés. 6:(24)

Servicios de retaguardia. 16a:(7)

**Animal**

Pferdezug und Fahrzeugbau. 17:(85)

Bull cart transportation in the tropics. 56:(9)

**Motor**

Motorisierungsfragen. 17:(68)

Control and operation of motor transportation in the theater of operations. 49:(5)

**RAILWAYS**

National defense and transportation. 32:(62)

**FIELD Forces Art of War**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

**FUTURE WARFARE**

New developments in warfare. 39:(24)

**Leadership Morale Psychology**

**LEADERSHIP**

Der Werk Kriegsgeschichtlicher Studien. 17:(121)

Success in war. 39:(20)

Practical peace-time leadership. 39:(27)

**MORALE**

Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)

**PSYCHOLOGY**

Ein neuer russischer kriegsroman. 17:(71)

Praktische Psychologie in der Wehrmacht. 17:(151)

Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)

Success in war. 39:(20)

**Strategy**

Strategische Lähmung als Ziel des entscheidungsuchenden Angriffs? 17:(75)

Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampfwagen. 17:(108)

Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

**FIELD Forces Command and Staff**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

Alkohol—Nikotin—Koffein. 17:(77)

The line and staff principle in industry. 44:(15)

**GREAT BRITAIN**

Changes in army organization and administration. 12:(24)

**Commanders Command**

[Includes Inspections, tactical and command]

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

Die Lähmung des Hirns. 17:(69)

Strategische Lähmung als Ziel des entscheidungsuchenden Angriffs? 17:(75)

Befehlserteilung in Krieg und Frieden. 17:(88)

Der Werk Kriegsgeschichtlicher Studien. 17:(121)

**Intelligence Information**

Feindüberwachung und operative Überraschung. 17:(144)

**Orders Decisions Reports**

ABSTRACT TOPICS  
Befehlserteilung in Krieg und Frieden. 17:(88)  
FIELD ORDERS

Orders. 12:(23)

**Signal communications [Field Forces]**

ABSTRACT TOPICS  
Development of communication and command.  
7:(36)

**Staff [Field Forces]**

ABSTRACT TOPICS  
Die Lähmung des Hirns. 17:(69)  
Great Britain  
Changes in army organization and administration. 12:(24)

**FIELD Forces Large units**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

APPLICATORY EXERCISES  
Command Post Exercises  
Signal communications in the Third Corps Area  
Command Post Exercises of 1930. 46:(8)  
Field maneuvers (Austria)  
Die Schlussmanöver des österreichischen Bundesheeres. 17:(153)  
Field maneuvers (France)  
Die grossen französischen Herbstübungen in Lothringen. 17:(155)  
Field maneuvers (Germany)  
Alemania.—Las maniobras de Franconia. 6:(22)  
Field maneuvers (Great Britain)  
The British Army Exercise of 1930. 39:(25)  
Map problems  
Curso de preparación de Coroneles para el ascenso, año de 1930. 6:(18) (21)  
Luftüberlegenheit? 17:(78) (111)  
COMBINED ARMS (Functions Maneuvers Roles)

Abstract topics  
La combinaison des armes. 23:(29)  
New developments in warfare. 39:(24)

**FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS**

Austria  
Die neue österreichische Gefechtsvorschrift. 17:(145)  
Belgium  
Les ravitaillements et les évacuations pendant la bataille. 14:(27)

France  
Studien zur Vorschrift "F.u.G." 17:(104)

Germany  
Studien zur Vorschrift "F.u.G." 17:(104)

Great Britain  
Changes in army organization and administration. 12:(24)

**MILITIZATION CONCENTRATION**

Starre und bewegliche Aufmärsche. 17:(109)

MOTORIZATION [SEE ALSO: Field Forces Large units—Mechanization Mechanized forces]  
Motorisierungsfragen. 17:(68)  
Chronique de l'Infanterie. 14:(24)

France  
France: The year 1930 from a military point of view. 16:(58)

**TRAINING**

La combinaison des armes. 23:(29)

**Army**

**ARMS AND SERVICES**

Artillery  
The trend of Field Artillery. 40:(13)

**Corps**

**ARMS AND SERVICES**

Air Arm  
Cas concret d'emploi de l'Aéronautique et de la D.T.C.A. au Corps d'Armée. 14:(25)

**Artillery**

The trend of Field Artillery. 40:(13)

**Artillery, Antiaircraft**

Cas concret d'emploi de l'Aéronautique et de la D.T.C.A. au Corps d'Armée. 14:(25)

**TACTICS**

**Abstract topics**

Cas concret d'emploi de l'Aéronautique et de la D.T.C.A. au Corps d'Armée. 14:(25)

**Division**

**ARMS AND SERVICES**

Artillery  
The trend of Field Artillery. 40:(13)

**ORGANIZATION**

**Engineers**

Organisation der Pioniere. 17:(92)

**TACTICS**

**Abstract topics**

La 9e division en 1918. 23:(32)

**Defensive combat**

Curso de preparación de Coroneles para el ascenso, año de 1930. 6:(18)

**Defensive combat (Withdrawal)**

La 9e division en 1918. 23:(32)

**Offensive combat**

Curso de preparación de Coroneles para el ascenso, año de 1930. 6:(21)

**Division, Cavalry**

**ORGANIZATION**

**Abstract topics**

Grosze oder kleine Kavallerie-Einheiten? 17:(95)  
La cavalerie moderne. Etudes tactiques. 38:(16)

**TACTICS TRAINING COMBAT METHODS**

**Defensive combat**

La cavalerie moderne. Etudes tactiques. 38:(16)

**Mechanization Mechanized Forces**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL**

Was ist Stoszkraft? 17:(79) (83)  
Motorisierung und Kampfwagenverwendung. 17:(98)

Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampfwagen. 17:(108) (128) (140) (143)

Chronique de l'Infanterie. 14:(24)

The mechanization of war. 52:(10)  
Problems of mechanization which may confront infantry officers in the near future. 8:(13)

**Bibliography**

Tank and mechanization literature. 32:(66)

**Great Britain**

Der britische Heereshaushalt 1930/31. 17:(86)

**DIVISION**

**Organization**

Tank divisions. 39:(18)

**FIELD Forces Large units—Mechanization  
Mechanized Forces continued**

**TACTICS OPERATIONS COMBAT**

**Abstract topics**

- Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampf-  
wagen. 17:(108) (140) (143)  
Tank divisions. 39:(18)  
New developments in warfare. 39:(24)  
The British Army Exercise of 1930. 39:(25)  
Defense against tanks. 36:(12)  
Coordination of the attack. 36:(14)

**FIELD Forces Tactics Operations Combat**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

- Die Krise des Angriffs kann überwunden werden.  
17:(62)  
Was ist Stoszkraft? 17:(79) (83)  
Studien zur Vorschritt "F.u.G." 17:(104)  
Der Werk Kriegsgeschichtlicher Studien. 17:  
(121)  
Táctica y técnica. 22:(39)  
Curso abreviado de táctica aplicada. 22:(50)  
Problemas de combate. Fajas de combate.  
16a:(4)  
Methodism in tactics. 4:(27)  
Points to remember when dealing with tactical  
problems. 4:(28)

**Combat topics in general**

**AIR SUPERIORITY**

- Luftüberlegenheit? 17:(78) (111)

**ARTILLERY MISSION**

- Schutzleistung und Stoszkraft. 17:(141)

**FIRE SUPERIORITY**

- Schutzleistung und Stoszkraft. 17:(141)

**GAS SMOKE, USE OF (Russia)**

- Die kriegsschemische Ausbildung der Roten  
Armee. 17:(125)

**Defensive combat**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

- Über das Offenhalten von Engen. 17:(119)  
Curso de preparación de Coroneles para el  
asenso, año de 1930. 6:(18)  
Las diferentes formas de combate. II—La  
defensa. 16a:(2)  
Methodism in tactics. 4:(27)

**COUNTERATTACK**

- Defense against tanks. 36:(12)

**DELAYING ACTION**

- Hinhalten der Kampf und Volkscharakter. 17:  
(100) (105) (129)

- ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND (SEE ALSO:  
Technology, Military Engineering)

- Die polnische befestigte Feldstellung. 17:(97)  
Puntos de apoyo. 22:(55)

**WITHDRAWAL RETIREMENT RETREAT**

**Abstract topics**

- La 9e division en 1918. 23:(32)

**Night operations**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

- Reading maps, messages and fire control in-  
struments at night. 32:(57)

**Offensive combat**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

- Die Krise des Angriffs kann überwunden werden.  
17:(62)  
Was ist Stoszkraft? 17:(79) (83)  
Krisis im Angriffsgefecht. 17:(139)  
Schutzleistung und Stoszkraft. 17:(141)  
Die neue österreichische Gefechtsvorschrift.  
17:(145)

- Curso de preparación de Coroneles para el  
asenso, año de 1930. 6:(21)  
Coordination of the attack. 36:(14)

- Overseas expeditions** (SEE ALSO: Joint Forces  
—Joint operations)

- Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

- The Navy-Marine Corps problem. 56:(7)

- ATTACK AND LANDING ON HOSTILE SHORES**

- Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)

**DEFENSE OF COAST LINES**

- The role of seacoast fortifications. 39:(13)  
The temporary defense of a fleet base. 56:(5)  
The defense of posts. 7:(34)

**Protective and defensive measures**

**ANTITANK**

- Note relative a la vulnérabilité des chars par le  
feu de l'artillerie lointaine. 42:(20)  
Defense against tanks. 36:(12)

**Riots Domestic disturbances** [Tactics]

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

- National Guard duties in aid of civil authorities.  
40:(12)

**River crossings**

**ATTACK**

**Abstract topics**

- Über das Offenhalten von Engen. 17:(119)

**DEFENSE**

- La défense des cours d'eau et la bataille défen-  
sive du 15 juillet 1918 sur le front de la Marne.  
34:(35)

**Security**

**OUTPOSTS**

- Übergang zur Ruhe. 17:(147)

**SECURITY ON THE MARCH**

**Abstract topics**

- Gedanken über Marschsicherung. 17:(146) (150)

**Special warfare**

**MOUNTAIN WARFARE**

- Modernized mountain warfare. 8:(16)

- SMALL WARS** [Includes: Colonial warfare;

- Desert warfare; Guerrilla warfare]

**Abstract topics**

- The taking of Fort Riviere. 56:(10)

**Abstract topics** [Gas]

- The use of gas in minor warfare. 56:(8)

**Colonial warfare**

- The northwest frontier of India. 7:(28)  
The defence of "K" Depot (9th August, 1930).  
8:(12)

- Babu tactics. 8:(14)

**Desert warfare**

- Eight years of British control in Iraq. 7:(29)

**Troop movements**

**MARCHES**

- Neuzeitliche Marschtechnik. 17:(87)  
Luftschutz marschierender Truppen. 17:(138)

**II**

**HISTORY Military-Naval**

- [Includes: Military biography; Military geog-  
raphy]

**SEE ALSO:**

- History Military-Naval ... (Name of country);  
Wars.

*Periodical Literature—Subject Index*

**History**

ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL

Der Werk Kriegsgeschichtlicher Studien. 17: (121)

Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Belgium**

**History**

Les aspects militaires de la Révolution de 1830. 14:(26)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Canada**

**History**

The Second Red River Expedition, 1871. 15:(14)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Cuba**

**History**

Cronicas de la Guerra de Cuba. 13:(7) (10)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Egypt-Sudan**

**History**

The passing of an Empire: The fall of the Sultanate of Darfur. 12:(28)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Europe**

**History**

Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

**HISTORY Military-Naval France**

**Biography, Military-Naval**

[Napoleon] Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

[Joffre] Marshal Joffre, 1852-1931. 4:(25)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Germany**

**Biography, Military-Naval**

[Moltke] Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

[Frederick the Great] Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

[v.Steuben] The bicentenary of Steuben. 77:(10)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Guatemala**

**History**

Latin America: Isthmian revolts—Guatemala and Panama. 16:(51)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Haiti**

**History**

The taking of Fort Riviere. 56:(10)

**HISTORY Military-Naval India**

**History**

Siraj-Ud-Daulah as a general. 4:(19)

The northwest frontier of India. 7:(28)

The defence of "K" Depot (9th August, 1930). 8:(12)

**Military geography**

The northwest frontier of India. 7:(28)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Italy**

**History**

Italy's capture of the Senusi stronghold—a great march across 500 miles of desert. 71:(4)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Nicaragua**

**History**

Guerrilla warfare in Nicaragua. 67:(5)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Panama**

**History**

Latin America: Isthmian revolts—Guatemala and Panama. 16:(51)

**HISTORY Military-Naval Russia**

**Biography, Military-Naval**

[Suvorov] Alexander V. Suvorov, Generalissimo. 44:(18)

**History**

Is another war coming soon? IV—The threat of the Bear. 110:(17)

CIVIL WAR (1921)

Le combat de cavalerie. 38:(12)

**HISTORY Military-Naval United States**

[Other countries similarly]

SEE ALSO:

Armies United States—History:

Arms and Services ... United States—History:

Wars United States.

**Biography, Military-Naval**

[v.Steuben] The bicentenary of Steuben. 77:(10)

[Baker] When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

[Washington] Washington: "The Old Fox." 18:(8)

[Pershing] Pershing: Where he stands. 18:(9)

[Farragut] Farragut at the crossroads. 55:(16)

**History**

Are we a peaceful or warlike nation? 112:(4)

**Military geography**

**MILITARY EXPLORATIONS**

Captain John Pope's route to the Pacific. 44:(22)

**J**

**JOINT Forces in campaign Armies-Navies**

[—Air Forces]

**General subjects**

**JOINT OPERATIONS**

Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)

**Coast defense**

The role of seacoast fortifications. 33:(13)

The defence of posts. 7:(34)

**Landing attacks**

Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)

The Fleet and the Marines. 55:(20)

**Overseas movements**

The Fleet and the Marines. 55:(20)

**JOINT Forces in campaign United States**

(Army—Navy)

**Joint operations**

APPLICATORY EXERCISES (Army—Navy)

**Minor joint exercises**

Harbor defenses of San Francisco Army-Navy joint exercises. 39:(16)

**COAST DEFENSE**

The temporary defense of a fleet base. 56:(5)

**Aviation**

Naval aircraft in coastal warfare. 55:(13)

**INLAND WATERS**

Army and Navy forever. 13:(5)

**OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS**

The Navy-Marine Corps problem. 56:(7)

**N**

**NATIONAL Forces Armies Navies Air forces**

SEE ALSO:

Joint forces in campaign;

National forces Name of country.

**General subjects**

COMMAND AND DIRECTION OF NATIONAL FORCES

Organization of higher command in war. 45:(13)

**NATIONAL Forces Canada (Army—Navy—Air Force)**

**National Defense Military-Naval policies**

**NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES PREPAREDNESS**

Roles [of] the armed forces of Canada . . . (Prize essay). 15:(11)

**NATIONAL Forces France (Army—Navy—Air Force)**

**National Defense Military-Naval policies**

**NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES PREPAREDNESS**

**Military policies**

France: The year 1930 from a military point of view. 16:(58)

**Separate Air Force**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

France: The year 1930 from a military point of view. 16:(58)

**NATIONAL Forces Great Britain (Army—Navy—Air Force)**

**Command and direction**

**NATIONAL CONDUCT OF WAR**

Organization of higher command in war. 45:(13)

**Separate Air Forces**

**AIR MINISTRY**

The Air Ministry—And after. 5:(9)

**HISTORY**

Eight years of British control in Iraq. 7:(29)

Regional control and the co-ordination of air and land forces. 7:(30)

The work of the Royal Air Force at Aden. 7:(35)

**ORGANIZATION**

The Army and the Royal Air Force. 4:(30)

The Air Ministry—And after. 5:(9)

**SCHOOLS**

**Academy**

The West Point of other lands. VI—Royal Air Force College. 19:(9)

**TACTICS TRAINING COMBAT METHODS**

**Abstract topics**

Inglaterra.—Ejercicios de las Fuerzas Aéreas de 1930. 6:(25)

**NATIONAL Forces Sweden (Army—Navy—Air Force)**

**Separate Air Forces**

The Swedish Air Force. 4:(16)

**NATIONAL Forces United States (Army—Navy)**

**National Defense Military-Naval policies**

**ABSTRACT TOPICS**

National defense and transportation. 32:(62)

ANTI-DEFENSE ANTI-PATRIOTIC PACIFISM

War on military training. 77:(12)

Militarist or Pacifist? 32:(63)

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PATRIOTIC MOVEMENTS

Patriotic women gather to support national defense. 77:(11)

NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES PREPAREDNESS

**Military policies**

National strategy of the United States. 52:(11)

**National Mobilization**

**INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION**

Industry and national defense. 39:(15) (26)

**NAVIES**

**SEE ALSO:**

Joint forces in campaign;

National Forces;

Navies ... Name of country.

**General subjects**

**AERONAUTICS, NAVAL**

**Coast defense**

Naval aircraft in coastal warfare. 55:(13)

**COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH**

**Naval disarmament conferences**

Das Ergebnis der Londoner Flottenkonferenz. 17:(64)

Immediate problems of naval reduction. 68:(5)

The Franco-Italian naval agreement. 69:(3)

L'accord naval Franco-Italo-Britannique. 73:(3)

The conference must succeed. 76:(3)

Europe: Disarmament: The new naval pact. 16:(62)

**TECHNOLOGY, NAVAL**

**Signals Communications**

Communication organization. 55:(15)

**Naval warfare**

**ART OF NAVAL WARFARE**

**Command and staff**

Communication organization. 55:(15)

**Germany**

Evolution of the German naval war plans. 54:(6)

**Overseas Expeditions**

Naval aircraft in coastal warfare. 55:(13)

The Fleet and the Marines. 55:(20)

The temporary defense of a fleet base. 56:(5)

The Navy-Marine Corps problem. 56:(7)

**NAVIES Germany**

**Abstract topics—General and special**

Die marinopolitische Lage in der Ostsee. 17:(94)

**Training**

Evolution of the German naval war plans. 54:(6)

**NAVIES United States**

**SEE ALSO:**

Navies—Naval warfare;

Navies—General subjects—Technology,

Naval.

**Abstract topics—General and special**

La Flotte Américaine et la défense aéronavale de Panama. 73:(6)

**Aeronautics**

Army and Navy air forces. 3:(5)

No physical changes seen in the new air rule. 2:(8)

Naval aircraft in coastal warfare. 55:(13)

**Composition and strength**

An awakening due. 117:(1)

**Histories and records**

**SHIPS**

"As Before Except." 55:(14)

**Navy Department**

**BUREAUS**

**Ordnance**

Naval ordnance during 1930. 52:(15)

**NAVIES United States Marine Corps**

**Command and staff**

**SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS**

Marine Corps communications personnel. 56:(11)



## Periodical Literature—Subject Index

### History

The taking of Fort Riviere. 56:(10)

### Tactics Training Combat methods OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

The Fleet and the Marines. 55:(20)

## T

### TECHNOLOGY, Military Aeronautics

Our status in the air. 78:(3)

The French Air Salon: Military aircraft of to-day. 4:(17)

Trend of design in heavier-than-air craft. 44:(16)

### TECHNOLOGY, Military Automotive

[Includes gas, oil, lubricants]

Motorisierungsfragen. 17:(68)

### TECHNOLOGY, Military Chemicals Gas

Surveillance of chemical munitions. 53:(6)

A small technical library. 53:(7)

### TECHNOLOGY, Military Engineering

#### Routes

#### BRIDGES BRIDGING

Instrucciones sobre el material de "Puentes rápidos sobre botes plegadizos" de que disponen los Zapadores Pontoneros en campana. 22:(44)

Cálculo de los elementos de un puente tipo sobre pilotes para 10 toneladas. 22:(47)

The status of ponton bridge development. 44:(17)

#### Topography Surveying

#### ABSTRACT TOPICS

The Nicaragua Canal survey. 39:(17)

### TECHNOLOGY, Military Medical

#### Abstract topics—General and special

Das "klinische Heer." 17:(126)

Alkohol—Nikotin—Koffein. 17:(135)

### TECHNOLOGY, Military Ordnance Munitions

#### Abstract topics—General and special

The development of army ordnance. 52:(12)

#### BALLISTICS

Noch einmal: "Der Rückstosverlauf beim Gewehr." 17:(76)

#### Armored cars

Zwei neue Strassenpanzer. 17:(106)

Die neuen Autochenilles de Cavalerie "M 28" und "M 29." 17:(133)

A new type of armored car. 4:(21)

#### Artillery armament

#### ABSTRACT TOPICS

Caractéristiques générales des matériels d'artillerie modernes. 42:(19)

The trend of Field Artillery. 40:(13)

#### GUNS

Britain's new defense against aircraft. 71:(3)

A new Vickers-Armstrongs anti-aircraft gun. 4:(26)

#### Autochenille

Die neuen Autochenilles de Cavalerie "M 28" und "M 29." 17:(133)

#### Small arms

#### RIFLES PISTOLS

Noch einmal: "Der Rückstosverlauf beim Gewehr." 17:(76)

### Tanks Armament

Die neuen Autochenilles de Cavalerie "M 28"

und "M 29." 17:(133)

Thoughts on tanks. 35:(9)

### TECHNOLOGY, Military Signals

#### Animal transmission

#### PIGEONS

Training army pigeons to do their work. 112:(5)

#### Radio

Communication organization. 55:(15)

#### Telephony

Líneas telefónicas. 22:(40)

## W

### WAR PEACE

#### Abstract topics—General and special

"Soziologie des Krieger." 17:(117)

La Guerra y el libro. 13:(8)

The inevitability of war. 102:(8)

#### Causes of war

#### ABSTRACT TOPICS

Is another war coming soon? 110:(13) (14) (15) (17)

#### Economic and social aspects

#### ABSTRACT TOPICS

"Soziologie des Krieger." 17:(117)

#### Prevention of war

#### ABSTRACT TOPICS

Waging peace as the nations wage war. 112:(8)

#### DISARMAMENT

The conference must succeed. 76:(3)

Will the world disarm? 111:(3)

#### Resources, Military

#### INDUSTRIES, MILITARY INDUSTRIALISM

Industry and national defense. 39:(15) (26)

### RAW MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS

#### Petroleum

A study of the international petroleum situation. 55:(19)

Power fuel for the services. 7:(33)

#### TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

#### United States

National defense and transportation. 32:(62)

### WARS ...

#### Explanatory notes

Wars BC, are entered under WARS ANCIENT. All wars since the Christian era (AD) are entered generally with respect to location and should be looked for accordingly in the following areas:

WARS AFRICA

WARS ASIA

WARS CENTRAL AMERICA

WARS EUROPE

WARS MEXICO

WARS SOUTH AMERICA

WARS UNITED STATES

WARS WEST INDIES

Minor internal affairs and unimportant campaigns which are not found under WARS should be looked for under History Military-Naval; e.g., History Military-Naval Great Britain.

**WARS ...—Explanatory notes (continued)**

Major modern wars, whose entries are likely to be numerous, have those arranged by subject groups, as follows [SEE Wars World War for example]:

- A—General topics
- B—Special topics
- C—Civil history
- So io-economic history
- D—Joint National forces
- E—General military history
- Commanders
- Military forces
- F—Zone of Interior
- G—Arms and services
- H—Military conduct of war
- Field Forces
- J—Campaigns and battles
- K—Technology, Military
- L—Naval history

**WARS AFRICA Morocco**

**Campaigns (1919- )**

L'hiver 1925-1926 au Maroc dans un secteur du front Nord. 23:(28) (31)

**WARS ASIA China**

**Boxer Rebellion (1900)**

American troops in China—Their mission. 32:(61)

**Civil Wars (1912- )**

China: A brighter outlook. 80:(3)

**WARS ASIA India**

**Sepoy Rebellion [Indian Mutiny] (1857-1858)**

A subaltern in the Indian Mutiny. 45:(14)

**Tribal Wars (1930)**

The defence of "K" Depot (9th August, 1930). 8:(12)

**WARS EUROPE 17th century**

**Thirty Years' War (1618-1648)**

Recent studies on the 30 Years War. 98:(1)

**WARS EUROPE Napoleonic Wars (1795-1815)**

**E—General military history Commanders**

**COMMANDERS**

Napoleonic cavalry and its leaders. 37:(5)

**COMMANDERS (RUSSIA)**

Alexander V. Suvorov, Generalissimo. 44:(18)

**G—Arms and services**

**CAVALRY**

Napoleonic cavalry and its leaders. 37:(5)

**H—Military conduct of the war in the field**

**Theaters of operations Field Forces**

**TACTICS AND STRATEGY**

**Abstract topics**

Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**CAMPAIGN 1808 IN SPAIN**

Bailen (21 juillet 1808). 23:(35)

**WARS OF DIRECTORY**

**1799**

A campaign in the Alps in 1799. 12:(25)

**N—Napoleon**

Federico el Grande—Napoleón—Moltke. 22:(56)

**WARS EUROPE Peninsular War (1808-1814)**

Las batallas de la Guerra de la Independencia de 1808-1814. 6:(20)

**E—General military history Commanders**

**GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY**

Oman's Peninsular War. 12:(29)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**BATTLE OF BAYLEN**

Bailen (21 juillet 1808). 23:(35)

**WARS WEST INDIES**

**Cuba**

**REVOLUTION**

Cronicas de la Guerra de Cuba. 13:(7) (10)

**WARS UNITED STATES Revolution (1775-1783)**

**B—Special topics**

**TREASON TRAITORS**

A lesser tragedy of Arnold's treason. 112:(6)

**E—General military history Commanders**

**COMMANDERS**

The bicentenary of Steuben. 77:(10)

Washington: "The Old Fox." 18:(8)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**1782**

The Ohio campaigns of 1782. 99:(1)

**WARS UNITED STATES War of 1812 (1812-1814)**

**A—General topics**

For the preservation of the War of 1812. 103:(3)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**LOUISIANA CAMPAIGN**

**New Orleans**

The battle of New Orleans. 55:(18)

**WARS UNITED STATES Civil War (1861-1865)**

**B—Special topics**

**PERIODICALS**

The Chicago Times and the Civil War. 99:(2)

**D—Joint National Forces**

JOINT NATIONAL FORCES: ARMIES NAVIES

Army and Navy forever. 18:(5)

**G—Arms and Services**

**CAVALRY**

**Abstract topics**

Hell bent for leather. 18:(4)

**SIGNALS**

**History**

Military telegraph in the Civil War. 46:(9)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**1864**

Army and Navy forever. 18:(5)

**WARS UNITED STATES Spanish-American War (1898)**

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**SANTIAGO**

The winning of San Juan Hill. 79:(7)

**L—Naval history**

**NAVAL CONDUCT OF THE WAR**

**Naval forces (ships)**

"As Before Except." 55:(14)

**WARS UNITED STATES Mexican Operations (1912-1917)**

**Punitive Expedition (1916)**

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

**WARS WORLD WAR (1914-1918)**

SEE ALSO:

Wars World War Country [by name]

ARRANGEMENT OF SUBJECTS

A—General topics

B—Special topics

C—Civil history

Socio-economic history

D—Joint National forces

E—General military history

Military forces

Commanders

F—Zone of Interior

G—Arms and services

H—Military conduct of the war

Field Forces

J—Campaigns and battles

K—Technology, Military

L—Naval history

**B—Special topics**

FICTION

Ein neuer russischer kriegsroman. 17:(71)

An issue of blankets. 115:(8)

PERSONAL NARRATIVES

Wounded. 110:(12)

Some memories of the A.E.F. 44:(19)

SPIES

German spies in America. 110:(16) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)

**C—Civil history Socio-economic history**

CAUSES

Diplomatic background of America's entry into the War. 67:(4)

POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY

Diplomatic background of America's entry into the War. 67:(4)

RESULTS

Debts

Let's cancel the war debts. 107:(2)

The war debts. 107:(3)

What action—or inaction—on war debts will do. 74:(3)

The truth about the war debts. 75:(2)

Reparations and indemnities

The economic consequences of reparations. 78:(4)

Treaties

The Reich calls a hand. 55:(17)

**D—Joint National forces**

JOINT NATIONAL FORCES: ARMIES NAVIES

Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)

**E—General military history Commanders**

SEE ALSO:

J—Campaigns and battles

COMMANDERS

"Der Feldherr wider Willen." 17:(72)

If Foch had listened to Pershing instead of to Haig. 115:(7)

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

Pershing: Where he stands. 18:(9)

France

Marshal Joffre, 1852-1931. 4:(25)

Great Britain

A justification of Smith-Dorrien. 4:(29)

Italy

La gran guerra en el frente italiano, según las Memorias del general Cadorna. 22:(49)

GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY

La gran guerra en el frente italiano, según las

Memorias del general Cadorna. 22:(49)

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

Great Britain

L'effort militaire de la Grande-Bretagne en 1914-1918. 23:(27)

**F—Zone of Interior**

ARMY COMMAND AND DIRECTION WAR DEPARTMENT

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

**G—Arms and services**

AIR FORCES

Operations 1918

Die französische Luftdivision am 15. Juli 1918. 17:(99)

Tactics

Die Französische Luftdivision am 15. Juli 1918. 17:(99)

ARTILLERY

Antiaircraft artillery

The effect of aviation upon the missions of the Coast Artillery. 39:(23)

Tactics Operations

Die schwere Artillerie in der Marneschlacht 1914. 17:(61)

Schwere Artillerie im Bewegungskrieg. 17:(122) (127) (132)

Le combat de Schönholz (1917). 42:(17)

L'artillerie dans l'offensive en guerre de position. 42:(18) (21)

Tactics Operations (Troop movements)

Schließens rechter Flügel und die Heeresbespannung. 17:(102)

CAVALRY

History

The cavalry did fight. 18:(11)

Tactics Operations

Die deutsche kavallerie und die der verbündeten Westgegner im August und September 1914. 17:(73) (80)

Erfolgreiches Eingreifen von Reiterei gegen den Rücken des Gegners. 17:(93)

La charge du lieutenant Saison à Mittersheim (19 août 1914). 38:(15)

Reconnaissance et charge du sous-lieutenant Rozoy à Cheriay (29 septembre 1914). 38:(20)

Tactics Operations (Reconnaissance)

Exploration stratégique. Le 4e corps de cavalerie allemand en août 1914. 38:(10) (18)

ENGINEERS

History

The Sixth Engineers in the Meuse-Argonne. 44:(20)

Tactics Operations

The Sixth Engineers in the Meuse-Argonne. 44:(20)

INFANTRY

Abstract topics

Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)

TANKS

Abstract topics

Note relative à la vulnérabilité des chars par le feu de l'artillerie lointaine. 42:(20)

Tactics Operations

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts Juli 1918. 17:(114)

**WARS WORLD WAR (1914-1918) (continued)**

**H—Military conduct of the war in the field**

**Theaters of operations Field Forces**

[See: Wars World War United States—H, for special arrangement, AEF]

**COMMAND AND STAFF (Field Forces)**

**Command Leadership**

"Der Feldherr wider Willen." 17:(72)

Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)

**Orders Reports**

Befehlserteilung in Krieg und Frieden. 17:(88)

**FIELD FORCES LARGE UNITS**

**Abstract topics**

L'effort militaire de la Grande-Bretagne en 1914-1918. 23:(27)

**Field Forces**

Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)

**GHQ**

A justification of Smith-Dorrien. 4:(29)

**Armies**

Die schwere Artillerie in der Marneschlacht 1914. 17:(61)

La journée du 9 septembre 1914 à la gauche de la 9<sup>e</sup> armée. 23:(26)

La 1<sup>re</sup> armée allemande dans la bataille de l'Ourcq (5-9 septembre 1914). 34:(28) (31) (37)

**Corps**

Le 10<sup>e</sup> corps à Charleroi. 23:(25) (30) (34)

**Division**

La 9<sup>e</sup> division en 1918. 23:(32)

The Americans' first shot in the War. 110:(11)

**Corps, Cavalry**

Exploration stratégique. Le 4<sup>e</sup> corps de cavalerie allemand en août 1914. 38:(10) (18)

**TACTICS AND STRATEGY**

**Strategy**

"Der Feldherr wider Willen." 17:(72)

Starre und bewegliche Aufmärsche. 17:(109)

Succès stratégique, succès tactiques. 23:(33)

If Foch had listened to Pershing instead of to Haig. 115:(7)

Marshal Joffre, 1852-1931. 4:(25)

**Tactics**

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts

Juli 1918. 17:(114)

Krisis im Angriffsgefecht. 17:(139)

Succès stratégiques, succès tactiques. 23:(33)

**Tactics (Defensive combat)**

Methodism in tactics. 4:(27)

**Tactics (Joint operations)**

The German landing in Finland, 3rd of April, 1918. 12:(31)

**Tactics (Landing)**

Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)

**Tactics (River crossings)**

La défense des cours d'eau et la bataille défensive du 15 juillet 1918 sur le front de la Marne. 34:(35)

**Tactics (Security)**

Übergang zur Ruhe. 17:(147)

**Tactics (Withdrawal)**

La 9<sup>e</sup> division en 1918. 23:(32)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**SEE ALSO:**

E—General military history;

G—Arms and services;

H—Military conduct of the war.

**ASIATIC AREA—TURKISH THEATER**

**Dardanelles Front**

Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41)

**Palestine Front**

Allenby's campaigns in Palestine. 12:(30)

**EUROPEAN AREA—BALKAN THEATER**

**Abstract topics**

Der letzte Aufmarsch der Mittelmächte. 17:(149) (156)

**EUROPEAN AREA—ITALIAN THEATER**

**Abstract topics**

La gran guerra en el frente italiano, según las Memorias del general Cadorna. 22:(49)

**EUROPEAN AREA—RUSSIAN THEATER**

**1914**

The 1914 campaign in East Prussia. 15:(17)

**1917**

Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)

**1918**

The last German offensive. Rheims, 1918. 12:(26)

The German landing in Finland, 3rd of April, 1918. 12:(31)

**EUROPEAN AREA—WESTERN THEATER**

**1914**

Die schwere Artillerie in der Marneschlacht

1914. 17:(61)

Schwere Artillerie im Bewegungskrieg. 17:(122) (127) (132)

Le 10<sup>e</sup> corps à Charleroi. 23:(25) (30) (34)

La journée du 9 septembre 1914 à la gauche de la 9<sup>e</sup> armée. 23:(26)

Succès stratégique, succès tactiques. 23:(33)

La 1<sup>re</sup> armée allemande dans la bataille de l'Ourcq (5-9 septembre 1914). 34:(28) (31) (37)

La Défense de la Position Fortifiée de Namur en août 1914. 14:(23)

La Guerra: Su batallas y sus hombres. 16a:(10)

If Foch had listened to Pershing instead of to Haig. 115:(7)

**1917**

Le combat de Schönholz (1917). 42:(17)

**1918**

Die französische Luftdivision am 15. Juli 1918. 17:(99)

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts Juli 1918. 17:(114)

Die "Überraschung" vom 18. Juli 1918. 17:(157)

La 9<sup>e</sup> division en 1918. 23:(32)

La défense des cours d'eau et la bataille défensive du 15 juillet 1918 sur le front de la Marne. 34:(34)

If the Americans had not been discounted as amateurs. 115:(6)

The Sixth Engineers in the Meuse-Argonne. 44:(20)

**K—Technology, Military**

**ORDNANCE**

**Tanks**

Some little known French, German and American tanks of the Great War period. 35:(6) (7)

**L—Naval history**

**GENERAL NAVAL HISTORY**

Evolution of the German naval war plans. 54:(6)

- NAVAL CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES  
1916  
Eine versäumte Schlacht. 17:(131)  
NAVAL CONDUCT OF THE WAR  
Tactics and strategy  
Evolution of the German naval war plans. 54:(6)
- WARS WORLD WAR Austria-Hungary**  
**H—Military conduct of the war in the field**  
**Theaters of operations Field Forces**  
TACTICS AND STRATEGY  
Strategy  
Starre und bewegliche Aufmärsche. 17:(109)
- WARS WORLD WAR Belgium**  
**G—Arms and Services**  
CAVALRY  
Tactics Operations  
Die deutsche kavallerie und die der verbündeten  
Westgegner im August und September 1914.  
17:(80)  
J—Campaigns and battles  
EUROPEAN AREA—WESTERN THEATER  
1914  
La Défense de la Position Fortifiée de Namur  
en août 1914. 14:(23)
- WARS WORLD WAR France**  
**E—General military history Commanders**  
COMMANDERS  
[Foch] If Foch had listened to Pershing instead  
of to Haig. 115:(7)  
[Joffre] Marshal Joffre, 1852-1931. 4:(25)  
G—Arms and services  
A'R FORCES  
Operations 1918  
Die französische Luftdivision am 15. Juli 1918.  
17:(99)  
Tactics  
Die französische Luftdivision am 15. Juli 1918.  
17:(99)  
ARTILLERY  
Tactics Operations  
Le combat de Schönholz (1917). 42:(17)  
CAVALRY  
Tactics Operations  
Die deutsche kavallerie und die der verbündeten  
Westgegner im August und September 1914.  
17:(80)  
La charge du lieutenant Saison à Mittersheim  
(19 août 1914). 33:(15)  
Reconnaissance et charge du sous-lieutenant  
Rozoy à Chérisy (29 septembre 1914). 38:(20)  
INFANTRY  
Abstract topics  
Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française  
pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)  
TANKS  
Abstract topics  
Note relative à la vulnérabilité des chars par le  
feu de l'artillerie lointaine. 42:(20)  
Tactics Operations  
Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotetrêts  
Juli 1918. 17:(114)

- H—Military conduct of the war in the field**  
**Theaters of operations Field Forces**  
COMMAND AND STAFF  
Command Leadership  
Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française  
pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)  
FIELD FORCES LARGE UNITS  
Field Forces  
Etude sur le moral de l'infanterie française  
pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 34:(34)  
Armies (Ninth Army)  
La journée du 9 septembre 1914 à la gauche de  
la 9e armée. 23:(26)  
Corps (X Corps)  
Le 10e corps à Charleroi. 23:(25) (30) (34)  
Division (9th Division)  
La 9e division en 1918. 23:(32)  
TACTICS AND STRATEGY  
Strategy  
Marshal Joffre, 1852-1931. 4:(25)  
Tactics  
Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotetrêts  
Juli 1918. 17:(114)  
J—Campaigns and battles  
EUROPEAN AREA—WESTERN THEATER  
1914  
Le 10e corps à Charleroi. 23:(25) (30) (34)  
La journée du 9 septembre 1914 à la gauche de  
la 9e armée. 23:(26)  
1917  
Le combat de Schönholz (1917). 42:(17)  
1918  
Die französische Luftdivision am 15. Juli 1918.  
17:(99)  
Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotetrêts  
Juli 1918. 17:(114)  
La 9e division en 1918. 23:(32)  
La défense des cours d'eau et la bataille défensive  
du 15 juillet 1918 sur le front de la Marne.  
34:(35)
- WARS WORLD WAR Germany**  
**C—Civil history Socio-economic history**  
RESULTS  
Reparations and indemnities  
The economic consequences of reparations.  
78:(4)  
Treaties  
The Reich calls a hand. 55:(17)  
D—Joint National forces  
JOINT NATIONAL FORCES: ARMIES NAVIES  
Operaciones combinadas. 22:(41) (48)  
**E—General military history Commanders**  
COMMANDERS  
"Der Feldherr wider Willen." 17:(72)  
G—Arms and services  
ARTILLERY  
Tactics Operations  
Die schwere Artillerie in der Marneschlacht  
1914. 17:(61)  
Schwere Artillerie im Bewegungskrieg. 17:(122)  
(127) (132)  
L'artillerie dans l'offensive en guerre de position.  
42:(18) (21)  
Tactics Operations (Troop movements)  
Schlieffens rechter Flügel und die Heeresbespannung.  
17:(102)

**WARS WORLD WAR Germany—G—Arms and services (continued)**

**CAVALRY**

**Tactics Operations**

Die deutsche kavalierie und die der verbündeten Westgegner im August und September 1914. 17:(73) (80)

Tactics Operations (Reconnaissance)

Exploration stratégique. Le 4e corps de cavalerie allemand en août 1914. 38:(10) (18)

**TANKS**

**Tactics Operations**

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts Juli 1918. 17:(114)

**H—Military conduct of the war in the field**

**Theaters of operations Field Forces**

**COMMAND AND STAFF (Field Forces)**

**Command Leadership**

"Der Feldherr wider Willen." 17:(72)

**Orders Reports**

Befehlserteilung in Krieg und Frieden. 17:(88)

**FIELD FORCES LARGE UNITS**

**Armies (First Army)**

Die schwere Artillerie in der Marneschlacht 1914. 17:(61)

La 1re armée allemande dans la bataille de l'Oureq (5-9 septembre 1914). 34:(28) (31) (37)

**Corps, Cavalry (IV)**

Exploration stratégique. Le 4e corps de cavalerie allemand en août 1914. 38:(10) (18)

**TACTICS AND STRATEGY**

**Strategy**

"Der Feldherr wider Willen." 17:(72)

Succès stratégique, succès tactiques. 23:(33)

**Tactics**

Krisis im Angriffsgefecht. 17:(139)

Succès stratégique, succès tactiques. 23:(33)

**Tactics (Security)**

Übergang zur Ruhe. 17:(147)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**EUROPEAN AREA—BALKAN THEATER**

**Abstract Topics**

Der letzte Aufmarsch der Mittelmächte. 17:(149) (156)

**EUROPEAN AREA—RUSSIAN THEATER**

1918

The German landing in Finland, 3rd of April, 1918. 12:(31)

**EUROPEAN AREA—WESTERN THEATER**

1914

Die schwere Artillerie in der Marneschlacht 1914. 17:(61)

Schwere Artillerie im Bewegungskrieg. 17:(122) (127) (132)

La 1re armée allemande dans la bataille de l'Oureq (5-9 septembre 1914). 34:(28) (31) (37)

La Guerra: Su batallas y sus hombres. 16a:(10)

1918

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts Juli 1918. 17:(114)

Die "Überraschung" vom 18. Juli 1918. 17:(157)

The last German offensive. Rheims, 1918. 12:(26)

**L—Naval history**

**GENERAL NAVAL HISTORY**

Evolution of the German naval war plans. 54:(6)

**NAVAL CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES**

1916

Eine versäumte Schlacht. 17:(131)

**NAVAL CONDUCT OF THE WAR**

**Tactics and strategy**

Evolution of the German naval war plans. 54:(6)

**WARS WORLD WAR Great Britain**

**E—General military history Commanders**

**COMMANDERS**

[Haig] If Foch had listened to Pershing instead of to Haig. 115:(7)

[Smith-Dorrien] A justification of Smith-Dorrien. 4:(29)

**GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY**

L'effort militaire de la Grande-Bretagne en 1914-1918. 23:(27)

**G—Arms and Services**

**CAVALRY**

**Tactics Operations**

Die deutsche kavalierie und die der verbündeten Westgegner im August und September 1914. 17:(73) (80)

**H—Military conduct of the war in the field**

**Theaters of operations Field Forces**

**FIELD FORCES LARGE UNITS**

**Abstract topics**

L'effort militaire de la Grande-Bretagne en 1914-1918. 23:(27)

**GHQ**

A justification of Smith-Dorrien. 4:(29)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**ASIATIC AREA—TURKISH THEATER**

**Palestine Front**

Allenby's campaigns in Palestine. 12:(30)

**L—Naval history**

**NAVAL CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES**

1916

Eine versäumte Schlacht. 17:(131)

**WARS WORLD WAR Italy**

**E—General military history Commanders**

**COMMANDERS**

[Cadorna] La gran guerra en el frente italiano, según las Memorias del general Cadorna. 22:(49)

**GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY**

La gran guerra en el frente italiano, según las Memorias del general Cadorna. 22:(49)

**J—Campaigns and battles**

**EUROPEAN AREA—TURKISH THEATER**

**Abstract topics**

La gran guerra en el frente italiano, según las Memorias del general Cadorna. 22:(49)

**WARS WORLD WAR Russia**

**G—Arms and Services**

**CAVALRY**

**Tactics Operations**

Erfolgreiches Eingreifen von Reitern gegen den Rücken des Gegners. 17:(93)

**WARS WORLD WAR United States**

**B—Special topics**

**FICTION**

An issue of blankets. 115:(8)

## Periodical Literature—Subject Index

### PERSONAL NARRATIVES

Wounded. 110:(12)  
Some memories of the A.E.F. 44:(19)

#### SPIES

German spies in America. 110:(16) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)

### C—Civil history Socio-economic history

#### CAUSES

Diplomatic background of America's entry into the War. 67:(4)

#### POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY

Diplomatic background of America's entry into the War. 67:(4)

#### RESULTS

##### Debts

Let's cancel the war debts. 107:(2)  
The war debts. 107:(3)  
What action—or inaction—on war debts will do. 74:(3)

### E—General military history Commanders

#### COMMANDERS

[Pershing] If Foch had listened to Pershing instead of to Haig. 115:(7)  
When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)  
Pershing: Where he stands. 18:(9)

#### GENERAL MILITARY HISTORY

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

### F—Zone of Interior

ARMY COMMAND AND DIRECTION WAR DEPARTMENT

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

### G—Arms and Services

#### ENGINEERS

##### History

The Sixth Engineers in the Meuse-Argonne. 44:(20)

### H—American Expeditionary Force in France (AEF)

#### ABSTRACT TOPICS—GENERAL AND SPECIAL

##### History

If the Americans had not been discounted as amateurs. 115:(6)

#### DIVISIONS

##### 1st Division

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts Juli 1918. 17:(114)

The Americans' first shot in the War. 110:(11)

##### 2d Division

Gedanken zur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterêts Juli 1918. 17:(114)

### J—Campaigns and battles

#### EUROPEAN AREA—WESTERN THEATER

##### 1918

If the Americans had not been discounted as amateurs. 115:(6)

The Sixth Engineers in the Meuse-Argonne. 44:(20)

## Subsection B

### Index to Subjects of Collateral Professional Interest

#### A

##### ARABIA

###### Aden

The work of the Royal Air Force at Aden. 7:(35)

#### B

##### BAKER, Newton Diehl, ex-Secretary of War (1871- )

When Mr. Baker made war. 1:(4) (5) (6)

##### BALKANS, The

Balkanfragen. 17:(120)

###### Foreign relations

###### ITALY

Italy and the Balkans. 16:(52)

##### BALTIC STATES

The Baltic States. 8:(15)

##### BRAZIL

###### Politics and government

Brazil: Outgrowths of the 1930 Revolution. 16:(57)

#### C

##### CANALS, Isthmian

The Nicaragua Canal survey. 39:(17)

##### CHINA

American troops in China—Their mission. 32:(61)

#### Finance

China: The remitted Boxer indemnities. 16:(48)

#### Foreign relations

China: A brighter outlook. 80:(3)

#### Politics and government

China: A brighter outlook. 80:(3)

China: Domestic problems of the Nanking Government. 16:(64)

##### CUBA

###### Economic conditions

Cuba: The political-economic situation. 16:(61)

###### Politics and government

Cuba: The political-economic situation. 16:(61)

#### D

##### DANZIG

German minority problem in upper Silesia. 16:(54)

#### E

##### ECONOMICS

Economic conflict as a regulating force in international affairs. 84:(1)

##### ESTHONIA

###### Description and travel

The Baltic States. 8:(15)



## EUROPE

L'Europe en armes. 73:(4)

### Politics and government

Is another war coming soon? 110:(13) (14) (15) (17)

## F

**FARRAGUT, Admiral David Glasgow (1801-1870)**

Farragut at the crossroads 55:(16)

## FINLAND

### Description and travel

The Baltic States. 8:(15)

## FRANCE

### Foreign relations

#### GREAT BRITAIN

L'accord naval Franco-Italo-Britannique. 73:(3)  
Europe: Disarmament: The new naval pact. 16:(62)

#### ITALY

The Franco-Italian naval agreement. 69:(3)  
L'accord naval Franco-Italo-Britannique. 73:(3)  
Europe: Disarmament: The new naval pact. 16:(62)

## G

## GERMANY

### Foreign relations

#### POLAND

A visit to the Polish Corridor. 79:(6)  
German minority problem in upper Silesia. 16:(54)

#### RUSSIA

Reichswehr and Red Army. 79:(5)  
Cooperation between the German and Soviet armies. 16:(46)

### Politics and government

Germany: The political situation as influenced by the Fascist boycott. 16:(63)  
The Reich calls a hand. 55:(17)

### Reparations

The economic consequences of reparations. 78:(4)

## GREAT Britain

### Colonies and dominions

#### INDIA

British Empire: India. 16:(55)

### Foreign relations

British Empire: Foreign relations. 16:(49)

#### FRANCE

L'accord naval Franco-Italo-Britannique. 73:(3)  
Europe: Disarmament: The new naval pact. 16:(62)

#### ITALY

Europe: Disarmament: The new naval pact. 16:(62)

## GUATEMALA

### Politics and government

Latin America: Isthmian revolts—Guatemala and Panama. 16:(51)

## II

## HAITI

### Description and travel

Salient Haitian facts. 56:(6)

### Politics and government

Haiti marches toward freedom. 76:(4)  
Salient Haitian facts. 56:(6)

## I

## INDIA

### Politics and government

India: Constitution or chaos. 80:(1)  
The unrest on the Indian Frontier. 80:(4)  
Das militärische Problem in Indien als Angelpunkt der indischen Verfassungsreformen. 17:(116)  
From Empire to Dominion: The Indian situation. 15:(13)  
British Empire: India. 16:(55)

## IRAQ

Eight years of British control in Iraq. 7:(29)

## ITALY

Eastward expansion of Italy. 54:(5)

### Foreign relations

Is another war coming soon? II—Clouds above the Adriatic. 110:(14)

#### BALKANS

Italy and the Balkans. 16:(52)

#### FRANCE

The Franco-Italian naval agreement. 69:(3)  
L'accord naval Franco-Italo-Britannique. 73:(3)  
Europe: Disarmament: The new naval pact. 16:(62)

#### GREAT BRITAIN

Europe: Disarmament: The new naval pact. 16:(62)

## J

## JAPAN

### Foreign relations

#### RUSSIA

The Soviet-Japanese fisheries dispute. 16:(56)

**JOFFRE, Marshal Joseph Jacques Cesaïre (1852-1931)**

Marshal Joffre, 1852-1931. 4:(25)

## L

## LATIN AMERICA

The 'Right of Revolution' in Latin America. 67:(7)

## LATVIA

### Description and travel

The Baltic States. 8:(15)

## LITHUANIA

### Description and travel

The Baltic States. 8:(15)

## N

## NICARAGUA

### Canal

The Nicaragua Canal survey. 39:(17)

### History

Guerrilla warfare in Nicaragua. 67:(5)

### Politics and government

Nicaragua: In again, out again. 68:(6)  
The evacuation of Nicaragua. 69:(2)

## O

## OGPU

Soviet Russia: The OGPU. 16:(47)

## OIL

A study of the international petroleum situation. 55:(19)

**P**

**PAN Americanism**

Pan Americanism, its origin and development. 32:(65)

**PANAMA**

**Politics and government**

Latin America: Isthmian revolts—Guatemala and Panama. 16:(51)

**PANAMA Canal**

La Flotte américaine et la défense aéronavale de Panama. 73:(6)

**PATENTS**

Patents. 47:(11)

**PERSHING, General John Joseph (1850- )**

Pershing: Where he stands. 18:(9)

**PHILIPPINE Islands**

The Philippines. 39:(19)

**Politics and government**

A Filipino's point of view. 90:(1)

**POLAND**

**Foreign relations**

**GERMANY**

A visit to the Polish Corridor. 79:(6)  
German minority problem in upper Silesia. 16:(54)

**Politics and government**

German minority problem in upper Silesia. 16 (54)

**Population**

German minority problem in upper Silesia. 16:(54)

**POLISH Corridor**

German minority problem in upper Silesia. 16:(54)

A visit to the Polish Corridor. 79:(6)

**PORTO Rico**

A Roosevelt's big task in Porto Rico. 112:(7)

**R**

**RAILROADS**

**Russia**

Die Turkestanisch-Sibirische Eisenbahn. 17(103)

**RUMANIA**

**Politics and government**

Rumania: The passing of the Bratianus and its implications. 16:(53)

**RUSSIA**

Russian realities. 80:(2)

**Economic conditions**

Russian economic situation. 84:(2)  
The Soviet Five-Year Plan. 15:(12)  
Soviet Russia: Financing the Five-Year Plan. 16:(60)

**Finance**

Soviet Russia: Financing the Five-Year Plan. 16:(60)

**Foreign relations**

Is another war coming soon? IV—The threat of the Bear. 110:(17)

**GERMANY**

Reichswehr and Red Army. 79:(5)  
Cooperation between the German and Soviet armies. 16:(46)

**JAPAN**

The Soviet-Japanese fisheries dispute. 16:(56)

**Politics and government**

Soviet Russia: The OGPU. 16:(47)

**Transportation**

**RAILWAYS**

Die Turkestanisch-Sibirische Eisenbahn. 17:(103)

**S**

**SILESIA**

German minority problem in upper Silesia. 16:(54)

**SPAIN**

**History**

Spain: The year 1930. 16:(50)

**Politics and government**

Spain: The year 1930. 16:(50)

**SUVOROV, General Alexander V. (1730-1800)**

Alexander V. Suvorov, Generalissimo. 44:(18)

**SWITZERLAND**

**Politics and government**

Schweizer Brief. 17:(137)

**U**

**UNITED States**

Are we a peaceful or warlike nation? 112:(4)

**Insular possessions**

Our empire—the haphazard nature of our insular government. 113:(1)


**Politics and government**

Our empire—the haphazard nature of our insular government. 113:(1)

**W**

**WASHINGTON, George (1732-1799)**

Washington: "The Old Fox." 18:(8)



## Section 6

### ABSTRACTS OF FOREIGN-LANGUAGE ARTICLES

#### EXPLANATION

The entries from foreign-language periodicals in the Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles (Section 4) include concise digests of the articles. Section 6, within the limitations of available facilities, translates in full or abstracts a few of the more important of such articles.

#### CONTENTS

	Page
Air superiority? v. Wedel ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	107
Artillery in the offensive in stabilized warfare ( <i>Revue d'Artillerie</i> )	108
Summary of the series: Artillery in the offensive in stabilized warfare ( <i>Revue d'Artillerie</i> )	109
Concerning the protection of defiles and bridgeheads ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	110
Cooperation of other arms with tanks ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	110
French Air Division on 15 July 1918 ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	111
German cavalry and that of the western Allies in August and September. Crisolli ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	114
Great French Fall Maneuvers in Lorraine ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	114
Heavy artillery in moving warfare. Elschner ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	115
Last concentration of the Central Powers ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	115
Modern march technique ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	116
9th Division in 1918. Gamelin & Petibon ( <i>Revue Militaire Française</i> )	117
Orders in peace and war. Fleck ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	118
Out of the workshop of the troops: The conduct of cavalry patrols ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	119
Strategic success; tactical success ( <i>Revue Militaire Française</i> )	120
Studies on the German field service regulations ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	121
Thoughts concerning security on the march ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	121
Thoughts on the Battle of Villers-Cotterêts, July 1918 ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	122
Surveillance of the enemy and strategical surprise. Ritter ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	125
What is assault power? ( <i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i> )	126

v. WEDEL, Oberleutnant, Germany Army.—**Air superiority?** [Luftüberlegenheit?] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 11 May, 11 July 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E. L. Gruber

In tactical problems we often see the statement made that one side or the other has air superiority. What does this mean? In the first place experience has shown that in spite of numerical inferiority of means, it is practically impossible to deny air observation or activity to an enemy. There is no such thing as an absolute air superiority.

With a numerically superior air force it is possible to neutralize or even paralyze hostile aviation for a limited period of time in a specified area, but such effect cannot be maintained indefinitely. A superior pursuit aviation can, for a limited period, gain freedom of action for observation and bombardment aviation, and a weak hostile pursuit aviation will probably be unable to keep our combat aviation from reaching its objective. However, a suitable combination of hostile pursuit aviation and anti-aircraft artillery may successfully ward off an attack by hostile combat aviation.

In map problems the solver should not be expected to draw on his phantasy as to the meaning of air superiority. In each case the exact air situation of the moment should be briefly stated in so far as it affects the solution of the problem. Care should be taken, however, not to introduce air factors just for scenic effect. The air factors as stated in the problem should have a particular bearing on the situation. For example, they should be introduced when it is desired that marches be made at night, that columns leave the roads early, that full use be made of woods in developing for combat, and so on. The influence of the air situation on the operations of larger units is even greater. The following examples are given to show how the air situation may be presented realistically in map problems and similar exercises:

(1) Between 9:00 and 9:15 AM a hostile observation plane flew over the column at 10,000 ft. altitude. Hostile pursuit aviation successfully defended this plane against Blue pursuit aviation.

(2) A hostile observation plane cruised over the area: X-Y-Z about 11:30 AM and 1:30 PM. Shortly thereafter, hostile artillery counter-battered the 1st Battalion, 2d F.A. In attacking this plane at 1:40 PM our Blue pursuit aviation was repulsed by Red pursuit aviation with a loss of two planes.

(3) During the morning hostile bombardment aviation estimated as a squadron made three attacks on the defile at X. Our pursuit aviation was unable to break up the hostile bombing attacks.

(4) Our pursuit aviation, in conjunction with Blue anti-aircraft artillery, was able to control the air over X and Y between 1:00 and 5:00 PM breaking up a hostile bombardment squadron in formation and bringing down 10 hostile planes.

(5) Between 11:00 AM and noon a major air action took place over the area: X-Y-Z between opposing pursuit forces which ended in a decisive Blue victory. During the afternoon only isolated hostile observation planes have ventured over our front lines.

(6) Since 10:00 PM the hostile aviation has been bombing the village A and the bridge at B every 15 minutes. Two of our pursuit planes dispatched to the hostile bombardment airdrome have failed to return.

**Artillerie in the offensive in stabilized warfare.** [L'artillerie dans l'offensive en guerre de position.] (By Colonel Bruchmuller, translated into the French by Major Brunet and Captain Aizier) (*Revue d'Artillerie*, December 1930) Abstracted by Major D.M. Beere

This is the final installment of Colonel Bruchmuller's book. In it is discussed the present day German doctrine on the tactical employment of field artillery under the following subheads:

(1) Dispositions resulting directly from the experience of the World War:

- (i) Measures to insure secrecy
- (ii) Calculations of artillery and ammunition necessary
- (iii) Organization for combat
- (iv) Preparatory measures
- (v) Movement of artillery and ammunition into position
- (vi) Organization of observation system.

(2) Methods resulting from the experience of the World War, but developed since the War:

- (i) Counterbattery
- (ii) Fire on infantry positions
- (iii) Rolling barrage
- (iv) Accompanying artillery
- (v) Displacement of artillery during the attack: preparatory measures; organization for combat; ammunition supply.

(3) Dispositions which are not the direct result of World War experience.

Of particular interest in this installment is the exposition of the German doctrine that in the attack of a deep zone there will be necessary two artillery preparations, the second preparation being made on the rear hostile position after a displacement forward of all artillery. In this the Germans are in accord with the French post-war doctrine. Both the Germans and French are at variance with the doctrine taught at the Command and General Staff School.

**Summary of the series: Artillery in the offensive in stabilized warfare.** [L'artillerie dans l'offensive en guerre de position.] (By Colonel Bruchmuller, translated into the French by Major Brunet and Captain Aizier) (*Revue d'Artillerie*, January to December, 1930—Volume 105, pages 47, 129, 217, 379, 500, 603; Volume 106, pages 36, 163, 275, 425, 489) Abstracted by Major D.M. Beere

A French translation of the 1926 edition of Colonel Bruchmuller's book of the above title with one chapter on general principles taken from an earlier (1921) edition entitled "The German Artillery in the Break-through Battles of the World War."

Colonel Bruchmuller's book is considered the best book on the employment of artillery in the offensive in the World War. The author was the chief of artillery for various offensives on the Eastern Front in the first part of the War. He gradually attained such prominence that he was employed as an army chief of artillery in all the great German offensives in 1918 on the Western Front.

A reader who does not wish to read the whole book, may obtain the meat of Colonel Bruchmuller's ideas by reading the chapters on general principles (Volume 105, pages 47, 129, January and February numbers), the chapter on the Chemin des Dames offensive, 27 May 1918 (Volume 106, page 36, July number), and the two concluding chapters (Volume 106, pages 489, 612, November and December numbers), in which Colonel Bruchmuller sums up the lessons of the War and their present application relative the employment of artillery.

Following is detailed the contents of the various numbers of the *Revue d'Artillerie*:

*January and February, 1930* (Volume 105, pages 47, 129)

General principles.

*March 1930* (Volume 105, page 217)

The attack of the Russian bridgehead at Witonitz, November 1916. Example of an attack with comparatively weak (numerically) artillery.

*April 1930* (Volume 105, page 379)

The attack of the Russian bridgehead at Toboly, April, 1917. Example of a division attack with comparatively strong artillery.

*May 1930* (Volume 105, page 500)

An army corps in the breakthrough in Galicia, July 1917.

*June 1930* (Volume 105, page 603)

An army in the attack on a narrow front. Battle of Riga, September 1917.

*July 1930* (Volume 106, page 36)

An army in the attack on a wide front. Chemin des Dames, May 1918.

*August 1930* (Volume 106, page 163)

An attack by several groups of armies directed by G.H.Q., 21 March 1918.

*September 1930* (Volume 106, page 275)

An attack to reduce a salient, Korytnica Swiniuchy, September 1917.

October 1930 (Volume 106, page 425)

An attack debouching from two defiles. The capture of the Jacobstadt bridgehead, September 1917.

November 1920 (Volume 106, page 489)

Summary of the lessons of the World War relative employment of artillery in the offensive in position warfare. Also discussed is the influence of the improper employment of the artillery with the Seventeenth Army, on the failure of that army's attack on 21 March, 1918.

December 1930 (Volume 106, page 612)

A discussion of the present doctrine of artillery employment and its relation to methods used by Colonel Bruchmuller during the War.

**Concerning the protection of defiles and bridgeheads.** [Über das Offenhalten von Engen.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 25 July 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

Concerning the protection of defiles the principle is usually laid down that a unit should take position in front of the defile so that the enemy will not be able to place effective fire on it and so the larger unit following in rear will have room for development. This often leads small units or security detachments into faulty dispositions. A reinforced infantry brigade or regiment cannot be expected to establish a bridgehead so as to put the crossing or defile beyond hostile artillery fire. If it did so, then its flanks would be in the air so that a lone hostile squadron could sneak in and block the defile. The commander of a unit with the mission of protecting a defile or establishing a bridgehead can only use his available forces to deny to the enemy the most advantageous terrain in front of the defile, i.e., usually the heights which would afford the enemy a good observation of the defile or crossing. To push a bridgehead out to the limit of effective artillery fire is almost always impracticable because the security of the bridgehead is itself jeopardized. The farther the infantry advances, the less artillery support will it get from its artillery on the near bank. Our experiences in the World War showed that a very deep bridgehead is usually unnecessary. The bridgehead will usually be no deeper than the zone which can be covered by friendly artillery fire from the near bank. The bridgeheads established at Albert across the Ancre and at Moreuil across the Avre were of very limited depth and yet were maintained for months. The principle that the depth of the bridgehead should be at least equal to the effective range of the hostile artillery is not a condition *sine qua non*.

**Cooperation of other arms with tanks.** [Zusammenarbeiten der Waffen mit Kampfwagen.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 11, 25 August, 4, 18 September 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

This is really a discussion of the latest ideas in the employment of tanks. Accompanying tanks are of lesser importance. They constitute one of the three or four waves in which formation tanks should be launched on the front of the main attack. The first and second waves penetrate the hostile position. The first wave then engages the hostile reserves while the second wave engages the hostile artillery. The third wave accompanies the infantry and assists it in cleaning up the hostile battle position. The fourth wave is used in the exploitation toward the critical objective. The principal assistance which the infantry can give is to use its heavy infantry weapons against hostile antitank weapons. The principal mission of the artillery is to protect the tanks in the zone of penetration from observed artillery fire. This is done primarily by protection fires (including smoke) laid down on the hostile OPs and battery positions which dominate



the zone of action of the tanks, by neutralizing certain critical areas in which hostile tanks are known or expected to be assembling, and by interdicting the main routes by which hostile reserves must move to intervene in antitank defense. To be able to give this support the artillery must be fully informed as to the plan of attack and probable rate of advance of the tank waves, so that the artillery plan of fire can be organized accordingly. In addition, some artillery should be attached to the leading tanks as accompanying artillery. Horse-drawn artillery is unsuited for this purpose. Either tractor-drawn or self propelled light artillery should be provided. These batteries will probably be used as accompanying guns, primarily against hostile antitank guns. Their support will be very close, principally by methods of direct laying. (11 August 1930)

The second installment (25 August 1930) comments that the cooperation of aviation was not mentioned. The writer suggests the use of attack aviation against the enemy's antitank guns in the zone of advance of the leading tanks. The late Major Sherman of the U.S. Air Corps is quoted as an authority.

An article of 4 September comments on the above extracts. The writer believes that the tendency in the employment of tanks will divorce them absolutely from the infantry and gradually lead to their employment as the main element of a mechanized force which in his opinion is the modern heavy cavalry and should follow the same tactical principles of employment.

This installment (18 September 1930) offers another viewpoint on this controversial subject which has been discussed in previous numbers.


Tanks are the modern combat cavalry. They will not be used apart from but in close cooperation with the other arms particularly infantry and artillery. The heavy cavalry was not used to roam all over the battle field ahead of its infantry. It was held in readiness behind the infantry and at the critical moment was launched either to penetrate the wavering line or to envelope the enemy's center of resistance. Tanks should be used in the same way. They should be held immediately available to intervene at the critical moment in the combat initiated by the other arms. The speed and fire power of tanks is best exploited when used as a part of a mechanized force composed of all arms: infantry in armored trucks, accompanying artillery, etc. Their principal mission is to gain the decision in battle and not to chase ahead of all other elements.

**The French Air Division on 15 July 1918.** [Die französische Luftdivision am 15. Juli 1918.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 25 June 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

In the January 1930 number of *Revue des Forces Aériennes*, Major Langevin discusses the employment of the Air Division with the Center Group of Armies (French Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Armies) holding the front on both sides of Rheims between the Argonne and the Ourcq in July 1918. The air division was composed of two brigades each containing a pursuit group, a day bombardment group and an observation group. The organic four night bombardment groups were detached from the division and kept under control of the group of armies. Since the French expected the coming German attack to strike both the Fourth and Fifth Armies, one air brigade was placed at the disposition of each army. Since these two armies already had together a total of 20 pursuit and 34 observation flights, the addition of the air division made up a very good concentration of air forces on this front. The first difficulty experienced was the lack of air-dromes particularly in the sector of the Fifth Army. The air brigades were therefore concentrated: by the Fourth Army north of St. Dizier; by the Fifth Army south of the line Fere Champenoise—La Ferté Gaucher about 50 to 70 kilometers from the front (See sketch).

The mission of the air division was purely defensive. The pursuit aviation was therefore held in readiness to wrest control of the air from the

German aviation when it appeared. Under this protection the bombardment aviation was to be launched against critical targets in the zone of ground combat. To maintain secrecy the combat aviation therefore remained generally inactive while awaiting the German attack. Each smaller unit was permitted to make a practice flight to become oriented. There was no strategic idea then behind the employment of the air division; its contemplated missions were all in the immediate forward combat



zone. The high command was undoubtedly justified in its preliminary measures for secrecy, but on 12 July, French GHQ was sure that the German preparations were nearing completion and that the attack would be launched on 15 July. The German preparations had already gained such momentum that the attack could hardly have been stopped after 13 July without the greatest confusion and loss of morale. Hence beginning on

13 July the French air divisions should have been used against the heavy movements in the rear area just as the artillery was used in harassing, interdiction and COP fires in the forward area.

On the day of the attack, the pursuit aviation was directed to take the air early and gain superiority. Under this protection the observation aviation went aloft to spot objectives for the bombardment squadrons which were there launched successively on call. In the Fourth Army all the aviation with the Army was placed under centralized control. In the Fifth Army this was not done and as a result cooperation between the organic army aviation and the air brigade was never assured. The great effect of the COP and barrage fires on the front of the Fourth Army was undoubtedly due to the uninterrupted protection which its pursuit aviation gave to the planes on observation and surveillance missions. Battle reconnaissance was also continuous so that the command could take timely measures for defense.

On the front of the Fifth Army matters did not run so smoothly. The battle for air superiority was conducted piece-meal and without centralized control, so the results were negative. The German pursuit aviation practically interdicted all French air reconnaissance and fully protected their attack aviation. At 6:15 AM when the Germans began to penetrate the main line of resistance at several places, the Army commander was compelled to get an accurate picture of the situation by an air reconnaissance in force. The reconnaissance, however, failed because sufficient pursuit aviation to gain superiority was lacking. The continued progress of the German attack, therefore, forced the withdrawal of the artillery on different parts of the front so that the amount of artillery fire became so reduced that the Germans were able to cross the Marne at several places. Both bombing squadrons were, therefore, launched shortly after 10:00 AM against the Marne bridges. Due to a low ceiling, one squadron was unable to find its objectives; the other squadron had better success and succeeded in destroying two bridges. At 11:30 AM the attack was over. The Germans immediately concentrated a large pursuit force to protect the bridges.

Toward 3:00 PM the situation for the Fifth Army became continually more critical. In the meantime the artillery had reached its new positions in rear and with air observation was firing on the German crossings in the Marne. But the losses in French observation planes were very heavy due to the failure of the pursuit aviation to gain superiority. Late in the afternoon when weather conditions improved, a second bombardment attack was made on the Marne bridges. In all 45 tons of bombs were dropped; considerable losses were also inflicted by machine gun fire on troops congested at the crossings.

In conclusion the following criticisms are made of the employment of the French Air Divisions on 15 July 1918: The night bombardment squadron should not have been detached from the air division. On the other hand, an organic observation group is unnecessary for combat aviation and should have been attached to the Army which is better able to control and exploit reconnaissance. Subdividing the air division into two mixed brigades split the available pursuit and bombardment aviation into two fractions neither of which was able to carry out its mission. The bombardment aviation should have been launched at more distant objectives. The first attack on the Marne bridges was justified because at that particular moment a large part of the artillery was out of action during displacement to the rear and its effect could be replaced only by bombardment aviation. Not so the second bombing attack when the artillery was in action again. The bombardment aviation should then have been launched against more distant objectives of strategic importance. Another lesson to be drawn is that the ability to concentrate a large air force in battle, depends in great measure on the available number of airdromes. However, the increased speed and radius of action of modern airplanes has made this problem somewhat easier today.

CRISOLLI, Hauptmann, German Army.—**The German cavalry and that of the western Allies in August and September.** [Die deutsche kavallerie und die der verbündeten Westgegner im August und September 1914.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 11, 18 May 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

A study of the organization, equipment and general principles governing the employment of the German and British cavalry in 1914. (11 May 1930)

This is a continuation from the previous number. The organization and equipment of the French and Belgian cavalry is discussed and a comparison of tactical employment made with the German. The following conclusions are reached: The British had the better organization and equipment but depended too much on fire power in frontal attack to make use of their mobility. The French had the best combat text but did not know how to apply its principles. This was probably due to the fact that the training regulations had been introduced just shortly before the War began. The German cavalry was best mounted and applied sound combat principles but failed to appreciate at the beginning the value and importance of fire power. The Belgian cavalry was greatly handicapped by its deficient training and equipment. However, it made good use of its fire power by fighting delaying actions on foot wherever a suitable obstacle presented itself. The poorest results were accomplished by the French cavalry which during this phase showed exactly how cavalry should *not* be employed. (18 May 1930)

**The great French Fall maneuvers in Lorraine.** [Die grossen französischen Herbstübungen in Lothringen.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 25 September 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

An account of the maneuvers held in Lorraine 3-10 September 1930 along the Rhine-Marne Canal north of Luneville. The Red side was composed of the 11th Division reinforced by a portee regiment, an antiaircraft detachment and aviation. The Blue side was stronger, composed of the 5th Cavalry Division and the 2d (North African) and 13th Divisions reinforced by a light tank regiment, a portee regiment, a tractor-drawn heavy artillery regiment, an antiaircraft detachment and aviation. The maneuvers were suspended each day from noon until 7:00 PM. Sunday, 7 September was a day of rest. One of the principal purposes of the maneuvers was to test the new motorized equipment, and the mobility and combat power of the new cavalry division with its regiment of portee dragons. This motorization has emphasized the importance of good roads and the need of very thorough and strict traffic control in the combat zone. Communications were not always satisfactory, particularly between air and ground. During the approach march expeditious communication between staffs was established only by radio. The new cavalry division is not only more mobile but contains far more fire power. Its mobility was tried out only on the first day. Thereafter, its missions seem to have been such as to test more its fire power and defensive front to be held which in one case exceeded 20 kilometers. Frequent comment was made of the new character of infantry combat on the defensive. The large endowment of automatic weapons enables infantry to cover its withdrawal to a rear position behind a screen of automatic weapons. This will force the attacker to a repetition of attacks without ever coming to a decision. In general, the maneuvers were drawn to test the tactics of covering troops and this in a way explains the large frontages used. Whereas the maneuvers in the Alps were to try out the tactics of covering forces in mountainous regions, those in Lorraine were to try out similar tactics in open and rolling terrain.

ELSCHNER, Oberstleutnant German Army.—**Heavy artillery in moving warfare.** [Schwere Artillerie im Bewegungskrieg.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 4, 11, 18 August 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

An account of the employment of the corps artillery with the German First and Second Army on the front between Sancy and Congy on the Petit and Grand Morin during the battle of the Marne 6-8 September 1914. (4 August 1930)

The employment of the corps artillery of the Guard Corps on the left of the German Second Army in its attack across the St. Gond Marsh in the direction of Fere-Champenoise 6-9 September 1914, is discussed. The outstanding principle illustrated is failure to concentrate the mass of the artillery in support of the decisive attack which the author who was present as a regimental commander ascribes to the fact that the heavy batteries were attached in a routine manner to divisions. (11 August 1930)

In this last instalment the operations of the heavy artillery supporting the successful attacks on Mount Aout and Maily are discussed. Here the principle of concentration of fire was carried out and the infantry was able to take its objectives without fighting. The German Third Army and the left of the Second Army were advancing victoriously at noon 9 September, when Bulow's fateful order for withdrawal was received. The battle impressed everyone with the great power and effect of the 15 cm howitzer and 21 cm mortar, and their ability to follow the divisions anywhere in battle. Time and again batteries marched 10 to 15 miles during the night and were ready to fire early in the morning. (18 August 1930)

**The last concentration of the Central Powers.** [Der letzte Aufmarsch der Mittelmächte.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 18, 25, September, 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

In his recent book, *La grande guerre dans les Balkans* [See page 41, this issue for review], Commandant Larcher tells how "General Franchet d'Esperey hoped to exploit his Balkan victory by a grand march on Budapest, Vienna and Berlin and thus end the war decisively." He failed however to estimate the difficulties of supply from his base at Saloniki. When the Central Powers defeated Serbia in 1915 it took them over four months to restore the single track Serbian RR, over 300 miles in length, so it could carry 12 trains each way per day. When the Bulgarian Army fled in front of the Allied offensive in 1918 the German railway troops systematically destroyed the railway again as they fell back. The Central Powers now concentrated a new army from all available sources, practically the last available reserves. The first unit moved in was the Austrian 9th Division from the Piave front. This division arrived the later part of September 1918, fought at Vranje on 4 October and Nisch on 10 October to stem the retreat of the Bulgarians but to no avail. The victorious Serbian contingent, fighting in its own country and able to live off the land, was able to force this division back to the line: Drina—Save—Danube where the Serbs on 30 September having recovered their homeland, lost desire for further advance. In the meantime the Central Powers concentrated the following units in order to reestablish their south front generally along the line: Drina—Save—Danube. 1-15 October: German Alpine Corps (Western Front), German 219th Division (Ukraine), German 217th Division (Rumania); after 15 October: Austrian 4th and 48th FA Brigades and German 10th Cavalry Division (Italian Front), the Austrian 59th and German 4th Cavalry Divisions (Ukraine) and the German 32d Division (Western Front). These were to be followed after 1 November by the German 15th Division and Hungarian 155th Brigade (Ukraine), and the German 27th and 38th Divisions (Tirol). The movements in November were for political reasons never completed.

In order to renew the operations in the Balkans a new front had to be established along the frontier streams of the Danube monarchies Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. By 25 October the rail concentration had progressed so far that 8 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, and 1 F.A. brigade had arrived. Another cavalry division and F.A. brigade were on the way. Rail schedules were prepared for the movement of additional units. The army command estimated the situation as not unfavorable. The Austrian 9th Division had been driven back by the Serbians but the latter had scattered all over northern Serbia and given up further pursuit. General Franchet d'Esperey had a great strategical plan in mind but its execution was impractical. The mass of his forces were still in the vicinity of Saloniki, over 300 miles from the Danube front. The German engineers had thoroughly destroyed the single-track railroad and main highway connecting Saloniki with Belgrade via Nisch. It was estimated that the Allies would be unable to put this line of communications in operation until April or May 1919, and that the railroad would then have a capacity of only 12 through trains of 200 tons each per day. After deducting trains required for sick and wounded, repair and maintenance material, replacements, etc., this would leave only four trains for subsistence supplies and one for ammunition, or enough for 8 or 10 divisions. Under the circumstances it is not at all strange that each of the Allies pursued their own aims. Great Britain pressed toward Constantinople, Italy was afraid Serbia would get ahead of her to the Adriatic. The interallied Council in Paris saw d'Esperey's situation clearly and therefore limited his mission as follows: "Liberate Serbia, occupy Bulgaria, establish a continuous front along the Danube preparatory to subjugation of Turkey and liberation of Rumania."

On 16 October Emperor Carl of Austria issued his manifesto granting autonomy to all the states composing the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This was the beginning of the end. In rapid succession revolt and secession broke out in every state, and the reigns of government were seized by revolutionary elements. All rail movements stopped. Troop trains still in movement were seized, unloaded where they happened to be, and troops after being disarmed by organized revolutionary elements were dispersed. So we see the unusual situation at the close of the War on the Balkan front: General Franchet d'Esperey's Orient Army was the captive of its own communications through Serbia; the Army of the Central Powers being concentrated along the Danube was the captive of the revolutionary elements of the dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire in its rear.

**Modern march technique.** [Neuzeitliche Marschtechnik.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 4 June 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

Two factors, long-range artillery fire and combat aviation have practically made the daylight march in division column an impossible undertaking. When marches are made at day the formation will be in regimental columns. To reduce losses from the action of hostile combat aviation, these columns will themselves be marched in echelons so that each regimental column will be five or more miles long. When these columns come within range of hostile long-range artillery fire, which under modern conditions may be taken over 15,000 yards, the regimental columns will have to leave the road and adopt an approach march formation. In order not to disclose the formation for attack, this approach will usually have to be undertaken at night and will require from 6 to 8 hours. Troops cannot make night marches for a prolonged period without suffering in morale and combat efficiency. Therefore, the march until contact with the enemy is made will usually have to be made at day in regimental columns to minimize losses due to hostile aviation. The approach march will have to be made at night to reduce losses from artillery fire.



GAMELIN, Général, & PETIBON, Commandant, French Army.—**The 9th Division in 1918.** [La 9e division en 1918.] (*Revue Militaire Française*, January 1931) Abstracted by P.T. Whitley

The authors, General Gamelin and Commandant Petibon were, respectively commander and G-3 of the French 9th Division in 1918. As chief of a French Military Mission to Brazil the former had his staff officer write a series of lectures, on division operations, which were published in that country. The series now beginning in the *Revue Militaire Française* is based upon the Brazilian lectures mentioned.

The 9th Division during 1918 participated in the following operations:

(1) The operations of the end of March in the vicinity of Noyon which brought on the arrival of British supporting troops, a retreat maneuver and the victorious resistance on the assigned position;

(2) The occupation of a defensive sector in Haute-Alsace from April to June in common with an American division where they were called to put in practice a disposition in depth similar to the one which assured, on July 15th, the success of the Fourth Army in Champagne;

(3) The counteroffensive developing from the 17th to the 27th of July in the Fifth Army, at the northwest of Epernay;

(4) And, finally in the great offensive operations which started by forcing the river Vesle at the east of Fismes, the 30th of September, followed by a series of continued actions, carried the troops in exploitation of their successes across the region of the field of Sissonne up to the Meuse to the north of Nezieres which they reached on the morning of the 11th of November.

General Gamelin states that, although these operations are actually 12 years old, they still hold a real interest. It is important not to forget that they were operations of open warfare and that materiel has not had any serious modifications since that time. The only progress of great importance being the adoption of an improved type of automatic rifle which increases considerably the infantry fire power. The development of the use of the automobile will soon open new fields and the coming years will probably bring new improvements so that the beginning of another war will much accelerate progress. Actually the fundamental difference between the 1918 operations and those for which we have to prepare ourselves, are the proportions of troops in respect to the front of strategic development. Another essential difference is that at the beginning of a conflict it may not be possible to dispose of artillery as numerous nor of such large supplies of ammunition as were available during the end of the last campaign and there again, the necessity will come up for artillery maneuver and fire displacement. The problems for our imagination and judgment today are about increased infantry fires, a greater mobility, aviation and whatever surprises science holds in store for us. At any rate we shall always have to maneuver, to fight a retreating action when it is impossible to resist, to fight on the defensive to the limit, and to attack; and, although there may be a complete change of means of war, the experience of a recent past has a value which is not negligible, and above all, we must not forget the moral factors which never change.

General Gamelin proceeds to state that extreme simplicity of instruction and extreme ingenuity among the commanders and general staffs to exploit to the most the modern implements and to make the greatest use of all progress,—such are the phases of the problems. They might seem quite contradictory but we may be able to reconcile them after deep thought.

Then follows the recital, by Commandant Petibon, of the 9th Division at Noyon in March which executed a withdrawal; particularly emphasized, in such a maneuver is the great importance of a counterattack at the psychological moment in order to insure success of the withdrawal.



In March 1918 the 9th Division was at rest in the region of Estrées St. Denis. The division was composed of divisional infantry (3 regiments), the divisional artillery, a squadron of cavalry, a company of engineers, a battalion of Territorials and the service troops, all in excellent shape and fully prepared. On the 21st of March the Germans break the British front and advance rapidly. Orders of "Alert" are immediately telephoned to each cantonment. The probable intentions of the enemy are to advance rapidly and divide the British and French armies, turning towards Amiens on one side and Paris on the other. The intentions of the French are to rapidly constitute a grouping of their forces, to pick up the retreating British Fifth Army, stop the enemy and to seek to establish liaison with the British armies which are still holding ground in front of Amiens and northward. Then follows the complete orders issued by General Gamelin and the various movements executed during the following days; the latter are also shown on a map.

The situation becomes very serious on March 24th. The Germans have advanced taking Caumont and their slightest progress would cut off all lines of retreat. If the French troops are immediately brought back the movement could not escape the observation of the enemy and would be for him a signal of general assault with assured success. To stand still until night time when the enemy would be unable to observe the retreat would be wiser although audacious and very difficult to accomplish. The general of the 9th Division follows the latter course which he considers possible, taking into consideration the stubborn resistance offered by his troops. But the enemy's advance must be checked. He decides to halt the enemy by a counterattack—not to gain territory which he knows he will have to abandon—but to check his advance. The general has practically no troops in the necessary direction but luckily the 89th Regiment (of the 10th Corps reserve, which had been turned over to the 9th Division) arrives at this critical moment to help. This regiment reached them after a forced march because of the critical condition on the front of the 9th Division, and is very tired; but that does not matter. It is immediately engaged in combat. The counterattack develops, Beaugies is taken then abandoned; but the mission is accomplished, and the enemy is temporarily halted. The artillery begins its movements to the rear. The falling night and the momentary check of the enemy permit the necessary movements to be quietly and successfully executed. [To be continued]

FLECK, Generalleutnant German Army.—**Orders in peace and war.** [Befehlserteilung in Krieg und Frieden.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 4 June 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

In our peace time tactical exercises and map problems, things usually run so smoothly, and all orders are so promptly obeyed that we are apt to forget the frictions of war both in the issue and the execution of orders. Anyone who has served on a division or higher staff knows the critical situations which every commander is compelled to meet. He naturally avoids giving too many orders and the troops have confidence in his leadership when they see that few, if any, orders have to be recalled. Probably the best example in this respect is the leadership and judgment of General von Beseler who was charged with the capture of Antwerp in 1914. According to the war plan, General v.Beseler was to have five reserve corps and 50 battalions of heavy artillery for the capture of Antwerp. Instead he had only one reserve corps, a marine brigade, and few battalions of heavy artillery. On 9 September, 1914, German G.H.Q. gave the orders for the beginning of the operations against Antwerp. However, on the next day these orders were revoked and G.H.Q. directed that v.Beseler postpone the operations until the movement of troops from the left to the right wing had been completed. At the same time the Belgians made a strong sortie which was not repulsed until 13 September. G.H.Q. now placed v.Beseler's

force under the control of the Governor General v.d.Goltz who had a different idea concerning the attack on Antwerp. On 14 September, the heavy artillery released by the fall of Maubeuge began to arrive. On 16 September, G.H.Q. sent new instructions concerning the operations at Antwerp and decided to reinforce the German besieging force with another reserve corps. v.d.Goltz now changed v.Beseler's mission, directing him to cover Antwerp while he, v.d.Goltz, took over the other mission of covering the flanks and the line of communications. Vigorous protest was made by v.Beseler against this curtailment of his control and v.d.Goltz gave in. On 23 September, G.H.Q. sent new instructions and informed v.Beseler that instead of a corps he would get only a division as reinforcement. G.H.Q. also believed the attack should be made against the east front whereas v.Beseler had decided as the result of reconnaissance to attack the southeast front with a secondary attack west in the direction of Ghent to cut off the Belgians should they withdraw to join the French. Finally v.Beseler's plan was approved and on 27 September 1914 he launched the attack which resulted in the capture of Antwerp on 9 October. In spite of the vacillation of G.H.Q. and the interference of the Governor General, v.Beseler had the will power to adhere to his plan. He issued no orders which were likely to be recalled. The differences and conflicts he had with higher authority went no farther than his staff. As a result he saved his troops a vast amount of useless exertion. No orders had to be countermanded. In war, the enemy is not the only antagonist whom the commander must combat.

**Out of the workshop of the troops: The conduct of cavalry patrols.**

[Aus der Werkstatt der Truppe: Die Kavallerie-Patrouille.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 4 July 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

This is a very interesting discussion evidently based on practical experience. Patrols sent out by a reconnaissance detachment should consist of 8-12 men to make allowance for messengers and successive scout waves. The patrol operates in three scout waves, one each at morning, noon and evening. Average rate of advance of a reconnaissance detachment is 3 miles per hour; of its patrols  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles per hour; of messengers 6 miles per hour. If a cavalry patrol is sent out 3 miles by an advance guard, a reply can not be expected for  $1\frac{1}{4}$  hours. The distance covered by a reconnaissance detachment in one day is usually 21 to 24 miles. The patrols will however, cover 24 to 30 miles in three bounds, and messengers even more. It is therefore better to hold messengers with the detachment when they return with a report so they may be given proper rest and care. Such messengers will often have covered 15 to 18 miles in 3 hours and should not be sent out again until they have had time to recuperate. Early in the morning they are then sent back as a group to the patrol leader with new orders for the day, if necessary mounted on fresh horses. The instructions to a patrol leader should cover:

- (1) Situations;
- (2) Purpose of the reconnaissance;
- (3) The jumps to be made by the detachment;
- (4) By what route it will advance;
- (5) When the patrol will start;
- (6) From what points the three reports will be made during the day;
- (7) How long the patrol may expect to be out.

The patrol must advance so that it will not fall into an ambush as a whole. Arrived at its destination for the day, the patrol must usually remain in hiding until dark and then settle down for the night in some secluded shelter, taking security measures to prevent a surprise.

LOIZEAU, Colonel French Army.—**Strategic success; tactical success.**  
[Succès stratégiques, succès tactiques.] (*Revue Militaire Française*,  
January 1931) Abstracted by P.T. Whitley

This is the second installment of a series of articles on *Strategic and Tactical Success*, continued from the December issue. It deals with *La Première Bataille de France*, and the conduct of that phase of the war by v.Moltke. The article is prefaced by a reiteration of the von Schlieffen principles of strategy, to which v.Moltke had pledged adherence:

*Main idea:* Only one aim: to destroy the enemy.

*Procedure:* A single will; not partial success but great, decisive, destructive blows.

*Means:* All forces directed toward the supreme object.

It fell to the lot of v.Moltke not only to prepare the war plan for the struggle at home, but to be responsible for its execution.

A—The War Plan.

(1) *The war on two fronts* wherein is explained v.Schlieffen's conception of annihilating first the most powerful enemy acting rapidly to avoid a dangerous intervention.

(2) *War against France*, v.Schlieffen's conception: turn the fortified barrier on the right flank where there is possibility of strategic success. Then there is a description of procedure and means, comparing those of v.Schlieffen's with v.Moltke's and concluding that, the strategic idea being the same, v.Moltke's plan is more concise and simple.

B—The Execution of the Maneuvers for the First Battle (15-25 August).

This describes the battle of the Sambre where the right wing of the German army runs into the French at Charleroi and the British at Mons and cannot prevent the Allies from avoiding an envelopment. There is then a discussion of the battle of the Ardennes and the intended German "victory of Cannae," which was the supreme aim of v.Schlieffen's strategy and which he did not hope to reach so rapidly. v.Moltke is convinced that the first battle gave the expected results—to the north of Verdun a strategic success, to the south a great tactical success, and yet, in spite of the beautiful tactical successes the enemy avoided the decisive maneuver of envelopment. The main object was missed. v.Moltke keeps the fundamental aim but at the same time seeks success in a different direction and is obliged to use to that end a large part of his forces. On the main field the battle is not conducted right, the means are insufficient, so the strategic success was not complete.

C—The March on the Seine.

v.Moltke estimates the situation of the enemy: The French army is badly shaken, the Belgian army in dissolution; the French are in retreat toward Paris. Then he examines the intentions of the enemy who is fighting to gain time and to hold the larger part of the German forces on the French front so as to facilitate a Russian offensive. The line of resistance would be the Marne. The strategic intention is not to give the French army any rest; by a rapid advance towards Paris to prevent the organization of new forces, and to remove from the country the larger part of its means of defense. A hurried advance is instantly necessary. But there is no direction nor coordination, each German army working for itself after its own conception and expecting the solution of its difficulties by its neighbor. v.Moltke is too far from the front and cannot command. This situation shows the weakness of the right wing which obliges v.Moltke to shorten the scope of his actions and virtually renders the First Army incapable of functioning.

D—The Battle of the Marne.

After 3 days' fight v.Moltke sees the danger created on his right wing by the gap opened between the 1st and 2d Armies on the Marne at Chateau-

Thierry, a danger which is more alarming since having lost the initiative of the operations he has no reserves whatever at his disposal. He is obliged to face the eventuality of a retreat. On the 9th Hentsch retreats followed by Kluck. In vain v.Moltke orders the Third Army to stay south of Marne with a view to participating with the Fourth Army in an offensive of the Fifth Army. The divergence of direction, of retreat, the failure of the attempt to pierce the center, the immobility of his left wing, and the absence of reserves convince v.Moltke of the impossibility of success in the west. On the 10th he orders a retreat of the four armies of the right wing and on the eleventh the retreat of the Fifth Army. If v.Moltke had brought toward the decisive wing the major part of his armies in Lorraine, if he had directed and coordinated the movement of his principal grouping, he could perhaps have realized a strategic success before his adversary had the time and the means to prepare a counteroffensive. According to Colonel Loizeau, v.Moltke did not know how to hit the great, powerful and destructive blows which he (Moltke) knew to be the supreme aim of strategy. v.Moltke, according to Ludendorf, was a great military genius but he did not possess enough energy; his temperament was more pacific than combative. v.Moltke, adds Colonel Loizeau, had not received the divine spark which Schlieffen accorded to real strategy. [To be continued]

**Studies on the German field service regulations.** [Studien zur Vorschrift "F.u.G."] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 4 July 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

At the close of the War all nations took steps to put down in print the combat lessons that were learned. Germany was first to publish her field service regulations in 1921. The French followed shortly thereafter. The two are far part in their ideas as to the nature of combat. The French system is highly routinized and is based on the idea of conserving man power by the maximum use of fire power and machines of war. Germany on the other hand being denied many modern means, teaches a method of combat based on the morale of the individual soldier and the personality and initiative of the leaders. If we study the field service regulations of other nations, we can readily see that they are sharply divided into these two schools of combat. Other nations have copied either the German or the French systems without however, considering the underlying political and military reasons which caused France and Germany to follow such different lines. Recently the French completely revised their field service regulations but the underlying basic ideas have not been changed, namely: France has reached the height of her political expansion, her man-power is limited and will not increase because of a diminishing birth rate. Therefore she can afford to let her enemies force the war and remain on the defensive, the key-stone of which is fire power. It would appear, however, that Germany can also examine her combat ideas to see whether they give full consideration to all the modern mechanical means including motor vehicles, tanks, combat aviation, antiaircraft artillery, antitank guns and automatic weapons which have been developed during the past ten years. At the same time certain parts of the present German field service regulations should be classified and the entire matter arranged in a more convenient sequence. In particular more space should be given to the coordination of infantry and artillery fires and the cooperation between these two principal arms, as well as between combat aviation and tanks.

**Thoughts concerning security on the march.** [Gedanken über Marsch-sicherung.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 11, 18 September 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber


Although enormous improvements have been made in fire weapons, we still adhere to the clumsy security measures and formations of the Napoleonic era. Although the field service regulations states the size of the

advance guard should be between one-third and one-sixth the force, the general tendency is to make the advance guards strong, usually about one-third the force. For a division this is far too much. With the information that will usually come in from cavalry and aviation the advance guard can now be much smaller, in some cases not more than one-ninth the force. Under modern conditions, the advance guard commander will seldom have to act on his own decision. When contact is imminent, the division commander will usually be with the advance guard commander and the action which the latter takes will be based on the former's decisions. Problems which show the advance guard commander acting on his own initiative, reflect an unusual or unreal situation.

Security on the march can be greatly simplified by reducing the size of the security detachment and increasing the march distances. Nowadays no march column can stay in the road when within 5-6 miles of the enemy due to the danger of long range artillery fire. Due to the radius of action of aviation and modern cavalry, march conditions practically must cease when units are within a day's march of each other. The advance must then be made in developed columns, on a broader front, from one terrain line to the next, taking advantage of the cover provided by the terrain. Large advance guards are therefore quite unnecessary. With cavalry out in front, the principal purpose of the advance guard is to give warning and protection against inroads by armored cars which may push in either from the front or flank. Security against such inroads is best provided by a number of small successive security combat groups each provided with antitank weapons and the means of quickly throwing up obstacles. Finally it must not be forgotten that the advance guard commander is seldom independent; nearly all his actions are based on the column commander's decisions. With a rear guard commander it is different. He will usually be left on his own initiative and in each situation must decide on what action to take to facilitate the unmolested retirement of the main body.

**Thoughts on the Battle of Villers-Cotterets, July 1918.** [Gedanken sur Schlacht von Villers-Cotterets Juli 1918.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 18 July 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

To us this is known as the battle of Soissons and it is of particular interest because four American divisions participated therein: the 1st, 2d, 4th and 26th Divisions. In driving their Marne salient deeper into French territory, the Germans created a situation which from the viewpoint of



supply was very critical. The daily requirements of the 35 German divisions in the salient extending from west of Soissons to Rheims amounted to 8000 tons, i.e., 20 daily trains, all of which had to pass through the railroad center at Soissons. Due to the scarcity of trucks nearly all these supplies had to

be hauled by animal transport. Since Soissons lay only 12 kilometers behind the nearest part of the front, the German engineers about the middle of June built a switch line to a new supply center at Sermoise, 10 kilometers east of Soissons [See sketch]. Nevertheless the security of these two centers and the supply situation presented a critical problem for the Germans, and for the same reason constituted the critical objective of any Allied attack. When the attack on 15 July failed, German GHQ saw that the position of the German Seventh Army in the Marne salient was critical and began making plans for its evacuation on 22 July. However, General Foch had also seen the critical situation developing for the Germans in the Marne salient, and as early as 14 June began making plans for an attack against the west face with Soissons as the principal objective. The opportunity to launch this attack finally came when the German attack of 15 July failed and Foch gave the orders to attack on 18 July.


No great stretch of imagination is needed to visualize the catastrophe that would have befallen the German divisions in the Marne salient, had the Allied attack, by a quick, powerful blow, succeeded in reaching Soissons on the first day of the attack and Sermoise on the second day. Why this did not happen is due, as we see it in retrospect, to the failure of the French high command to create a mass in the main effort and to launch this main effort in the decisive direction from a suitable assembly position. All of this was possible but apparently not fully appreciated by Foch and his staff. The Germans defended the west face of the salient with 8-10 divisions which were greatly depleted in strength due to battle losses and influenza. The average strength of infantry battalions was about 200 men; of artillery battalions 5-6 pieces. The Allies were able to concentrate: 24 divisions (4 of which were American with twice the strength of French divisions), 3 cavalry divisions, 2133 guns, 493 tanks, and an air force totaling 1143 planes of all types. The French could also have concentrated 135 additional tanks, 45 from the south face of the salient and 90 from the east face, making available a total of 640 tanks.

With the British experience at Cambrai and the French experience at Chemin des Dames in 1917, and the recent German offensive in 1918 still fresh in mind, it would seem that the French high command would have taken past lessons to heart and organized an attack with an outstanding main effort on the critical part of the front. Instead, we see almost a uniform distribution of means along the whole west face of the salient. Divisions all attacked with about the same front—2000 meters. Of the 493 tanks available, the army held out 156 in army reserve, while the corps parcelled out the remaining 337. Each corps and division in turn held out some reserve, so that actually on the day of the attack only 250 to 280 tanks were engaged along the whole front of 50 kilometers in small units. What magnificent and powerful results would have been accomplished on July 18 had the French high command concentrated a mass of 640 tanks on the critical part of the front, launching them in several waves in the decisive direction? All German divisions reported that their counterattacks made no headway due to the hostile tanks. On the other hand, the German 42d Division reported that the enemy attack was unable to make much headway east of Chaudun although supported by 6 (!) tanks. When the attack was held up at this critical point, the army commander decided to take one battalion of tanks in army reserve and commit it to action. Instead of assigning the battalion to one corps, he split it between two corps and added the proviso that these tanks were not to be used until the tanks of the front line divisions were stopped. Instead of giving impetus to the attack while it was going by a concentrated use of tanks, he split the tanks between two corps, and would not let them be used until the attack was checked.

The success of the battle depended principally upon three factors: (1) surprise; (2) concentration of means in the decisive attack; (3) proper use of terrain in launching the main attack toward the critical objective. The



great forest area of Villers-Cotterêts offered suitable cover for secretly assembling a large force including tanks. The large number of tanks available made it possible to dispense with an artillery preparation. If we look at the map, the first thing that will strike the eye is the long, flat ridge which extends from the forest of Villers-Cotterêts via Chaudun to Soissons. South of Soissons this ridge is cut by the valley of the Crise, east of which the ridge again continues eastward passing south of Sermeuse. Except for the valley of the Crise, this ridge line is unbroken by woods or deep draws. The plateau is gently rolling, without numerous villages, and at the time of the battle was generally covered with ripe grain, awaiting harvest, and offering excellent cover for the low light Renault tank. Here is where the



tanks should have been massed. The army should have been given the mission to cut off and destroy the German forces in the salient. To accomplish this the first objective should have been Soissons and Sermeuse. After that the attack should have been pressed up the Vesle toward Rheims.

Based on these considerations, let us plan the battle as French GHQ should have done in July 1918. The terrain, decisive objective and direction of attack, and the available assembly positions, indicate that the main attack must be launched on the front: Longpont—St. Pierre Aigle, inclusive. Since this front is 10 kilometers, we will allow five divisions in the first



line. To reach the objective—Sermoise, these divisions will not only need impulse from the rear but should also have reserves for flank protection. We will therefore, back them up with 4 divisions and 3 cavalry divisions in reserve making a total of 9 divisions and 3 cavalry divisions in our main effort. This we will support with the mass of our tanks, artillery and combat aviation. We have remaining there 15 divisions. Of this number we will use four divisions in our north wing which will reach north of the Aisne, the divisions attacking on a front of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 kilometers each. In rear of the south flank of this group we will have one division in second line so that it can be thrown in to assist the main attack. Two divisions will be held in army reserve, leaving eight divisions for our south wing. Allowing on an average of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  kilometer front for each of these divisions, will enable us to extend the south flank of the attack to Dammard. We have thus fixed a front of 32-35 kilometers for our attack instead of 50 kilometers as did French GHQ in 1918. But most important of all, we have created an overwhelming mass on a front of 10 kilometers to be launched in a main effort toward Sermoise against which the Germans can oppose only three weak divisions.

But what about our tanks? Let us also mass them in the main attack and in doing so let us keep in mind the lessons we learned from the battle of Cambrai [See RCMW No. 37, page 61, giving summary of article from *Militär-Wochenblatt*, No. 24/114, 25 December 1929.] We have three missions to be executed by our tanks: (1) penetrate the hostile position and assist the infantry in cleaning up; (2) engage the hostile artillery which is in the zone of attack; and (3) break through and seize the distant objective. We must therefore, have several tank waves, each wave having its specific mission. On 18 July, our first two waves will be leading tanks which penetrate the hostile position. The first wave engages the hostile artillery that has not been neutralized, our second wave pushes on to the valley of the Crise to engage any reserves that may be in the zone of action. The third wave advances with the infantry as accompanying tanks and assists it in cleaning up the position. Our fourth wave follows as reserve, and when the breakthrough has been accomplished, is launched with the cavalry and attached artillery on Sermoise. The tank maneuver is protected by the aviation which is also used to transmit orders.

On 18 July the French could have put about 125 tanks in each of the four waves. Each wave would have been formed in width and depth to cover the front of the main attack which was 10 kilometers. Had they used also the tanks available from the south and east face of the Marne salient, a fifth wave for exploitation could have been formed. This mass of tanks supporting the main effort, all directed toward the critical objectives Sermoise and Soissons, would have sealed the fate of the German Seventh Army. But luckily for the Germans, the tank was a new weapon for the French and the tactical principles governing its employment in mass were not understood. The battle of 18 July 1918 emphasized also the importance of the problem of supply on the operations. As for the tank, it has taken us ten years to work out its proper tactical employment. But this is the usual fate of every new weapon.

**RITTER, Hauptmann German Army.—Surveillance of the enemy and strategic surprise.** [Feindüberwachung und operative Überraschung.] (*Militär-Wochenblatt*, 4 September 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

In connection with the article "Thoughts on the Battle of Villers-Cotterêts (Soissons) July 1918" the statement was made that the French surprised the German Seventh (Ninth) Army in this counteroffensive. Captain Ritter who was on the General Staff of the German Seventh Army denies this and as his proof cites the actual entries made beginning 1 July 1918, in the army war diary with the keeping of which he was charged.

What is interesting to us is the nature of these entries from a G-2 viewpoint because they show in what form the vital information of strategical import was recorded and sent on to GHQ.

- 1 July. Distant air reconnaissance has determined heavy traffic in rear of the hostile front between the Aisne and the Marne. Heavy rail and truck movements have been observed between Paris and the area: Villers-Cotterêts—Compiègne. The enemy has increased his artillery on this front considerably. In the sector of the XXXIX Reserve Corps 117 new hostile battery positions have been identified within the past four days.
- 2 July. Distant air reconnaissance again determined heavy movement in the sector between the Ourcq and the Marne.
- 4 July. The XIII Corps reports indications of increased artillery adjustments on its front.
- 5 July. Note: on this day the VII, XXXIX Reserve and XIII Corps passed to the newly organized Ninth Army.
- 7 July. Air reconnaissance has determined heavy rail movements on the rail net: Crepy en Valois—Villers Cotterêts—Mareuil—Crouy—Meaux—La Ferte sous Jouarre. All railroad stations are crowded with trains and numerous truck columns are in their vicinity.
- 8 July. Air reconnaissance has determined heavy detrainments at Crepy en Valois, Nanteuil de Haudouin, Ormoy-Villers, and Vaumoise. Heavy truck traffic is radiating from these stations.
- 9 July. A reliable secret agent reports that a hostile major offensive is to be launched on 14 July between the Aisne and the Marne, and also between Rheims and the Marne.
- 10 July. In reply to GHQ query at what places on the army front there were indications of a methodical preparation for attack by the enemy, Army headquarters replied that this was particularly noticeable between the Ourcq and the Marne.
- 11 July. A deserter has just reported heavy troop concentrations in the Forest of Villers-Cotterêts and predicted an early attack between the Aisne and the Marne. In reply to query from the Group of Armies, Army headquarters reported that while the information still lacked precise confirmation, nevertheless the army was figuring on the possibility of a hostile major counter-offensive between the Aisne and the Marne.
- 15 July. The enemy has maintained an effective air counterreconnaissance barrage on the west face of the Marne salient all day.

**What is assault power?** [Was ist Stoszkraft?] (*Militär-Woche-blatt*, 18, 25 May 1930) Abstracted by Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Gruber

After quoting from Colonel Fuller's latest book on mechanization that our present armies are still infantry armies based on the means of combat that existed 70 years ago, the author proposes the question indicated by the title of this article. He then traces historically the elements of shock action in different periods and shows how the bayonet assault and echelon tactics of Frederick the Great succumbed to the fire tactics of the French; how the column tactics of Napoleon succumbed to the fire tactics of the German needle gun; and how the French at Gravelotte were able to oppose successfully the shock tactics of the German infantry by rifle and artillery fire.

The advent of the machine gun and heavy artillery pushed the rifleman with his bayonet still further in the background. The Russo-Japanese War showed that the assault power of infantry lay in its machine guns, and that of the division in the combined fire power of its artillery and machine guns. But these were found inadequate in the World War in which the technical protection against artillery and machine gun fire were so highly developed

*Periodical Literature—Translated Articles*

as to practically neutralize the effect of fire power. This led to the development of the tank which is gradually leading to mechanization. Today an army's assault power lies in its tanks, its combat aviation and its mechanized artillery. This assault power will be changing from period to period depending upon the progress made in technique and materiel. First it was the bayonet, then the rifle, which was succeeded by the machine gun and the artillery. All of these still have their value in the defense, but in the attack the power of the assault lies in its tanks, combat aviation and mechanized artillery.